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The household forms an important decision and production unit in the economy. To
what extent household characteristics are important for individual choices and economic
outcomes is the overall question of this thesis. The most weight is given to household
labor supply decisions in the presence of children - and how children aﬀect the further
careers of husband and wife, measured by wages. I also study how the relative economic
interests of husband and wife are represented in the political system through the eﬀect of
relative income on individual voting behavior.
The ﬁrst chapter studies how men and women’s labor supply depend on own and
spouse wage, how labor supply changes with children - and how the importance of relative
wages in the household changes with children. The second chapter studies how having
children aﬀects wages - and thereby the role of children in changing the relative wages
of men and women. The third chapter addresses the endogeneity of the child-decision
and estimates the impact of an exogenous distribution of children (using miscarriage as
a proxy) on fertility and labor market outcomes for women. The fourth chapter studies
which income in the household best predicts individual voting behavior - own income or
spouse income.
Chapter 2: Children, labor supply and wage elasticities
Having children causes a radical change in the household’s need for home production. It
alters the degree of substitutability between home and market hours - and the substi-
tutability between spouses’ hours at home and in the market.
Mincer (1962) was the ﬁrst to study female labor force participation with the household
as the appropriate decision unit, recognizing that women substitute market hours for
home production, not just leisure. With men increasingly taking share in the caring for
children, having children also potentially changes the substitutability of men’s market
hours to home hours. In addition, having children may increase the substitutability of
spouses’ market hours. With the basic insight of Becker (1981), spouses can specialize in
diﬀerent tasks and thereby increase the gains to marriage.
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In this paper we investigate the respective roles of children and relative wages in de-
termining household specialization on Norwegian administrative data and wage statistics
from 1997-2007. More speciﬁcally, we estimate the eﬀect of having children on men and
women’s working hours, as well as the eﬀect of wages on working hours - both their own
and their spouse’s (known as own and cross wage elasticities). In addition, we estimate
how having children aﬀects the own and cross wage elasticities, by including the inter-
action between wages and children. This has not been estimated before in the empirical
literature, and here lies the main contribution of this paper.
Our results show that the presence of children has the largest average eﬀects for female
labor supply; both for labor force participation and for working hours. The increase
in home production also raises women’s responsiveness to wage changes; the own wage
elasticities become more positive while the cross wage elasticities become more negative.
This is consistent with the substitution eﬀect between home and market hours becoming
stronger with children. For men, the presence of children has less impact both on the
levels and on the wage responsiveness of labor force participation and working hours.
There is however an average negative eﬀect on men’s working hours, and their cross wage
elasticity is more negative after children. This indicates that the presence of children
increases the substitutability of spouses’ market work in the household, and underlines
the importance of children also for men’s labor supply.
Chapter 3: Parenthood wage penalties in a double income society
Having children aﬀects labor supply negatively, as we saw in the previous chapter. The
negative eﬀect on labor supply may in turn lead to lower wages, for instance through the
eﬀect it has on human capital (Mincer and Polachek, 1974). Internationally, there is a
large literature documenting a negative association between having children and women’s
wages, and a smaller literature documenting a positive association between having children
and wages for men. The Norwegian context is diﬀerent in many respects, with high female
labor force participation, one of the narrowest gender wage gaps in the OECD countries,
and a generous welfare system with various policies securing child care, paid parental
leave and job protection. We show that in this context, the motherhood penalties are still
signiﬁcant, but we also ﬁnd that men experience a negative private cost from fatherhood.
We use data from oﬃcial Norwegian registries on wages and income, covering about
70% of the working population in the years from 1997 to 2007.Using individual ﬁxed
eﬀects estimation on a sample of individuals who are observed to have at least one child
by 2008, we ﬁnd a substantial wage penalty for women - ranging from 1.7% for women
with lower secondary education to 4.7% for women with higher education, higher degree.
Contrary to most other studies, we ﬁnd negative (though comparatively small) eﬀects
of having children on men’s wages - around 0.4% to 0.5%. This is consistent with an
increasing role of fathers as care-givers.
2
Introduction
The estimated penalty for women is only partly explained when we include measures
of experience, parental leave, working part time and sector of employment. For men on
the other hand, variation in parental leave explains half of the fatherhood wage penalty.
We ﬁnd the largest penalties to parenthood in the private sector, for full time workers,
and for those who take the longest leave.
Chapter 4: Random kids - causal inferences from using miscar-
riage as a natural experiment
We saw in the previous chapters that having children has large impacts on labor market
outcomes. Children are not exogenous to labor market outcomes, however. Whether to
have children and when to have them are decisions the household make, and may be inﬂu-
enced by economic circumstances, like career opportunities. Having children is therefore
inﬂuenced by labor market outcomes - which in turn are inﬂuenced by having children.
The two directions of causality is also reﬂected in diﬀerent research traditions; labor
economists treat children as an independent variable inﬂuencing labor market outcomes,
while demographers treat labor market outcomes as the independent variable inﬂuencing
fertility choices.
Miscarriage randomly prevents the birth of a child. It thus provides unique variation
in whether a woman has a child at the planned point in time which we exploit to estimate
the causal impact of an exogenous distribution of children on labor market outcomes. The
potential impact of economic factors on who becomes parents and at what time is equal
for the group that miscarries and the group that gives birth. The only diﬀerence between
the groups is that some have children while some do not in the planned birth-year. This
will ensure the causal interpretation of the eﬀect going from having children to labor
market outcomes.
We estimate the eﬀect of miscarriage on ﬁve diﬀerent family outcomes; whether an
individual has children at all, timing of birth, number of children, spacing of siblings and
age of youngest child. Further, we estimate the eﬀect of miscarriage on four diﬀerent labor
market outcomes; earnings, labor market participation, weekly hours and hourly wages.
We interpret the eﬀect of miscarriage on labor market outcomes as the eﬀect of randomly
distributing children for women who plan to have children at the same time.
Having a miscarriage has what seems like permanent consequences for fertility out-
comes. 1 out of 5 having a miscarriage still has no children ﬁve years later. The number for
those who miscarry at second birth are approximately the same. Furthermore, those who
miscarry also have fewer children and for those that have more than one child, the spac-
ing between their children is shorter than for others. Despite permanent consequences for
fertility it seems to be very few such long term consequences for labor-market outcomes.
Whereas employment and sickness absence are dramatically aﬀected during pregnancies
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and the ﬁrst one or two years after birth, those who miscarry and those who give birth
are almost identical 5 years later, regardless of whether we compare wages, earnings,
employment, sickness absence or social insurance dependency.
Chapter 5: How husbands and wives vote
In this chapter, I study to what extent the relative incomes in a household is represented in
the political system through the eﬀect that the relative incomes has on individual voting
behavior.
In basic models in political economy, like the Median-voter model, individual polit-
ical preferences are a function of individual incomes (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). The
basic insight is that redistribution is less beneﬁcial for high-income earners who there-
fore demand lower levels of redistribution. These models abstract from the fact that
most individuals are part of a household, and that this household will inﬂuence your eco-
nomic position and/or your political views. Most major surveys on voting behavior (like
the World Values Survey, the Eurobarometer, American National Election Studies and
a number of other election studies) take the other extreme and only ask for household
income.
I use the National Child Development Study (NCDS) and the British Cohort Study
(BCS) which are detailed survey data on two British cohorts born in 1958 and 1970
to study the relative importance of own versus spouse income in determining political
preferences. The data are unique for my purpose, as it is the only data to my knowledge
that contain both individual income and spouse income in combination with individual
voting behavior. In addition, the data have a panel structure, which enables me to
investigate the role of income over the life-cycle. The empirical method I use is OLS
regression to estimate the quantitative importance of own versus household income.
I show that predictions of voting behavior based on individual income and household
income give very diﬀerent results, especially for women who are not the main earners of
the family. I ﬁnd that individual income is only important for women if their income is
fairly representative of the household - if they work full-time or earn a higher income than
their husband. Otherwise, their husband’s income has a much larger impact. Men always
vote according to individual income. Even in the cases where he earns less than his wife,
his wife’s income has no signiﬁcant impact on his voting behavior. On average, household
income is therefore the best predictor of both men and women’s voting behavior, but this
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Children, labor supply and wage
elasticities
Sara Cools1 Marte Strøm2
Abstract Having children causes a radical change in the household’s need for home
production. It alters the degree of substitutability between home and market hours - and
the substitutability between spouses’ hours at home and in the market. We ﬁnd that,
conditional on being employed, the level of both men and women’s weekly working hours
is reduced after having children; women’s by 12% and men’s by 1.5%. Women’s labor
force participation is reduced by 10% while men’s participation increases with 0.5%. We
also ﬁnd that having children increases the substitutability of market and home hours, as
reﬂected in a more positive own wage elasticity, and the substitutability between spouse’s
market work, as reﬂected in a more negative cross wage elasticity. The change in the
own wage elasticity is more marked for women than for men, in line with the assumption
that home and market hours are more of a substitute for women. The marked change
in both men and women’s cross wage elasticity shows, however, that spouses’ hours are
substitutes to a larger extent after having children.
This paper is part of the research activities at the center of Equality, Social Organization, and Performance
(ESOP) at the Department of Economics at the University of Oslo. ESOP is supported by the Research
Council of Norway.
1Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo. sara.cools@econ.uio.no
2Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo. marte.strom@econ.uio.no
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2.1 Introduction
The causal relationship between having children, the parents’ wages and household spe-
cialization is not clear cut. One the one hand, children increase the scope for specialization
within the household, and wages form economic incentives inﬂuencing the decision on how
to specialize. On the other hand, the degree of specialization will inﬂuence relative pro-
ductivity both in the market, as is reﬂected in wages, and at home. As stated in Lundberg
and Rose (1999), “[for] any couple, the initial gains to specialization will be reinforced
over time as husband and wife acquire skills speciﬁc to the market or domestic sectors”.
In this paper we investigate the respective roles of children and relative wages in
determining household specialization. More speciﬁcally, we estimate the eﬀect of having
children on men and women’s working hours, as well as the eﬀect of wages on working
hours - both their own and their spouse’s (known as own and cross wage elasticities).
In addition, we estimate how the partial response to either varies with the other, that
is, how the response in working hours to having children varies with an individual’s own
wage rate and with that of their spouse. Conversely, we estimate how having children
aﬀects the own and cross wage elasticities.
The eﬀect of the interaction between wages and children on labor supply has not been
estimated before in the empirical literature, and here lies the main contribution of this
paper. Having children constitutes probably the largest increase in home production in
the household. If home production is a closer substitute to women’s market work (for
economic, social or cultural reasons), the substitution eﬀect [of what? wage increases?]
should be stronger for women after they have children. The extent to which men’s wage
elasticities change in the same way will reﬂect whether child care is also a close substitute
to men’s market work. The changes in wage elasticities for the husband and wife will in
addition reﬂect to what extent household labor supply depend on the relative wages of
the spouses after children.
The paper relates to two somewhat separate strands in the empirical literature on
family and female labor force participation. First, there is a literature on individual wage
elasticities within the household, estimating own and cross wage elasticities of men and
women (Blundell et al., 1998; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; Devereux, 2004; Blau and
Kahn, 2007). Although this tradition recognizes the importance of home production for
(especially) female labor supply elasticities, children are often treated as exogenous and
used as control variables. Secondly, there is a literature on how children aﬀect labor supply
in itself, taking into account the endogeneity of the childbearing decision (see Rosenzweig
and Wolpin (1980) and Angrist and Evans (1998) for important contributions). In both
strands of the literature, women’s labor supply is found to be more responsive than men’s,
both to having children and to own and spouse’s wage.
We use a panel on wage and working hours for Norwegian households for the years
from 1997 to 2007. We rely on diﬀerent estimation methods in order to deal with issues
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of endogeneity, both of having children and of wages, when estimating the determinants
of individual labor supply.
To identify the wage elasticities we instrument individual wages, using average hourly
wages in diﬀerent groups based on gender, education, cohort and region of residence.
Instrumenting wages in this way reduces measurement error and cuts the reverse causal
link going from labor supply to hourly wage. To identify the change in behavior before
and after the household has children, we exploit the panel structure of the data, including
individual ﬁxed eﬀects to use the within-individual variation in labor supply.3 In addition,
we restrict the sample to households we observe to have children during the time window,
in order to avoid problems of time-variant heterogeneity that aﬀects both hours and the
probability of having children.
Our results show that the presence of children has the largest average eﬀects for female
labor supply; both for labor force participation and for working hours. The increase in
home production also increases women’s responsiveness to wage changes; the own wage
elasticities become more positive while the cross wage elasticities become more negative.
This is consistent with the substitution eﬀect between home and market hours becoming
stronger with children. For men, the presence of children has less impact both on the
levels and on the wage responsiveness of labor force participation and working hours.
There is however an average negative eﬀect on men’s working hours, and their cross wage
elasticity is more negative after children. This indicates that the presence of children
increases the substitutability of spouses’ market work in the household, and underlines
the importance of children also for men’s labor supply.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 brieﬂy discusses the literature
on children, female labor supply and household specialization. Section 2.3 presents our
empirical strategy. In Section 3.4 we give a description of our data. In Section 2.5
we present the results of our estimations of the eﬀect of children on labor supply and
wage elasticities in the household. Section 2.6 summarizes the results, and Section 3.8
concludes.
2.2 The literature on children and household special-
ization
Jacob Mincer in his seminal paper was the ﬁrst to study empirically female labor force
participation with the household as the appropriate decision unit (Mincer, 1962). In the
same paper he abandoned the usual theory of seeing workers as substituting only between
market work and leisure. He recognized that non-market activity includes also household
3Labor supply is estimated separately for men and women, with individual ﬁxed eﬀects. The individual
is however part of the same household over the whole time window and the individual ﬁxed eﬀect therefore
captures ﬁxed characteristics of the husband as well.
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work and child care. Individual market wages and household productivities will determine
the allocation of labor between the market and the non-market activities. He found larger
own wage elasticities for women and explained this by the diﬀerence between husband
and wife in non-market activities; household production is a more substitutable activity
for market work than leisure.
The substitution of labor in the household between market and home production
depending on the spouses’ relative productivities at both activities is also the basis of the
unitary model of household behavior (Becker, 1974, 1981)4. Since consumption is shared,
it allows the household to make use of their comparative advantages at market and at
home production.
Seeing women as substituting between market and home production in addition to
leisure has proved an inﬂuential and fruitful way to analyze female labor supply behavior
over time. Growth in female labor supply over time has been interpreted in light of
the relative importance of income and substitution eﬀects in diﬀerent time periods (see
e.g. Goldin (2006)). Blau and Kahn (2007) compare men and women’s wage elasticities
over the period 1980-2000 and ﬁnd a strong decrease in female wage elasticities over
the period. Their suggested reason is that the substitution eﬀect is weaker with lower
levels of home production. With an increasing trend that men and women share more in
home production, they hypothesize that men and women’s wage elasticities will continue
converging.
In general, women’s labor supply is found to be much more wage elastic than men’s.
For both men and women, own wage elasticities are higher than cross wage elasticities.
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) report a median own wage labor supply elasticity, based
on 18-20 estimates, of 0.08 for married men and 0.78 for married women. Women’s cross
wage elasticity is also found to be much higher than men’s (Kooreman and Kapteyn, 1986;
Killingsworth, 1984; Devereux, 2004), but Blau and Kahn (2007) ﬁnd that it declined over
the last decades of the 20th century, thus approaching men’s in size.
(Blau and Kahn, 2007) report higher elasticities for mothers than for non-mothers.
Using a simultaneous equations approach, Lundberg (1988) ﬁnds no interaction in spouses’
labor supply in households without children, but does ﬁnd interaction in work hours and
a negative cross earnings eﬀect in households with children. Dalmia and Sicilian (2008)
ﬁnd positive assortative matching on age, education, income and hours worked for couples
without children, but negative assortative matching on income and hours worked in older
marriages and marriages with children. They interpret this as a sign of specialization
when a couple has children. However, as these analyses are cross sectional, the larger
wage elasticities in families with children may at least partly be due to selection of families
with more interrelated labor supply into parenthood.
4Chiappori (1988) has the most general representation of household decision making, only imposing
Pareto eﬃciency
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There is to our knowledge no study of the change in elasticities within families moving
from being a couple to having children. If wage elasticities are diﬀerent at diﬀerent stages
in the life cycle, this is in accordance with the insights of Heckman and Macurdy (1980)
on the non-substitutability of non-market time at two diﬀerent ages (a result that did not
ﬁnd support in their empirical analysis).
There is an extensive literature documenting a negative eﬀect on women’s labor supply
of having children. The earlier literature is reviewed in Browning (1992), later literature
includes for instance Angrist and Evans (1998); Lundberg and Rose (2000). There is
some evidence of a positive eﬀect on men’s labor supply (Pencavel, 1986; Lundberg and
Rose, 2002; Simonsen and Skipper, 2008). Together, they indicate that some degree of
specialization takes place within the average household.
Some studies on the labor supply eﬀect of children link spouses’ labor supply, among
others Angrist and Evans (1998); Lundberg and Rose (2002). Angrist and Evans (1998)
look at the eﬀect on men and women’s labor supply by educational level of the wife,
but ﬁnd no signiﬁcant heterogeneity. Lundberg and Rose (2002) look at the eﬀect of
children on men’s hours if the wife is continuously employed or not, and ﬁnd his hours are
positively aﬀected if she has a career break while his hours are negatively aﬀected if the
wife is continuously employed. These studies do not however include wages as explanatory
variables in their model.
2.3 Estimation
In this paper, we both want to estimate the eﬀect of children on labor supply, own and
cross wage elasticities and the interaction between the two. Both wages and having
children are potentially endogenous regressors.
To identify the eﬀect of having children on household labor supply, we avoid the
problem of selection into parenthood by restricting our sample to those couples who
are observed to have a child together.5 We also include individual ﬁxed eﬀects in some
speciﬁcations to control for time-invariant heterogeneity that both inﬂuences the level of
hours and the timing of children.
To identify the wage elasticities, we instrument wages with the mean wage of individ-
uals within the same educational group, cohort, gender, region and year. By doing this,
we exploit the changes in an individual’s wage that is unrelated to the individual’s own
labor supply history or unobserved characteristics.
The diﬀerent methods are discussed more thoroughly below.
5Cools and Strøm (2012) show that men who become fathers are on a steeper wage path than men
who do not become fathers.
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2.3.1 Empirical speciﬁcation
Our reduced form model of an individual’s labor supply is
LSit = β lnwit + βs lnw
s
it + βI ln Iit + πChild
+ ρChild× lnwit + ρsChild× lnwsit + ρIChild× ln Iit (1)
+ γXit + ηi + νt + it
We estimate the model using linear estimation methods. LSit is the measure of indi-
vidual i’s labor supply in year t - either the natural logarithm of weekly working hours
or a dummy indicating labor force participation. w is the individual’s hourly wage, ws
is the hourly wage of the spouse and I is the household’s capital income. β is our esti-
mate of own wage elasticity before children, βs our estimate of cross wage elasticity before
children.
Child is an indicator variable for whether the couple has had their ﬁrst child, and π is
our estimated coeﬃcient of the average eﬀect of having children. Our estimated change
in own and cross wage elasticities after children is therefore ρ and ρs respectively.
X is a vector of age dummies (each spanning three years) for both parents, and
indicator variables for expecting a ﬁrst child or having a ﬁrst child younger than one
year. We control for being pregnant with and having a baby because we are interested in
the change in hours and wage elasticities from normal labor market behavior before the
couple becomes parents to the labor market behavior after the child has turned one year.
6
η are individual ﬁxed eﬀects, and ν are year ﬁxed eﬀects.  is the error term, clustered
at the individual level.7
2.3.2 Constructing households
Linking the parents of a child to each other is crucial for the analysis in this paper. Only
marital status can be observed over the whole time window that we use, cohabitation
status is available only from 2002. In Norway, there are equally many children born to
cohabiting parents as to married parents.8
6We wish to weed out unusual labor market behavior during these periods. Only to mention some:
Women are more sick during pregnancy, and the Norwegian parental leave system provides incentives for
both parents to seek employment when expecting a child. During the ﬁrst year after birth, one parent
can stay at home with full wage compensation - and some kindergartens only accept children that are
one year or older.
7Ideally, standard errors would be clustered at the IV group of both spouses, in addition to at the
individual/household level. This is not feasible.
8In 2007 the share born to married parents was 45%. 11% were born to single mothers, and
the remaining 44% to cohabiting parents. The total number of live births was 58459. Source:
http://statbank.ssb.no/statistikkbanken/
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Because we do not want to limit our sample to married couples only, we use the
linking of children to their parents in order to identify what we will call “spouses” in this
paper: They are parents who have their ﬁrst child together. In addition, neither parent is
registered as being a single parent the year the child is born, and neither parent already
has a child from a previous relationship.
We use observations on these parents from four years before their ﬁrst child is born
until the ﬁrst child is four years old. The exact choice of four years is the result of the
trade-oﬀ between having many observations and the probability of capturing a couple
who is actually living together, both before and after the child is born.
This way of constructing households matters for the external validity of our estimated
wage elasticities for couples without children. Our estimates may be understood as esti-
mates of wage elasticities in the period just before having children.
2.3.3 Individual ﬁxed eﬀects
Since we have panel data, we have the possibility to correct for time-invariant hetero-
geneity by including individual ﬁxed eﬀects in the estimations. Since the individuals in
our sample by construction belong to the same household over the whole time window,
individual ﬁxed eﬀects will also capture ﬁxed eﬀects of the spouse and household. Es-
timating the relationship in Equation 1 may suﬀer from omitted variables bias if there
are unobserved characteristics of the household that both determine hours, when to have
children and the mean wage of the IV group that the individual belongs to. Examples
of omitted variables that would be of particular importance here are tastes for work and
views on gender roles. If these unobserved characteristics are time-invariant, we control
for them by including individual ﬁxed eﬀects.
There are still potential problems with time-variant heterogeneity. If unobserved
characteristics change over the life cycle and the change is correlated with changes in
labor supply and with changes in wages (or with changes in the mean wage of the IV
group when we use instrumental variables), we cannot fully control for this. An example
is that if households with more diverging wages (measured by their own wage or by
their IV group wage) change their views on gender roles more than households with less
divergence in wages, the resulting labor sharing in the household will seem dependent on
the relative wages when it is really dependent on the views on gender roles.
Including individual ﬁxed eﬀects means that we only use the variation within the
diﬀerent observations for the same individual. The wage elasticities will be identiﬁed by
those individuals who change the relevant labor supply behavior during the sample period.
49% of our the women and 40% of the men in our Wage statistic sample change working
hours - and 21% of the women and 8% of the men in the labor force participation sample
change participation status - at least once over the period.
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Hourly wages are generally prone to measurement error, and our data are no exception.
Measurement error creates an attenuation bias in the estimate, which is even larger in a
within-estimator (Solon, 1985; Griliches and Hausman, 1986). By instrumenting wages,
we also correct for measurement error.
2.3.4 Instrumenting wages
To accommodate the problem of reverse causality, omitted variable bias and measurement
error when estimating the impact of wages on labor supply, we instrument wages in a given
year using the mean wage that year of individuals of the same sex who have the same
education, live in the same region and who are born within the same 3 year cohort. Our
instrument is similar to those applied by Blundell et al. (1998), who use education/cohort
groups, and Devereux (2004), who uses groups based on the interaction of husband’s and
wife’s education/cohort, plus region.9
The women and men in our sample belong to 247 and 254 distinct education groups,
respectively, based on the three ﬁrst digits of the six-digit education code provided by
Statistics Norway (“NUS2000”). The ﬁrst digit indicates one out of nine levels of educa-
tion, running from no education (deﬁned as less than mandatory education in Norway)
to training as researcher (20 years of education or more). The second digit indicates one
out of nine broad ﬁelds of education (“fagfelt”), and the third digit further divides these
ﬁelds into nine groups. Together, the second and third digit deﬁne narrow ﬁelds of ed-
ucation (“faggrupper”). In combination with the ﬁrst digit, indicating the length of the
education, we believe that this is the relevant level when instrumenting wages.10
Women are divided into 14 “birth cohorts”, each spanning three years. As we have a
less strict requirement on the age of men in our sample, they are sorted into 20 diﬀerent
cohorts. Finally, there are 46 diﬀerent regions.
The instrumental variable is constructed by computing the mean wage within each such
education/cohort/region group (in the following referred to as the IV group), subtracting
the individual’s own wage. Naturally, this computation is done using all individuals in the
original data (Statistics Norway’s “Wage statistic”, described more in detail in Section
2.4.1) who have ﬁnished their education at the time of observation - we do not restrict
the observations underlying the generation of the instrumental variable to those who are
included in our ﬁnal sample. In total, the women in our sample belong to 26245 diﬀerent
groups, and the men to 27104 diﬀerent groups. In order to avoid small sample bias in
our instruments, we exclude groups with less than 12 observations in the original data set
from our analyses, and thus we end up with 15472 and 14555 diﬀerent groups for women
9Blau and Kahn (2007) use income decile.
10A full description of Statistics Norway’s education data can be found at
http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/04/90/nos c751 en/nos c751 en.pdf
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and men respectively, where the median number of observations underlying the group
means each year is 100 and 127 respectively.
The ﬁrst stage underlying our IV 2SLS estimates is
lnZit = βˆ ln w¯it + βˆs ln w¯
s
it + βˆI ln Iit + πˆChild
+ ρˆChild× ln w¯it + ρˆsChild× ln w¯sit + ρˆIChild× ln Iit (2)
+ γˆXit + μt + ζi + εit
Zit is either one of our four instrumental variables for individual i in year t; the indi-
vidual’s own wage, their spouse’s wage, own wage interacted with the dummy for having
children, and spouse wage likewise interacted. w¯ is the mean wage of the individual’s IV
group (own wage not included), w¯s is the mean wage of the IV group of the spouse, I is
household capital income, and Child1 is a dummy indicating the presence of a ﬁrst child
older than one year. X is a series of age dummies for the individual and the spouse, each
group spanning 3 years (corresponding to the IV group cohorts). μt is a vector of year
dummies. ζi is treated as a separate entity in speciﬁcations including individual ﬁxed
eﬀects.
Table 1 reports the ﬁrst stage results for our instrumental variables, each column shows
the coeﬃcients from a regression of Equation 2 for every instrumented variable. There are
two panels, Panel A reports ﬁrst stage result without including individual ﬁxed eﬀects, in
Panel B individual ﬁxed eﬀects are included.
Along the diagonal of Panel A, we see that the instruments are very strong predictors
of the corresponding instrumented variables, considerably stronger than the other instru-
ments. The “right” instrument predicts the diﬀerent wage variables. The coeﬃcients in
each column also sum to less than one, which is reassuring.
Panel B reports the ﬁrst stage of the estimation with ﬁxed eﬀects. There are large and
strongly signiﬁcant coeﬃcients along the diagonal also here. However, in columns (3) and
(4), where the instrumented variables are the interactions of wages and the child dummy
(therefore representing the change in wages after children), also wages before children are
strong predictors, with an equally large, negative coeﬃcient. This is due to the fact that
the ﬁrst period change after children will have the interaction going from zero to a strictly
positive number, as the zero observation is negatively correlated to the group mean wage,
as has no impact on the validity of the estimates in the second stage.
The exclusion restriction on our instrumental variables is that the mean wage in the
individual’s (or their spouse’s) IV group is only related to hours worked by the individual
through its relation to the individual’s wage. This is admittedly a strong assumption to
make. For instance, a larger demand for the competence of individuals in a particular edu-
cation group might at the same time increase their wages and their hours. Our IV reduces
the problem of reverse causality and measurement error. Time-invariant heterogeneity is
15














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Children, labor supply and wage elasticities
controlled for by including household ﬁxed eﬀects. If there is time-variant heterogeneity
that correlates both with the mean wage of the IV group and with individual working
hours, we cannot fully control for this.
2.3.5 Alternative IV
The presence of children in the household is thoroughly documented to inﬂuence hourly
wages. Because we wish to investigate the relative roles of spouses’ wages, this poses a
problem also when wages are instrumented as described above, as the incidence of children
is likely to be correlated between individuals in the same IV group and the decisions made
by household’s on labor sharing is likely to be correlated with the labor sharing decisions
in the households of the respective IV groups. That is, the instrument is not valid if
unobserved household labor sharing is correlated both with the instrumental variables
and with labor supply.
In order to accommodate this possibility, we use a modiﬁed IV as an alternative to the
main construct described above. For this IV we only include wage observations for those
individuals in the IV group who have not had children. We stick to the same requirement
of there being at least 12 wage observations underlying the group mean for us to use it.
For this alternative instrument we then end up with 11744 diﬀerent IV groups for the
women and 10781 diﬀerent groups for the men in our sample, with respective median
numbers of observations underlying the group means of 63 and 79.
The ﬁrst stage results for these alternative instrumental variables are reported in
Appendix Table 8.
2.3.6 Extrapolating wages
For our analysis of wage elasticities along the extensive margin (labor force participation),
we must impute wages in years with missing observations, as wages are observed only when
the individual is registered with employment and positive hours. Due to the sampling of
our data (see Section 2.4.1), and because individuals who have breaks in the labor force
participation are not systematically found in the lower end of the income distribution in
Norway, we do not predict wages using the approach of Blau and Kahn (2007). Rather,
we extrapolate and intrapolate wages linearly.
The wage measure used for the analysis of participation is instrumented in the same
way as described in Section 2.3.4, the only diﬀerence is that where wages have been
imputed the actual IV group mean wage is used, as there is no observation of the indi-
vidual’s own to be excluded. Appendix Table 9 and 10 give the ﬁrst stage results for the
instrumental variables used in the participation analysis.
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2.4 Data and descriptive statistics
2.4.1 Outcome variables
Working hours
Our data on weekly working hours are constructed from the information on contracted
working hours and overtime in Statistics Norway’s “Wage statistic” (“Lønnsstatistikken”).
The Wage statistic is based on employer reports for a sample of Norwegian enterprizes
on all employees by the 1st of October. Every year all public enterprizes and all private
enterprizes with more than a certain number11 of employees are included, for the remain-
ing private sector a 50% sample of medium size enterprizes and a 20% sample of small
enterprizes is drawn every year.12 On average, the Wage statistic covers about 80% of
Norwegian employees (100% of the public sector employees and 70% of the private sector
employees) every year.
Contracted hours are given either in numbers or in percentages.13 Typically, public
sector enterprizes report hours in percentages and private sector enterprizes report a
number of hours per week. When reported in percentages, we use 100% = 37.5 hours per
week. We sum contracted hours across all reported employment of the individual within
each year.14
Overtime is reported in hours per month. We set negative overtime to zero and
overtime is truncated at 100 hours per month. Overtime is then multiplied by 12× 7/365
in order to get hours of overtime per week. Alas, it turns out that there are no reports
of overtime in the years 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2005. Also, there are comparatively few
reports of overtime in 1998 and 1999. There is little reason to suspect this reporting error
to be systematically linked to wages or having children.
Finally, the variable we use, weekly working hours, is the sum of weekly contracted
hours and weekly overtime. This measure is also set to zero if negative, and truncated
at 100 hours per month. Due to measurement error in the overtime variable, we also run
robustness checks using only contracted hours.
Labor force participation
Our measure of participation is a dummy variable constructed from information in Statis-
tic Norway’s “Income registry” (“Registerbasert inntektsﬁl”). The Income registry is
11The number varies with industry and year.
12Employment in agriculture, hunting and forestry is left out. So are enterprizes with 3 or less employ-
ees.
13We have replaced the contracted number of hours by one tenth of the original number if it exceeds
70 hours per week, as the distribution of hours above this threshold peaks at typical numbers of hours
times ten (f.i., there are peaks at 150, 175, 350, 355 and 375 hours per week).
14We delete obvious duplicate reports.
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based on tax reports and contains information on all types of income for every Norwegian
resident.
If an individual’s occupational income (“wyrkinnt”), i.e. the sum of wages and business
income (income reported as wage income by the self-employed, not including capital
income), exceeds 2 times the basic amount (G) of the Norwegian social security system,
participation is set to one, zero otherwise.15
2.4.2 Explanatory variables
Hourly wages
The Wage statistic contains information on contracted monthly pay for every observation
on contracted hours (see Section 2.4.1). For every employment observation we calcu-
late hourly wages by dividing contracted monthly wages - multiplied by 12 × 7/365 -
by contracted hours per week. For individual’s who are registered with more than one
employment in a given year, we choose as the hourly wage from the employment where
the individual works the most contracted hours (and in case of a tie, where he or she gets
the most contracted wages) to represent the hourly wage of the individual that year.
Capital income
The information on individual capital income comes from the Income registry (see Section
2.4.1), and is the sum of interests, dividends, realized proﬁts net of realized loss and other
capital income during each year. As households often share capital ownership, investments
and mortgages, it may not be meaningful to use the information at the individual level.
We therefore sum the capital income at the household level.
Demographic information
The information on birth year, education and the linking of parents to their children
comes from Statistics Norway demography, family and education registers.
2.4.3 Sample
For both outcomes, our sample consists of couples who had their ﬁrst child between 1993
and 2007. We restrict the sample to couples where neither parent is younger than 20 -
and the woman (man) is no older than 45 (55) - years the year the child was born. We
exclude couples who have multiple births. We also exclude couples where either parent
is registered as being a single parent the year the child was born, or where either parent
15 G (“Folketrygdens grunnbeløp”) is adjusted yearly (or more often) in accordance with changes in
the general income level. From January 1 2010, G is NOK 72 881 (apprioximately USD 12 500). It is
common to use both 1G and 2G as a lower limit on earnings when deﬁning labor force participation.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics, Wage statistics sample
1997 2007
Mother Father Mother Father
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Participation 0.96 (0.21) 0.99 (0.093) 0.96 (0.21) 0.99 (0.087)
Yearly earnings 203.9 (76.8) 290.5 (111.7) 269.8 (128.5) 409.8 (198.3)
Working hours 34.1 (11.5) 43.6 (15.9) 32.7 (10.6) 43.9 (16.0)
Contracted hours 32.3 (8.47) 36.8 (5.99) 31.5 (8.97) 36.4 (6.18)
Hourly wage 116.4 (29.2) 135.0 (45.5) 157.4 (46.1) 189.8 (90.1)
Age 29.6 (4.21) 31.7 (4.76) 31.7 (4.23) 33.8 (4.76)
Age at ﬁrst child 29.1 (4.03) 31.2 (4.59) 29.6 (4.09) 31.7 (4.62)
Lower sec. or less 0.15 (0.36) 0.16 (0.37) 0.090 (0.29) 0.13 (0.33)
Upper secondary 0.26 (0.44) 0.35 (0.48) 0.20 (0.40) 0.31 (0.46)
Higher ed. ≤ 4 yrs 0.48 (0.50) 0.33 (0.47) 0.53 (0.50) 0.35 (0.48)
Higher ed. > 4 yrs 0.11 (0.31) 0.16 (0.37) 0.18 (0.38) 0.21 (0.41)
N 17866 17866 23308 23308
Note: Sample is households who had their ﬁrst child between 1993 and 2007 and where both spouses are
registered with employment in Statistics Norway’s Wage Statistic in the given year. Participation is a
dummy variable indicating whether the individual is registered with income above 2G in the given year.
Working hours and contracted hours are measured per week. Working hours is the sum of contracted
hours and overtime. Yearly earnings are given in constant 1998 NOK and are measured in 1000s.
already had a child from a previous relationship. Lastly, we only include couples where
education status is observed for both parents.
264148 households satisfy these criteria. Then, for each couple we include observations
in the four years prior to their ﬁrst child is born and in the ﬁrst four years after the child is
born. We exclude observations during years in which either parent is still taking education.
We also exclude observations for years in which region of residence is observed. We lose
49663 households completely due to these restrictions.
The samples are further only restricted by the availability of data, as described above.
The sample used in our analysis of working hours consists of 101519 households, making
a total of 269827 household-years. This sample is described in Table 2. The sample used
in our analysis of labor force participation consists of 138035 households, with a total of
637465 household-years. This sample is described in Table 3. For reference, descriptive
statistics on the whole sample of parents can be found in Appendix Table 11.
In Table 2 we show descriptive statistics for the ﬁrst and last year of observation on
the sample we use in the working hours analysis, i.e., the individual-year observations
where the individual is observed in the Wage statistic. The composition of households
changed only slightly over the period. The women observed in 2007 work 1.4 less hours on
average, have higher wages, are 2.1 years older, and 0.5 years older at ﬁrst birth. There
is also a larger share with higher eduction. The pattern is similar for men. Due to our
20
Children, labor supply and wage elasticities
Table 3: Descriptive statistics, labor force participation sample
1997 2007
Mother Father Mother Father
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Participation 0.85 (0.36) 0.96 (0.20) 0.91 (0.28) 0.98 (0.14)
Yearly earnings 179.7 (92.6) 280.0 (140.1) 252.9 (145.8) 410.4 (268.6)
Age 28.7 (4.37) 31.0 (4.89) 31.5 (4.27) 33.7 (4.75)
Age at ﬁrst child 28.3 (4.14) 30.5 (4.66) 29.4 (4.13) 31.6 (4.62)
Lower sec. or less 0.21 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40) 0.11 (0.32) 0.15 (0.36)
Upper secondary 0.32 (0.47) 0.39 (0.49) 0.26 (0.44) 0.36 (0.48)
Higher ed. ≤ 4 yrs 0.39 (0.49) 0.28 (0.45) 0.48 (0.50) 0.32 (0.47)
Higher ed. > 4 yrs 0.086 (0.28) 0.13 (0.33) 0.15 (0.36) 0.17 (0.38)
N 55727 55727 43517 43517
Note: Sample is households who had their ﬁrst child between 1993 and 2007 and where each spouse is
registered with employment in Statistics Norway’s Wage Statistic for at least two years in the period
1997-2007. Participation is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is registered with income
above 2G in the given year. Yearly earnings are given in constant 1998 NOK and are measured in 1000s.
sampling of individuals who are observed to become parents by the end of 2007 at the
latest, the composition of the sample is of course diﬀerent in 1997 (where the share of
non-parents is 50%) and in 2007 (where the share of non-parents is only 20%). In Table
12 in the Appendix, we divide the sample into those who have children and those who
do not yet have children, and we estimate the diﬀerence over time for the two groups. In
the last column, we also estimate the diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences for the two groups to see
whether the trends have been diﬀerent over the period for parents and non-parents.
There are some obvious diﬀerences when we compare the Wage statistics sample in
Table 2 to the descriptive statistics for the population sample of households (all households
who fulﬁll the sample criteria described above, but who are not necessarily observed in the
Wage statistic) in Appendix Table 11. This reﬂects that it is not random who participates
and is observed in the Wage statistic. For our analyses of elasticities along the intensive
margin, this should be kept in mind.
In Table 3 we show descriptive statistics for the ﬁrst and last year of observation on
the sample we use in the labor force participation analysis, i.e., the sample of households
where both parents are observed at least twice in the Wage statistic over the period (but
not necessarily in a given year, as wages are extra-/intrapolated other years, based on
the existing observations). The changes in the descriptive statistics from 1997 to 2007 for
this sample are about the same as in Table 2.
Comparing this sample to the population descriptives in Appendix Table 11, we see
that the means are very similar. Naturally, the labor force participation sample has higher
labor force participation - and somewhat higher education and income. The parents’ age
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Table 4: The eﬀect of wages and children on women’s working hours
OLS OLS-FE IV IV-FE IV’-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First child -0.20*** -0.12*** -0.19*** -0.12*** -0.12***
(0.0032) (0.0052) (0.0032) (0.0057) (0.0055)
ln(Own wage) 0.013 -0.33*** 0.19*** -0.47** -0.23
(0.016) (0.036) (0.027) (0.23) (0.16)
ln(Own wage) × Child 0.080*** 0.014 0.22*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.021) (0.025) (0.027) (0.031) (0.024)
ln(Spouse’s wage) 0.048*** 0.010 0.092*** 0.22** 0.12
(0.0068) (0.0087) (0.019) (0.11) (0.11)
ln(Spouse wage) × Child 0.022** -0.0063 -0.0016 -0.046* -0.031
(0.0097) (0.0100) (0.022) (0.027) (0.024)
ln(Capital income) 0.0098*** 0.0031*** 0.0040*** 0.0037*** 0.0041***
(0.00100) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011)
ln(Cap. income) × Child -0.0052*** -0.0061*** -0.0088*** -0.0080*** -0.0086***
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Individual FE No Yes No Yes Yes
N 176150 176150 176130 147555 146858
Note: Each column provides estimates from a linear regression based on Equation 1, the outcome variable
being the natural logarithm of weekly working hours. Year dummies and age dummies for both spouses
and a dummy for expecting a child and for having a baby younger than one year are included in each
regression. Wages are instrumented in speciﬁcations (3)-(5) (an alternative instrumental variable is used
in speciﬁcation (5)). Individual ﬁxed eﬀects are included in speciﬁcations (2), (4) and (5). Robust
standard errors clustered at the individual level are in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
at the birth of the ﬁrst child is about the same. The labor force participation sample is
therefore quite representative of the average Norwegian household with children during
this period.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Wage elasticities and the eﬀect of children on female labor
supply
Working hours - the intensive margin
Table 4 displays the estimated eﬀect of children, wages, and their interaction, on female
working hours. The estimated eﬀect of children on the working hours of women who
remain employed ranges from 12 to 20% across speciﬁcations. In our most trusted spec-
iﬁcation in column (4) with both individual ﬁxed eﬀects and instrumented wages, the
eﬀect is 12% (this amounts to around 4.5 hours per week for a full time worker). We will
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concentrate on column (3) and (4) in the following analysis of wage elasticities.
The most important result to note is that women’s wage elasticities change substan-
tially once they have children. The increased level of home production increases the
substitution eﬀect of female working hours; own wage elasticities become more positive
and the cross wage elasticities become more negative. The results are consistent with
caring for children being a substitute to female working hours.
The estimated own wage elasticity before children shows a clear pattern. Concentrat-
ing on the IV estimates in columns (3) and (4), the elasticity is estimated - very precisely
- to be .19 when individual ﬁxed eﬀects are not included. Blau and Kahn (2007) ﬁnd
comparable estimates of .14 for the period 1999-2001 in the US. However, the elasticity
turns negative once ﬁxed eﬀects are included. This implies that there are ﬁxed unob-
served characteristics that gives a positive correlation between working hours and the
mean wages of the IV group in column (3). Identifying the wage elasticities only using
within-individual variation gives a negative own wage elasticity of -0.47 in column (4).
This means that before children, the income eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect. This
can be connected to the period before children being a period of large investments (e.g.
in housing). It is not uncommon in the literature to ﬁnd negative own wage elasticities
(see Killingsworth (1984) for a review).
The interaction between the logarithm of own wage and the child dummy shows that
the own wage elasticity becomes more positive after the child is born (the coeﬃcient is
.13). This means that women who have higher wage reduce their working hours less as a
result of having children than do women with lower wage. For instance, women who have
wages at 10% above the mean work 1.3% more on average after children (meaning that
their reduction in hours is 8.3%, rather than 9.6%) compared to women with mean wages
- all else equal. Without individual ﬁxed eﬀects we thus see an own wage elasticity after
children of .41, with individual ﬁxed eﬀects the elasticity is -.34. This is consistent with
the ﬁnding of larger own wage elasticities for the group of women with small children in
both Blundell et al. (1998) and Blau and Kahn (2007), although these studies do not look
at changes within households.
The cross wage elasticity, that is the coeﬃcient on the logarithm of the spouse’s wage,
is consistently positive across speciﬁcations, regardless of the inclusion of individual ﬁxed
eﬀects. This means that women whose spouse has a higher wage, tend to work more
hours - given their own wage. The cross wage elasticity is .09 and signiﬁcant at the
1% level when individual ﬁxed eﬀects are not included (speciﬁcation (3)), about half of
the corresponding own wage elasticity. This means that a 10% increase in the spouse’s
wage causes a .9% increase in hours. Blau and Kahn (2007) estimate the cross wage
elasticity to be -.10. The substitution of spouse hours seems therefore to be stronger in
the US also before children. Including ﬁxed eﬀects (speciﬁcation (4)) gives an estimated
cross wage elasticity of .22, also about half the absolute size of the corresponding own
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Table 5: The eﬀect of wages and children on women’s labor force participation
OLS OLS-FE IV IV-FE IV’-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First child -0.12*** -0.098*** -0.10*** -0.096*** -0.095***
(0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0018) (0.0029) (0.0029)
ln(Own wage) 0.041*** -0.016*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.22***
(0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0075) (0.050) (0.058)
ln(Own wage) × Child 0.099*** 0.077*** 0.30*** 0.26*** 0.26***
(0.0058) (0.0059) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
ln(Spouse’s wage) -0.0035* -0.0055* -0.042*** 0.084** 0.13***
(0.0018) (0.0032) (0.0067) (0.036) (0.048)
ln(Spouse wage) × Child 0.010*** -0.0021 -0.064*** -0.075*** -0.072***
(0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0096) (0.011) (0.011)
ln(Capital income) 0.0058*** 0.00092* 0.0039*** 0.0022*** 0.0023***
(0.00046) (0.00055) (0.00051) (0.00060) (0.00061)
ln(Cap. income) × Child 0.0020*** -0.00076 -0.0012 -0.0037*** -0.0041***
(0.00065) (0.00068) (0.00073) (0.00076) (0.00079)
Individual FE No Yes No Yes Yes
N 418678 418678 409862 386840 385329
Note: Each column provides estimates from a linear regression based on Equation 1, the outcome variable
being a dummy for labor force participation. Year dummies and age dummies for both spouses and a
dummy for expecting a child and for having a baby younger than one year are included in each regression.
Wages are instrumented in speciﬁcations (3)-(5). Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level
are in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
wage elasticity. The cross wage elasticity change by -.046 after having children, going
in the opposite direction of the change in own wage elasticity. This means that all else
equal, women whose spouse earns more, tend to reduce working hours more after they
have children. From the two interaction terms, we thus see that more home production
changes the importance of comparative advantage for labor sharing in a direction that is
consistent with the Becker model.
Labor force participation - the extensive margin
Table 5 displays the estimated eﬀect of children, wages, and their interaction, on female
labor force participation (as deﬁned in 2.4.1). Having children reduces the probability
of women participating in the labor market by about 10 percentage points on average,
regardless of speciﬁcation.
As for the results on women’s working hours, the most important result to note here
is the change in wage elasticities after having children in speciﬁcation (4). The pattern
is the same as for working hours; the substitution eﬀect is stronger and the own wage
elasticity becomes more positive, while the cross wage elasticity becomes more negative.
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The size of the change is almost double the change we found in working hours elasticities.
For this labor supply measure, the own wage elasticity before children is positive both
when we do include and do not include individual ﬁxed eﬀects - and about .2. This is in
the lower end of the estimates found elsewhere in the literature - though the most recent
estimate in Blau and Kahn (2007) is .3. After children, the elasticity more than doubles
in all speciﬁcations. The estimated own wage elasticity after having children is thus
slightly below .5 when wages are instrumented, regardless of the inclusion of individual
ﬁxed eﬀects. The fact that the responsiveness of female labor force participation to wages
is much larger after children provides evidence that the elasticity of female labor supply
is dependent on how much home production there is, as is suggested by Blau and Kahn
(2007).
The cross wage elasticity (the coeﬃcient on the spouse’s hourly wage) changes sign
according to whether individual ﬁxed eﬀects are included. In column (3) it is negative,
indicating that women whose spouse earns a higher hourly wage have a lower probability
of participating in paid work. Including ﬁxed eﬀects the estimated cross wage elasticity is
positive. According to speciﬁcation (4), therefore, the typical specialization according to
wage incentives is not present before children. The higher the wage of the husband, the
higher is the probability that the wife works. This means that before children, changes in
wage diﬀerences in the family do not lead to within household divergence in participation.
Having children signiﬁcantly alters the cross wage elasticity with about -.07 (in the
IV speciﬁcations) - also in accordance with a Beckerian framework.
The coeﬃcients on the interaction terms signify that the probability of going out of the
labor force due to having children varies with own and spouse’s wage and wage growth.
Again looking at speciﬁcation (4), having a 10% higher wage growth relative to the mean
after children means a 2.6 percentage points higher probability of labor force participation.
Having a wage growth at 50% higher than the mean cancels out the negative eﬀect of
children on participation.16 The change in participation after children also varies with
spouse wage, but the impact is much smaller than that of own wage. All else equal, women
whose spouse has 10% higher wage growth, have 0.75 percentage points lower probability
of participating after children.
The average eﬀect on female labor force participation is as we see to a large degree
heterogeneous with respect to both own wage and spouse wage. The pattern is as pre-
dicted in the basic models of household labor supply. Before children (with a smaller
amount of household production), the pattern is rather that women work with a higher
probability both if she has higher wages herself, and if her husband has higher wages.
The mechanisms underlying the results before children are therefore diﬀerent than the
mechanisms presented in the standard models of household behavior.
16Admittedly, if the elasticity is the same for all incomes, which is not certain.
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Table 6: The eﬀect of wages and children on men’s working hours
OLS OLS-FE IV IV-FE IV’-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First child -0.00059 -0.016*** -0.0021 -0.015*** -0.015***
(0.0027) (0.0045) (0.0027) (0.0046) (0.0046)
ln(Own wage) 0.055*** -0.053*** 0.10*** -0.27*** -0.17*
(0.0079) (0.014) (0.014) (0.079) (0.095)
ln(Own wage) × Child -0.064*** -0.038*** -0.0084 0.0015 0.00035
(0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020)
ln(Spouse’s wage) -0.022*** -0.0012 -0.069*** 0.10 0.0076
(0.0065) (0.0075) (0.015) (0.094) (0.12)
ln(Spouse wage) × Child -0.00087 -0.021** -0.039** -0.040** -0.040**
(0.0088) (0.0087) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
ln(Capital income) 0.0040*** 0.0024** 0.0032*** 0.0031*** 0.0030***
(0.00087) (0.00098) (0.00097) (0.0010) (0.0010)
ln(Cap. income) × Child -0.0018 -0.0018* -0.0035*** -0.0025** -0.0027**
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Individual FE No Yes No Yes Yes
N 176156 176156 176130 147555 146858
Note: Each column provides estimates from a linear regression based on Equation 1, the outcome variable
being the natural logarithm of weekly working hours. Year dummies and age dummies for both spouses
and a dummy for expecting a child and for having a baby younger than one year are included in each
regression. Wages are instrumented in speciﬁcations (3)-(5). Robust standard errors clustered at the
individual level are in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
2.5.2 Wage elasticities and the eﬀect of children on male labor
supply
Working hours - the intensive margin
Table 6 displays the estimated eﬀect of children, wages, and their interaction, on male
working hours. We ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of children on men’s working hours - at about
-1.5% and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcations.17
This ﬁnding is contrary to what other studies on men’s labor market response to father-
hood have found, most of them using data from the US (e.g. Lundberg and Rose (2002)).
Our result indicates that specialization in the care for children is less strong in Norwegian
households.
In the cross section analysis (speciﬁcation (3)), the estimated own wage elasticity is
.10 and the cross wage elasticity is -.069. As the same pattern is observed for women,
we see that households with diverging wages also diverge in hours. Including individual
ﬁxed eﬀects in speciﬁcation (4), the own wage elasticity becomes negative, exactly as for
women. The income eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect in the period before children.
17This amounts to about half an hour a week for the average male childless employee.
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Having children does not signiﬁcantly alter men’s own wage elasticity, but the cross
wage elasticity becomes more negative (the change is about -.04 and statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 5% level in speciﬁcations (3) and (4)). The small change in own wage
elasticities after children may reﬂect that home production is a closer substitute to female
hours than male hours. The small but signiﬁcant change in cross wage elasticities does
however imply more specialization in line with comparative advantage in households after
they have children.
Held together with the results for women, the pattern emerging is that for the average
household, a relative change in wages within households leads to changes in hours for
both partners. When the woman has a higher wage, she works more and the husband
works less. This is also evidence that part of the explanation for men’s comparatively
small reduction in market hours little after they have children, is that men on average
have higher wages than women. The heterogeneity of the response in hours to having
children wages shows that men do reduce their market hours more if the wife has higher
wages.
Labor force participation - the extensive margin
Table 7 displays the estimated eﬀect of children, wages, and their interaction, on female
labor force participation (as deﬁned in 2.4.1). Having children increases the probability
of men’s labor force participation very little, only 0.53 percentage points. The eﬀect of
children on labor force participation in the household is that women on average are less
likely and men more likely to participate.
The pattern of wage elasticities is more consistent across speciﬁcations for this measure
of male labor supply participation. The cross section speciﬁcation (3) gives a positive own
wage elasticity of 0.084 and a negative cross wage elasticity of -0.026. When including
ﬁxed eﬀects in speciﬁcation (4), the cross wage elasticity before children is no longer
statistically signiﬁcant. The other coeﬃcients remains largely unaltered. The pattern
is thus the same as for women, and households with diverging wages also diverge in
participation probabilities.
After children, wage elasticities are reduced for men, participation is less wage elastic
after children. This may reﬂect the fact that leaving the labor force to stay home with
children is not a close alternative for men; home production is not as close a substitute
for market production as it is for women (probably the views on gender roles plays an
important part here). Rather it is the case that with children, men participate even more
certainly because the household has a higher need for a certain level of consumption after
children.
The heterogeneity of the response to having children is opposite of the heterogeneity
for women. For men, it is those who have larger increases in wages who increase their labor
force participation less after children. This may reﬂect that the men with higher wage
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Table 7: The eﬀect of wages and children on men’s labor force participation
OLS OLS-FE IV IV-FE IV’-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First child 0.013*** 0.0054*** 0.012*** 0.0053*** 0.0051***
(0.00098) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0017)
ln(Own wage) 0.039*** 0.023*** 0.084*** 0.11*** 0.12***
(0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0047) (0.021) (0.029)
ln(Own wage) × Child -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.022***
(0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0053) (0.0061) (0.0065)
ln(Spouse’s wage) 0.00035 0.0025 -0.026*** 0.022 -0.017
(0.0016) (0.0023) (0.0051) (0.025) (0.032)
ln(Spouse wage) × Child 0.0019 0.0019 0.016*** 0.012* 0.0085
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0055) (0.0064) (0.0066)
ln(Capital income) 0.0043*** 0.00075* 0.0028*** 0.00065 0.00066
(0.00037) (0.00041) (0.00039) (0.00042) (0.00042)
ln(Cap. income) × Child -0.0019*** -0.0017*** -0.0019*** -0.0020*** -0.0020***
(0.00042) (0.00043) (0.00044) (0.00046) (0.00046)
Individual FE No Yes No Yes Yes
N 418678 418678 409862 386840 385329
Note: Each column provides estimates from a linear regression based on Equation 1, the outcome variable
being a dummy for labor force participation. Year dummies and age dummies for both spouses and a
dummy for expecting a child and for having a baby younger than one year are included in each regression.
Wages are instrumented in speciﬁcations (3)-(5). Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level
are in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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growth are already on higher levels of participation and do not have the same potential
to increase it any further.
2.6 Summary of results
Our IV and individual ﬁxed eﬀects analysis shows that women on average reduce their
working hours (contingent on being employed) by 12%, and the probability of labor force
participation by 10 percentage points, when they have children. For men, the contingent
reduction in working hours is 1.5%, whereas the probability of participating increases
with half a percentage point. Children thus cause a net reduction in the household’s total
labor supply.
For both men and women, we ﬁnd a positive own wage elasticity of working hours
before having children in the cross section analysis (.2 for women and .1 for men), and
a negative own wage elasticity of working hours before having children when we include
individual ﬁxed eﬀects (-.5 for women and -.3 for men). For women, the cross wage
elasticity of working hours before children is positive both without and with ﬁxed eﬀects
(.1 and .2), whereas for men, the cross wage elasticity before children is negative (at -.07)
in the cross section analysis and not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels when
individual ﬁxed eﬀects are included. The pattern is slightly diﬀerent when we look at
the wage elasticities of labor force participation: Own wage elasticities before children are
positive for both sexes and irrespective of individual ﬁxed eﬀects (about .2 for women and
.1 for men). Cross wage elasticities before children are negative for both men and women
in the cross section analysis (-.04 for women and -.03 for men), and positive in the ﬁxed
eﬀects analysis (.08 for women and .02 (not statistically signiﬁcant) for men). Summing
up, the overall pattern before children is not consistent with husband and wife’s market
hours being substitutes when we include household ﬁxed eﬀects. The higher the wage of
the spouse, the more the wife works, while for men, if the wages of the wife increases,
there is no signiﬁcant change in his hours.
Having children signiﬁcantly alters the own wage elasticity of both measures of female
labor supply, regardless of the inclusion of individual ﬁxed eﬀects. The own wage elasticity
of labor force participation more than doubles, as does the own wage elasticity of working
hours in the cross section analysis. In the ﬁxed eﬀects analysis, the negative own wage
elasticity of female working hours is reduced by 28% after children. The cross wage
elasticity of female working hours is not as signiﬁcantly altered by having children in either
speciﬁcation. However, there is a strong and negative change in the cross wage elasticity
of female labor force participation, more than doubling the negative cross wage elasticity
before children in the cross section analysis, and practically annulling the positive cross
wage elasticity before children in the ﬁxed eﬀects analysis. For men, where having children
has a much smaller impact on labor supply, there is no change in the own wage elasticity
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of working hours, and a negative change at about .025 in the own wage elasticity of
labor force participation (reducing the positive own wage elasticity before children by
about one fourth). The cross wage elasticity of male working hours becomes signiﬁcantly
more negative after having children (the change is -.04 both without and with individual
ﬁxed eﬀects), and the cross wage elasticity of male labor force participation becomes
signiﬁcantly more positive after having children (the change is .016 in the cross section
analysis and .012 when including individual ﬁxed eﬀects). The size of the change in own
wage elasticities is substantial compared to the relatively small wage elasticities before
children. The wage elasticities are still small, and the labor supply response to having
children is not very diﬀerent for individuals with higher wages. There is however a clear
pattern that substitution between spouse hours is more important after children. For
women who earn 10% higher wages, she works 1.3% more hours while her husband works
0.4% less hours.
2.7 Conclusion
We have shown that the level of home production in the household inﬂuences both men and
women’s level of hours working in the market, and the responsiveness of their respective
labor supply to their own and to their spouse’s wage. Both men and women in our sample
decrease their market hours in response to having children, indicating that both spouses
share in the caring for children. Women do however reduce their hours by ten times more
than men do - contingent on staying employed - and female labor force participation
is reduced by 10 percentage points after having children, whereas men’s participation
increases slightly.
The change in the responsiveness of labor supply to wages is most prominent for
women. This is consistent with caring for children being a closer substitute to female
labor supply than to male labor supply. We do however also ﬁnd that men’s working
hours become more responsive to their spouse’s wage after having children. Held together
with the results for women, the pattern emerging is that for the average household, a
relative change in wages within households leads to changes in hours for both spouses.
If a woman has higher wages, she will work relatively more than other women - and her
husband relatively less than their husbands - after having children.
The relatively high wages of women compared to men in Norway thus seem to play a
role in changing the traditional tasks of men and women when it comes to child rearing.
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics, whole sample
1997 2007
Mother Father Mother Father
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Participation 0.77 (0.42) 0.92 (0.26) 0.78 (0.41) 0.93 (0.25)
Yearly earnings 160.6 (100.1) 271.5 (888.3) 211.8 (150.2) 380.3 (1076.1)
Age 28.5 (4.55) 30.9 (5.14) 30.6 (4.66) 33.2 (5.26)
Age at ﬁrst child 28.0 (4.31) 30.4 (4.90) 28.6 (4.47) 31.2 (5.10)
Lower sec. or less 0.27 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44) 0.22 (0.41) 0.23 (0.42)
Upper secondary 0.34 (0.47) 0.40 (0.49) 0.27 (0.44) 0.38 (0.48)
Higher ed. ≤ 4 yrs 0.33 (0.47) 0.24 (0.42) 0.40 (0.49) 0.26 (0.44)
Higher ed. > 4 yrs 0.068 (0.25) 0.10 (0.30) 0.12 (0.32) 0.14 (0.34)
N 90023 90023 80486 80486
Note: Sample is households who had their ﬁrst child between 1993 and 2007. Participation is a dummy
variable indicating whether the individual is registered with income above 2G in the given year. Yearly
earnings are given in constant 1998 NOK and are measured in 1000s.
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Parenthood wage penalties in a
double income society
Sara Cools1 Marte Strøm2
Abstract We estimate parenthood wage penalties using panel data for Norwegian em-
ployees in the period 1997-2007. The Norwegian institutional setting is one of high female
labor force participation and family friendly welfare policies like publicly provided child
care, paid parental leave and job protection during the absence. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd
substantial wage penalties to motherhood, ranging from a 1.5% wage reduction for women
with lower secondary education to 4.7% for women with more than four years of higher
education. The wage penalties we ﬁnd for women can not be explained by years spent
not working or on maternity leave, nor by moving to part time work or public sector
employment subsequent to having children. The motherhood wage penalties are however
larger for women with higher education and for women who were working full time and
in the private sector before having children. Contrary to most results found using U.S.
data and previous research for Norway, we ﬁnd a wage penalty also to fatherhood for men
with more than lower secondary education at about .5%. Also for men, the penalty is
greater for those who work full time and in the private sector. A substantial share of the
fatherhood wage penalty can be explained by paternity leave.
This paper is part of the research activities at the center of Equality, Social Organization, and Performance
(ESOP) at the Department of Economics at the University of Oslo. ESOP is supported by the Research
Council of Norway.
1Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo. sara.cools@econ.uio.no




The economic dynamic of the household changed greatly over the 20th century, as both
female participation in market work rose and total fertility declined. Now, even as total
fertility fell dramatically in most OECD countries, the population share having at least one
child did not fall as dramatically. The two income household with children is increasingly
becoming the norm rather than the exception.
In Scandinavia, the combination of work and family is encouraged through various
policies securing child care, paid parental leave and job protection. In addition, not
only the two career household, but also the two carer household, is encouraged. Men
are increasingly participating in the rearing of children. As a result, many would argue,
Scandinavia has both the highest female labor force participation and among the highest
fertility rates in the OECD.3
There is a large literature on the negative career eﬀects of having children for mothers
(e.g. Waldfogel (1997); Budig and England (2001)), and some evidence of a positive
career eﬀect for men (e.g. Lundberg and Rose (2002); Simonsen and Skipper (2008)),
consistent with women and men specialising in diﬀerent tasks after children; child rearing
and market production respectively. Our context is however diﬀerent from other countries,
with a female labor force participation almost as high as for men (80% in 2007 in the age
group 25-64)4, and the gender wage gap is among the narrowest in the OECD countries.
We show that in this context, the motherhood penalties are still considerable, but we also
ﬁnd that men experience a negative private cost from fatherhood.
This is the ﬁrst broad panel data study of parenthood wage eﬀects in Norway. We
use data from oﬃcial Norwegian registries on wages and income, covering about 70% of
the working population in the years from 1997 to 2007. Using individual ﬁxed eﬀects
estimation on a sample of individuals who are observed to have at least one child by
2008, we ﬁnd a substantial wage penalty for women - ranging from -1.4% for women with
lower secondary education to -4.6% for women with higher education, higher degree.5.
Contrary most other studies, we ﬁnd negative (though comparatively small) eﬀects of
having children on men’s wages - about .5% for men with upper secondary education or
more. This is consistent with an increasing role of fathers as care givers.
The estimated penalty for women is only partly explained when we include measures
of experience, parental leave, working part time and sector of employment. For men on
the other hand, variation in parental leave explains half of the fatherhood wage penalty.
We ﬁnd the largest penalties to parenthood in the private sector, for full time workers,
and for those who take the longest leave.
3Source: OECD.stat.
4Source: OECD.stat. The corresponding number for men is 87%.




The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the literature on
wage penalties (and premia) to parenthood. Section 3.3 presents our empirical strategy.
In Section 3.4 we give a description of our data. In Section 3.5 we present the results of
our baseline speciﬁcation. In Section 3.6 we try to identify some channels through which
the parenthood wage penalty might work, and in Section 3.7 we investigate the variation
in the penalty across diﬀerent subgroups. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 The literature on the wage penalties to parent-
hood
The economic literature oﬀers several explanations for why we observe a motherhood
wage penalty.6 The most common explanation considers the eﬀect of children on women’s
productivity, which again will be reﬂected in their wages. Two main mechanisms for this
eﬀect have been proposed. First, childbearing and child rearing may cause a comparative
reduction in mothers labor market experience, both through periods out of the labor
market and through periods of reduced working hours. This will adversely aﬀect mothers’
accumulation of human capital (Mincer and Polachek, 1974). Second, in the framework
of Becker (1985), even for women working the same number of hours, mothers may put
in less eﬀort per hour because they spend more eﬀort during their time at home.
Other explanations do not evoke an eﬀect of children on women’s productivity: Moth-
ers may earn lower wages than non-mothers due to employers’ discrimination or because
they seek employment in “mother-friendly” jobs, oﬀering for instance greater ﬂexibility
at the price of lower wages.
There is substantial empirical evidence on a negative relationship between having chil-
dren and labor market outcomes like wages and labor supply (e.g Korenman and Neumark
(1992); Waldfogel (1997); Budig and England (2001); Lundberg and Rose (2002)). The
focus of this literature has mainly been on the eﬀects of motherhood.
There are some studies on the eﬀects of fatherhood on men’s wages and working
hours. Millimet (2000), Lundberg and Rose (2002) and Simonsen and Skipper (2008) ﬁnd
a positive eﬀect of having children both on men’s wages and working hours using U.S.
data. Astone et al. (2010) document a heterogeneous response for fathers; young men
work more while older men work less when they become fathers. Wilde et al. (2010) ﬁnd
small negative eﬀects of fatherhood on men’s wages (although they are not signiﬁcant in
most speciﬁcations).




3.2.1 The role of human capital
Most studies attribute a large part of the eﬀect to the adverse human capital eﬀects of
career breaks following the birth of a child, in the framework of Mincer and Polachek
(1974). Several authors have shown that when controlling for experience - measured
as time in active employment, net of career breaks and/or adjusted for part time - a
large part of the wage penalty is explained. The penalty is consequently interpreted as
a human capital eﬀect (Waldfogel, 1997; Lundberg and Rose, 2000; Budig and England,
2001; Datta Gupta and Smith, 2002; Anderson et al., 2002; Wilde et al., 2010).
Using Danish data, Datta Gupta and Smith (2002) ﬁnd no negative eﬀect on wages
of having children, apart from the negative eﬀect of a career break. Similarly, Lundberg
and Rose (2000), using U.S. data, ﬁnd no wage eﬀect of children for women who are
continuously attached to the labor market. Anderson et al. (2002), also using U.S. data,
ﬁnd that the number of years out of the labor force explains 30% of the motherhood wage
penalty on average. For college educated women, the whole penalty is explained by years
out of the labor force. In most other studies, an unexplained wage penalty remains, even
after controlling for experience.
Wilde et al. (2010) ﬁnd larger wage penalties for women with higher skills. In so far
as human capital is more important in jobs held by higher educated individuals, such a
pattern is consistent with a human capital explanation to the motherhood wage penalty.
3.2.2 The role of eﬀort
The Becker (1985) theory of a conﬂict between eﬀort in home production and eﬀort at
work is also supported in correlation studies. Several authors have found a negative
relationship between housework load and wages (Coverman, 1983; Shelton and Firestone,
1989; McAllister, 1990; Hersch and Stratton, 1997).
In addition, it is not clear whether we can interpret the length of a career break as
a human capital eﬀect, or whether it reﬂects an individual’s propensity to spend more
eﬀort at home relative to at work after returning to work. Using Swedish data, Albrecht
et al. (1999) ﬁnd that the type of career break (paid parental leave, unpaid care leave,
periods spent abroad, shorter leave periods, unemployment, military service) matters for
the eﬀect on wages, and that the eﬀects vary by gender. They ﬁnd no eﬀect of maternity
leave and a negative eﬀect of paternity leave.7 They interpret this as a signalling eﬀect of
parental leave, rather than a human capital eﬀect. As mothers are already expected by
employers to take leave for a considerable period of time, maternity leave is not a strong
signal to the employer of their type. For men, on the other hand, the length of parental
leave is a strong signal.





There are several endogeneity issues when estimating the eﬀect of having children on career
outcomes. First, who becomes parents may not be random. Especially for men, the issue of
positive selection into marriage and fatherhood is debated (Korenman and Neumark, 1991;
Gupta et al., 2007; Antonovics and Town, 2004; Krashinsky, 2004). Positive selection into
parenthood gives an upward bias in the estimated eﬀect of having children when comparing
parents to non-parents.
The most common measure used in the literature to correct for selection is to include
individual ﬁxed eﬀects, and thereby take out systematic diﬀerences in the wage levels
of parents and non-parents (e.g. Waldfogel (1997); Hersch and Stratton (1997); Budig
and England (2001); Anderson et al. (2002)). However, if individuals with higher wage
growth also have a higher propensity to become parents, results will still be biased with
ﬁxed eﬀects estimation.
Another solution to the problem of positive selection on both wage levels and wage
growth is to use a sample consisting only of individuals who are eventually observed to
become parents, as is done by Wilde et al. (2010).
Using individual ﬁxed eﬀects in a sample of individuals who become parents at one
point during the time window means that the eﬀect of children is estimated as the average
diﬀerence in a given outcome between those who have had a child and those who have
not yet had a child. If the timing of childbearing is endogenous to an individual’s career,
estimates will again be biased.
Postponing childbearing is found to reduce the negative career eﬀects of having chil-
dren (Hoﬀerth, 1984; Taniguchi, 1999; Buckles, 2008; Miller, 2011). Since there are strong
economic incentives to wait, the timing of children can not be assumed to be random.
If individuals with steeper wage growth have children at later ages, the estimated
eﬀect of children will be exaggerated in a ﬁxed eﬀects analysis conducted on a sample
of parents and parents-to-be. Wilde et al. (2010) address the endogeneity in the timing
of childbearing by running separate analyses of the wage eﬀects for diﬀerent skill levels
(deﬁned by Armed Forces Qualiﬁcation Scores taken at ages 14-21). If the timing of
children is random within a skill group, separate analyses will yield unbiased estimates.
A few studies estimate wage eﬀects of children using instrumental variables (see for
instance Angrist and Evans (1998) and Miller (2011)). Twin births and sibling sex com-
position are popular instruments, but can only be used for estimating eﬀects of second
and third child (or later), respectively. Miscarriage can be used as an instrument for the
eﬀect of a ﬁrst child - but is generally harder to observe.
When good instrumental variables are not readily available it is important to compare
individuals who are on similar wage paths before they have children.
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3.2.4 Parenthood wage penalties in Norway
Petersen et al. (2007) and Hardoy and Schøne (2008) study the association between par-
enthood and wages in Norway. Their results are not readily comparable to those presented
in this paper, as none of them use individual ﬁxed eﬀects and both include individuals who
are not observed to become parents in the sample. Both studies ﬁnd somewhat smaller
point estimates than we do of a motherhood wage penalty, and they both ﬁnd a small
positive eﬀect of children on men’s wages.
Petersen et al. (2007) use data for the private sector in Norway, for the years 1980
to 1997. Using ﬁxed eﬀects at the occupational level they study in particular how the
parenthood penalties - or, in men’s case, a premium - are explained by occupational
sorting. They ﬁnd that the within-job penalty for women disappears over the period,
whereas there is a small and stable premium for men.
Hardoy and Schøne (2008) run separate cross-section analyses of the years 1997 and
2003. They ﬁnd that mothers with two children have 3% lower wages on average than
women with no children, and that the number is stable over the period. Using quantile
regressions, they ﬁnd that the motherhood wage penalty is largest at the top of the income
distribution. Fathers of two children have on average 5% higher wages than men who do
not have children.
3.3 Estimating the wage penalty to parenthood
The concept of a wage penalty to having children is illustrated in Figure 1. The wage
of an individual is assumed to follow a certain path, illustrated by the dotted line, along
which the wage would continue developing if the individual were not to have children.
Then (at age 30) the individual becomes a parent and his or her wages are put oﬀ from
the original path. Wages then continue developing along a diﬀerent path, illustrated by
the solid line. What is usually referred to as the parenthood wage penalty is the distance
at a certain point in time between an individual’s actual wage and the counterfactual
wage at that point. The life time wage cost of having children is the area between the
two lines over the rest of the individual’s working life.
Three stylized development scenarios are illustrated in Figure 1. In the uppermost
panel, wages are set back initially and continue to grow at the same rate as the counter-
factual wage (the dotted reference path). This means the individual’s wages never catch
up with what his or her wages would have been in the absence of children, but remain at
a constant distance. In the middle panel, though wages are set back initially they grow
faster than the reference path. The penalty thus becomes smaller over time, until wages
have caught up with the reference path - and maybe surpasses it. The lowermost panel
illustrates the case where wages continue to grow more slowly than the reference path
after the initial setback, and the penalty thus grows over time.
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As the individuals’ counterfactual wage paths can not be observed, we need to compare
parents to non-parents who are expected to follow similar wage paths - all else equal -
in order to identify the wage penalty to parenthood. The identifying assumption in this
paper, is that the wages of individuals with the same level of education, conditional on age
and individual ﬁxed eﬀects, who eventually have children - but who do not have children
yet - follow the same path as the wages of those who have children would have done in
the absence of children. Our empirical strategy is explained more in detail below.
In order to avoid the problem of selection into parenthood, we exclude individuals who
are not observed to have had children by the end of 2007. Lundberg and Rose (2000) and
Wilde et al. (2010) also correct for selection into parenthood by restricting the sample to
contain only people who eventually become parents.
In all our estimations we include individual ﬁxed eﬀects in order to take out time-
invariant unobservable heterogeneity that is correlated both with the average wage level
and with the propensity to have children at diﬀerent ages. However, as discussed in
Section 3.2.3, bias may be caused also by time-variant heterogeneity in unobservables:
People who have children early may be systematically diﬀerent from people who have
children late, in ways that matter for their wage development. We thus need to compare
individuals who are expected to follow similar wage paths, all else equal. Wilde et al.
(2010) address this problem by running separate analyses for four quartiles in the skill
distribution, as measured by Armed Forces Qualiﬁcation Scores taken at ages 14-21. We
do not have such ability measures, so we need to rely on observed realised education.
As an individual’s ultimate education level may be inﬂuenced by childbearing, we face a
trade-oﬀ between an education measure that truly reﬂects the individual’s type and wage
path on the one hand, and an education measure not too tainted by endogeneity on the
other.
Our strategy is to use individuals’ completed education at the age of 27 and in addition
only include individuals who had their ﬁrst child after the age of 23. In this way we are
able to distinguish many of those who end up having higher education.8 Our results
are robust to including individuals who had children earlier and also to using the last
observation on completed education. The diﬀerent education groups we look at are 1)
Lower secondary education or less, 2) Upper secondary education, 3) Higher education,
lower degree (four years or less of higher education) and 4) Higher education, higher
degree (more than four years of higher education).
The resulting identifying assumption for a causal interpretation of our results is that
within an education group, there is no systematic diﬀerence in the wage growth of those
8Measuring education at an earlier stage, we lose a lot of observations of higher education, higher
degree. Picking a later age of ﬁrst birth, we lose observations in the lower education groups.
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who have children at diﬀerent points in time, other than what is caused by the event of
having children itself.
Following Wilde et al. (2010), we test the issue of reverse causality - what if people
choose to start a family at a moment when they observe (or expect) wage growth to slow
down? - by a “simpliﬁed type of causality test”, and ﬁnd that, on the contrary, wages
grow faster just before the woman gets pregnant.9
3.3.2 Baseline speciﬁcation
The baseline speciﬁcation takes the form:
lnwit =πaChild[1-5]it + πbChild[6-10]it + πcChild[11-15]it (1)
+ ρaPregnantit + ρbBabyit + ρcChild[> 15]it
+ γXit + δf(Ageit) + et + vi + uit,
where i and t are the individual and year indicators, respectively. w denotes hourly
wages. The Child[*] variables are dummies for the age categories of the ﬁrst child.
Child[1-5]it is a variable taking a value between 0 and 1 according to how much of year t
individual i’s ﬁrst child is 1 to 5 years old.10
We wish to estimate the eﬀect of having a child on wages after the ﬁrst child turns
one, as family policies in Norway guarantee parents wage compensated parental leave
during the ﬁrst year. The variable Babyit, taking a value between 0 and 1 according to
how much of that year the individual had a ﬁrst-born baby younger than 1 year, takes
out the variation in wages caused by this period. Similarly, we take out the variation in
wages caused by pregnancy or the expectation of a child by using the variable Pregnantit,
which takes a value between 0 and 0.75 according to how much of the year was spent ”in
pregnancy”.11
X is a vector of controls for subsequent children (six variables for each of child number 2
and 3, constructed identically to those used for the ﬁrst child, and a sole dummy indicating
having more than three children).12 f(Age) is a fourth order polynomial in each parent’s
9We test this by including a dummy variable for “expecting” a child in the sense of having a child less
than two years later. For both men and women, in all education groups and prior to all three children,
the estimated coeﬃcients on these variable are positive - and quite often statistically signiﬁcant. The
results can be seen in Tables 10 and 11 in the Appendix.
10Child[6-10]it is a variable taking a value between 0 and 1 according to how much of year t individual
i’s ﬁrst child is 6 to 10, and Child[11-15]it is a variable taking a value between 0 and 1 according to how
much of year t individual i’s ﬁrst child is 11 to 15 years old.
11Both variables are included also in the analyses on men.
12Including variables for subsequent children may introduce selection bias to the equation, as the
measures discussed at the beginning of this section were taken to enhance the causal interpretation of the
estimated impact of the ﬁrst child only. Results are essentially unchanged when controls for subsequent
children are not included. Also, in the sample of individuals who are observed to have at least two children
by 2008, the estimated impact of the ﬁrst child is essentially the same as in our baseline speciﬁcation.
(Tables available from the authors upon request.)
49
Parenthood wage penalties
age. et is time ﬁxed eﬀects and vi is individual ﬁxed eﬀects.
Our main interest lies with the parameters πa, πb and πc, the eﬀect on wages of having
a ﬁrst child aged 1 to 5 years, 6 to 10 years and 11 to 15 years, respectively. The πs are
thus identiﬁed by comparing the wages of parents with the wages of the individuals with
the same level of education who have not yet have children, taking out individual ﬁxed
eﬀects and the variation due to age, pregnancies and caring for babies. As the dependent
variable is the natural logarithm of the wage, the interpretation of πa is that having a
child between 1 and 5 years of age reduces wages by 100πa percent. A change in πa of -0.01
means that the eﬀect of children on wages is one percentage point more negative. In terms
of Figure 1, for (weakly) negative values of the pis, πa = πb = πc would correspond to the
constant eﬀect over time of the uppermost panel, |πa| > |πb| > |πc| corresponds to the
scenario of parents’ wages catching up with their original wage path of the middle panel,
and |πa| < |πb| < |πc| corresponds to the case where parents’ wages keep deteriorating
relative to the wages of non-parents, as illustrated in the lowermost panel.
3.4 Data
Descriptive statistics for our sample of women and men are given in Table 1. The ﬁrst
8 rows in each panel gives the mean values of the variables observed in 2002. The next
ﬁve rows give the means for the variables we use to split samples in Section 3.7, and are
thus for the sample of parents with children born after 1993. These are constants for the
individual during the time window.
There are notable diﬀerences, both between men and women on average, and between
education groups. The women in our sample on average have lower wages, fewer and
younger children and are themselves younger and less experienced in the labor market,
than the men in our sample. They have on the other hand accumulated more parental
leave, and a much greater propensity to part time and public sector work.
The spread in wages is much greater for men than for women. Higher education pays
oﬀ in terms of higher hourly wage for both genders, and by about as much, hence it is the
spread within each education group that is about twice as big for men. The propensity
to work part time falls with the length of education for women, starting at 51% for the
women with only lower secondary education or less and ending with 24% for the women
in the group with highest education, but it is stable at 7% across all education groups
for men. 65% of all the women in our sample work in the public sector in 2002, in the
group of women with lower degree higher education the share is as high as 78%. The
share of men working in the public sector in 2002 is about 50% in the groups with higher
education, and about 27% in the groups with only secondary education.
84% in our sample of women who had children after 1993 took paid maternity leave








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































corresponding number is 58% in the sample of all men who had children after 1993, and
here the share is positively linked to the length of education.
3.4.1 Outcome variable: Hourly wage
Our measure of hourly wages is constructed using information on contracted hours and
monthly wages in Statistics Norway’s “Wage statistic” (“Lønnsstatistikken”). The Wage
statistic is based on employer reports for a sample of Norwegian enterprizes on all em-
ployees by the 1st of October. Every year all public enterprizes and all private enterprizes
with more than a certain number13 of employees are included, for the remaining private
sector a 50% sample of medium size enterprizes and a 20% sample of small enterprizes
is drawn every year.14 On average, the Wage statistic covers about 80% of Norwegian
employees (100% of the public sector employees and 70% of the private sector employees)
every year.
Contracted hours are given either in numbers or in percentages. Typically, public
sector enterprizes report hours in percentages and private sector enterprizes report a
number of hours per week. When reported in percentages, we use 100% = 37.5 hours per
week.15
For every employment observation we calculate hourly wages by dividing contracted
monthly wages - multiplied by 12×7/365 - by contracted hours per week. For individual’s
who are registered with more than one employment in a given year, we choose as the hourly
wage from the employment where the individual works the most contracted hours (and
in case of a tie, where he or she gets the most contracted wages) to represent the hourly
wage of the individual that year.
The resulting panel is unbalanced, both due to the sampling of medium size enterprizes,
and because people may move in and out of employment covered by the Wage statistic.
A missing observation for a given year may mean either that the person in question does
not work that year, that she is self-employed, or that she is employed in an enterprize
that is not included in that year’s sample.16
Using other oﬃcial registries we ﬁnd that about 20% of women and 7% of men who
have a missing wage observation when their ﬁrst child is 3 years old have earnings below
the basic amount (G) of the Norwegian social security system17, meaning that they are
13The number varies with industry and year.
14Employment in agriculture, hunting and forestry is left out. So are enterprizes with 3 or less employ-
ees.
15We have replaced the contracted number of hours by one tenth of the original number if it exceeds
70 hours per week, as the distribution of hours above this threshold peaks at typical numbers of hours
times ten (f.i., there are peaks at 150, 175, 350, 355 and 375 hours per week).
16In our measure of hourly wages we leave all these observations as missing. The resulting estimates
are therefore eﬀects on the intensive margin.
17 G (“Folketrygdens grunnbeløp”) is adjusted yearly (or more often) in accordance with changes in
the general income level. From January 1 2010, G is NOK 72 881 (apprioximately USD 12 500).
52
Parenthood wage penalties
marginally or not employed at all that year. About 50% of the women and 75% of the
men are registered as employed. Some of the remaining missing observations may indicate
self-employment.
As employment status is inﬂuenced by parenthood, our results may be biased if the
missing observations cover up hourly wages that are systematically diﬀerent from the ones
we observe. Missing observations due to time out of the labor force will most likely bias
our results towards zero, as the true hourly wage for those not working at all could hardly
be systematically higher than hourly wages for those working. It is less clear whether the
missing observations on self-employment or non-sampled employment hide hourly wages
that are higher or lower on average than the wages we observe.
3.4.2 Explanatory variables
The information on birth year, education and the linking of parents to their children
comes from Statistics Norway demography, family and education registers.
In Section 3.6, we include four “bad controls” in order to see to what extent they
explain the parenthood wage penalties. In Section 3.7 we divide the sample into dif-
ferent subsamples based on these four variables. Experience is constructed counting the
cumulative number of years the individual is registered with occupational income (the vari-
able “wyrkinnt” from Statistics Norways “Income registry” (“Registerbasert inntektsﬁl”))
above 1G (see footnote 17). Parental leave counts the cumulative number of days the in-
dividual has been registered with paid parental leave (the variable “erdag” from Statistics
Norway’s birth payment register (“Fødselspengeregisteret”)). Third, the variable Part
time used in Section 3.6 is constructed as a dummy variable equal to one if the individual
is registered as working 30 hours per week or less, zero if the registered number of weekly
hours is more than 30. In Section 3.7, we split the sample according to whether the individ-
ual was registered with full time or part time work the year when they had their ﬁrst child.
Because we need information going back to 1993, we use the variable “forv arb” from
Statistics Norway’s Employer/Employee register (“Arbeidstaker/arbeidsgiver-registeret”
(“Areg”)), which takes one of three values, according to whether the individual works
4-19, 20-29 and 30 or more hours per week, respectively. We include those who are regis-
tered with 30 or more hours per week in our “Full time” sample, those who are registered
with 4-29 hours per week in our “Part time” sample. Lastly, the Public sector variable
used in Section 3.6 is based on whether the individual is registered with a public sector
employment code in the Wage statistic (“stilling” is non-missing). When we split the
sample according to which sector individuals worked in the year they became parents, we
again use information from the Employer/Employee register, going back to 1993.18
18Sector of employment is not directly observable in the Employer/Employee register. We thank Ola




We study the years 1997 to 2007. Our sample consists of individuals born between 1952
(1947 if they are men) and 1990, who had their ﬁrst child when they were no younger
than 24 and no older than 40 (45) and who were observed to have at least one child by
the end of 2007. We exclude parents who at one point experience multiple births, such as
twins or triplets. For any given year, our sample consists of individuals between 21 and
50 (55) years of age.
3.5 Baseline results
The two panels of Figure 2 show the plotted age-wage proﬁles for women and men, sorted
into diﬀerent groups according to the age at which they have their ﬁrst child. The vertical
lines in the ﬁgure mark where each group start having children. Especially in the panel
for women, it is clear that wages grow at about the same pace before they have children.
When the child is born, wages ﬂatten out and continue on a diﬀerent path (what Wilde
et al. (2010) call the “mommy track”). The picture is less clear for men. For some of the
age groups (the < 25, 25-27 and 31-33 in particular) wages start lagging behind around
the time when they have children, but there is no sign of a distinct “daddy track”. The
childless men and women on average have lower wages at the outset. For men they stay in
the lower end throughout, reﬂecting a positive selection on wages of men into fatherhood.
Due to the bifurcation of the mommy track the childless women end up earning more on
average than the women who have children before they are 28 years old.
3.5.1 The impact of children on women’s hourly wages
Table 2 shows the results from regression on Equation 1 for our sample of women. On
average, having children reduces women’s wages by 2.3%. The eﬀect of having children
is strongest for the highest education group, and weakest for the lowest education group.
During the ﬁrst years after having children wages are reduced by 4.6% for those who
have a higher university degree and by 1.4% for women who do not have more than lower
secondary education.
The eﬀect does not wear oﬀ as the ﬁrst child grows older. For the highest education
category the eﬀect is stable over time, meaning that after the ﬁrst dip wages grow at the
same rate as for those who have not yet had children. This corresponds to the scenario of
the uppermost panel in Figure 1. For the three other categories, the eﬀect gets stronger
with time. This means that not only are wages reduced after the child is born, but they
also continue to grow more slowly - as in the lowermost panel of Figure 1.
Relative to estimates on U.S. data, we ﬁnd smaller wage penalties for Norwegian
women. (Waldfogel, 1997; Budig and England, 2001; Anderson et al., 2002) all ﬁnd
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Figure 2: Age-wage proﬁle by timing of ﬁrst child
Note: Plot of age and mean wage of diﬀerent timing-groups. Points are linearly connected. Mean wages
are calculated at each age, adjusted for real wage growth and reported in 1998 prices.
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Table 2: The eﬀect of children on women’s hourly wage.
All
Secondary education Higher education
Lower Upper Lower deg. Higher deg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First child
Age 1-5 -0.023*** -0.014*** -0.039*** -0.024*** -0.046***
(0.00088) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0038)
Age 6-10 -0.031*** -0.017*** -0.048*** -0.032*** -0.047***
(0.0012) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0055)
Age 11-15 -0.037*** -0.019*** -0.052*** -0.040*** -0.043***
(0.0015) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0071)
Age >15 -0.040*** -0.019*** -0.050*** -0.043*** -0.041***
(0.0017) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0024) (0.0088)
Second child
Age 1-5 -0.012*** -0.00051 -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.037***
(0.00079) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0037)
Age 6-10 -0.015*** -0.0047** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.035***
(0.0011) (0.0023) (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0055)
Age 11-15 -0.017*** -0.0074*** -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.037***
(0.0013) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0073)
Age >15 -0.016*** -0.0065** -0.022*** -0.031*** -0.038***
(0.0015) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0023) (0.0094)
Third child
Age 1-5 -0.0069*** 0.0013 -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.039***
(0.0011) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0049)
Age 6-10 -0.0084*** -0.0035 -0.020*** -0.023*** -0.043***
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0018) (0.0070)
Age 11-15 -0.0061*** -0.0050 -0.022*** -0.027*** -0.051***
(0.0016) (0.0033) (0.0036) (0.0022) (0.0095)
Age >15 -0.0027 -0.0066* -0.0076* -0.029*** -0.048***
(0.0019) (0.0037) (0.0046) (0.0027) (0.014)
Observations 2426818 672269 610888 1024431 119230
Note: Each column provides FE estimates from a regression based on Equation 1. Year dummies, a
polynomial in age and individual ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all speciﬁcations. So are controls for
pregnancy, having a baby younger than one year and for having more than 3 children. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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estimated wage penalties for the ﬁrst child of 4 to 6% with ﬁxed eﬀects estimation pooling
all education groups, i.e. a similar speciﬁcation to the one reported in column (1) of Table
2. Our estimate is around half the size. Wilde et al. (2010) use the method most similar to
ours, by including only women who are observed to become mothers in the time window
and by estimating the wage penalty separately for diﬀerent skill groups. They ﬁnd a
negative wage eﬀect of children of 7% for low skilled women and of 10% for high skilled
women during the ﬁrst four years after ﬁrst birth. They ﬁnd that the eﬀect is increasing
substantially in the years following, implying a much greater impact of children also on
wage growth than the one we ﬁnd for Norway.
Further children
Our empirical strategy, as described in Section 3.3.1, is directed at identifying the causal
eﬀect of the ﬁrst child only. As our sample is restricted to parents observed to have at
least one child, bias may result from adding controls for further children. We have carried
out several alternative estimations, such as not controlling for subsequent children and
restricting the sample to parents who are observed eventually to have at least two or at
least three children, and the estimates of the eﬀect of the ﬁrst child are robust to them
all.19
The estimated impact of the second and third child must nevertheless be interpreted
with caution (although they do not change substantially when limiting the sample to
individuals observed to have at least two and three children, respectively). There is an
additional negative eﬀect on wages of having a second and a third child for women. The
eﬀect is slightly smaller than the eﬀect of the ﬁrst child, but the patterns prevail: The
eﬀect is stronger for higher education groups, and it does not wear oﬀ with time.
The same pattern is found on U.S. data; the motherhood wage penalty is double
(Anderson et al., 2002), or three times as large (Waldfogel, 1997; Budig and England,
2001) for two children or more. Wilde et al. (2010) also include a variable for number of
additional children, and ﬁnd each additional child has about half as large an impact as
the ﬁrst child.
3.5.2 The impact of children on men’s hourly wages
Table 3 gives the results on the wage penalties to fatherhood. In our whole sample of
men, irrespective of education level, the average eﬀect of having children is not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at conventional levels. However, when we estimate the eﬀect on wages
separately for the four education groups we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant negative eﬀects
in all groups except for those who have no more than lower secondary education, where
there is a positive and not statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect at .1%. For the other groups,
19Tables are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 3: The eﬀect of children on men’s hourly wage.
All
Secondary education Higher education
Lower Upper Lower deg. Higher deg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First child
Age 1-5 0.00091 0.0014 -0.0059*** -0.0041** -0.0051
(0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0038)
Age 6-10 -0.0045*** 0.0024 -0.0088*** -0.012*** -0.0048
(0.0014) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0052)
Age 11-15 -0.0087*** 0.00057 -0.0088*** -0.015*** -0.0058
(0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0063)
Age >15 -0.011*** -0.00053 -0.0075** -0.016*** -0.0095
(0.0019) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0074)
Second child
Age 1-5 0.0094*** 0.011*** 0.0019 0.00041 0.00083
(0.00098) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0036)
Age 6-10 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.0033 0.00037 0.0057
(0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0047)
Age 11-15 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.0028 0.000059 0.014**
(0.0016) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0059)
Age >15 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.0041 0.0012 0.014**
(0.0018) (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0070)
Third child
Age 1-5 0.010*** 0.0092*** 0.0073*** 0.0021 -0.0013
(0.0013) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0046)
Age 6-10 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.0085*** 0.0036 -0.0011
(0.0016) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0058)
Age 11-15 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.0059* -0.0013
(0.0019) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0070)
Age >15 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.0047 -0.011
(0.0022) (0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0040) (0.0081)
Observations 2904039 997512 931936 754604 219987
Note: Each column provides FE estimates from a regression based on Equation 1. Year dummies, a
polynomial in age and individual ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all speciﬁcations. So are controls for
pregnancy, having a baby younger than one year and for having more than 3 children. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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having children causes a .4 to .6% decrease in wages during the ﬁrst years after the child
is born. For men in the two middle education groups, the eﬀect grows signiﬁcantly as the
child gets older.
The statistically and economically signiﬁcant wage penalty to fatherhood that we ﬁnd
here contrasts the ﬁndings of other studies on U.S. data (Lundberg and Rose, 2000, 2002;
Simonsen and Skipper, 2008). Most of these studies include all men. Wilde et al. (2010)
restrict their sample to those who become fathers and they also ﬁnd small negative eﬀects
on wages of becoming a father. When we include men who are not observed to become
fathers by 2008 in our sample, we ﬁnd a much stronger positive association between having
children and men’s wages in the whole sample of men (see Table 13 in the Appendix).
The pattern also applies in the diﬀerent subgroups according to level of education, but
the diﬀerence between including all men and including only eventual fathers does not
matter as much here, except for in the group with lower secondary education or less. It
thus seems that the main methodological reason for our contrasting ﬁndings on the wage
penalty to fatherhood is the splitting into subsamples based on level of education, although
restricting the sample to fathers-to-be only also plays a role. Apart from methodology,
clearly the diﬀerence in institutional setting - both at the formal and at the informal level
- between Norway and the U.S. may also matter for the diverging ﬁndings.
Further children
In Table 3 we see that having a second and a third child is positively associated with the
level of men’s wages. As for women, the warning about a causal interpretation of these
estimates applies here - even to a larger extent. When we restrict the sample of men to
those who are eventually observed to have at least two and at least three children, the
estimated impact of the second and third child respectively becomes negative.20
3.6 Explaining the wage penalties to parenthood.
We investigate the determinants of the motherhood wage penalty in two diﬀerent ways. In
this section, we are concerned with the question of to what extent changes in observable
circumstances explain the observed wage eﬀect of children. The observables we have
in mind are work experience, parental leave, part time work and sector of employment.
These variables are explained more in detail in Section 3.4.2.
The results are displayed in Table 4. Because reliable data for parental leave exist only
from 1993 onwards, the measure of paid parental leave can be constructed in the same
way for all individuals only if they had their ﬁrst child in 1993 or later. The sample is
therefore restricted in this way. This means that we observe parents’ wages until the ﬁrst
20The baseline estimation of the wage penalty to fatherhood for the ﬁrst child is however robust to
having no controls for further children at all. Tables are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 4: The eﬀect of children on women’s hourly wage. Including controls for experience,
parental leave, part time and sector of employment.
All
Secondary education Higher education
Lower Upper Lower deg. Higher deg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Baseline
First child
Age 1-5 -0.030*** -0.019*** -0.039*** -0.025*** -0.044***
(0.00096) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0040)
Age 6-10 -0.044*** -0.024*** -0.046*** -0.033*** -0.045***
(0.0014) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0060)
Age 11-13 -0.052*** -0.027*** -0.045*** -0.039*** -0.036***
(0.0020) (0.0046) (0.0038) (0.0029) (0.0094)
Observations 1232595 207023 337515 601793 86264
Panel B: Including explanatory variables
First child
Age 1-5 -0.033*** -0.022*** -0.044*** -0.030*** -0.041***
(0.0012) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0016) (0.0050)
Age 6-10 -0.047*** -0.027*** -0.052*** -0.038*** -0.041***
(0.0016) (0.0041) (0.0032) (0.0022) (0.0067)
Age 11-13 -0.055*** -0.031*** -0.051*** -0.044*** -0.033***
(0.0022) (0.0051) (0.0042) (0.0031) (0.0099)
Experience 0.0036*** 0.0047*** 0.0052*** 0.0019* 0.0077**
(0.00070) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0037)
Parental leave -0.0021** -0.0037 -0.00075 0.00063 -0.0037
(0.00089) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0034)
Part time 0.017*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.017*** -0.00052
(0.00046) (0.0012) (0.00095) (0.00060) (0.0019)
Public sector 0.0045*** -0.0077*** -0.0063*** 0.022*** -0.0051*
(0.00065) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0027)
Observations 1232595 207023 337515 601793 86264
Note: Each column in each panel provides FE estimates from a regression based on Equation 1 for the
sample of individuals who had their ﬁrst child in 1994 or later. Year dummies, a polynomial in age,
individual ﬁxed eﬀects and a set of dummies for having a second and a third child at various ages are
included in all speciﬁcations. So are controls for pregnancy, having a baby younger than one year and
for having more than 3 children. In the lower panel additional controls are included. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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child is 13 years old, at most, in 2007. In Panel A are the baseline results from estimating
Equation 1 for this sample. Results are very similar to those for the whole sample, given
in Table 2. In Panel B, the potential explanatory variables are included in the regression.
Comparing the two panels of Table 4, we see that inclusion of these variables does not
signiﬁcantly alter the coeﬃcients. If anything, the estimated impact of children is larger
when they are included. The results when we include only one variable at the time (given
in Table 14 in the Appendix) show that adding measures for experience, maternity leave
and sector of work does not alter the estimated impact of having children on women’s
wages. However, when a dummy for working less than 30 hours per week is added, the
estimated wage penalty becomes greater. It is thus the case that working part time, in
itself positively associated with hourly wage in all education groups (except in the highest
one where there is no signiﬁcant association), is also positively correlated with having
children. When the part time dummy is omitted from the analysis, the eﬀect of children
on wages is smaller because switching to part time work ameliorates the wage penalty to
motherhood.
The economically insigniﬁcant role of experience, part time work and parental leave
in explaining the motherhood wage penalties are surprising, as these variables are found
to explain a large part of the motherhood wage penalty in other countries (Waldfogel,
1997; Lundberg and Rose, 2000; Budig and England, 2001; Datta Gupta and Smith,
2002; Anderson et al., 2002; Wilde et al., 2010). One possible explanations for this is that
policies of job protection during child related absence from work have an eﬀect. A less
optimistic explanation is that career breaks around birth are already accounted for in the
wage oﬀer that the woman gets even before pregnancy. This is the reasoning in Albrecht
et al. (1999), who do not ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of child related career breaks for Swedish
women. It could also be that women have already chosen jobs where the negative eﬀects
of a career break are small.
In themselves, experience and part time work are generally positively associated with
the level of wages, whereas maternity leave seems to matter very little - if anything at
all - for wages. Public sector work is negatively associated with wages in all education
categories except for the one with lower degree higher education, where the association is
strong and positive. If women choose to work in the public sector because they plan to
have children (and think it is easier to combine with a public sector job), the true eﬀect
of having children on women’s wages is larger than our estimates, as some of the cost is
taken even before birth.
In Table 5 the corresponding results are given for men, for the sample who had their
ﬁrst child in 1993 or later. Panel A shows that in this sample the average eﬀect of children
on wages for all men, irrespective of level of education, is negative, at .6%. This sample
thus diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the sample used in Section 3.5. This is reﬂected in a stronger
wage penalty estimated for the two middle education groups, at .8 and .6% respectively
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Table 5: The eﬀect of children on men’s hourly wage. Including controls for experience,
parental leave, part time and sector of employment.
All
Secondary education Higher education
Lower Upper Lower deg. Higher deg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Baseline
First child
Age 1-5 -0.0062*** -0.00041 -0.0076*** -0.0055*** -0.0022
(0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0041)
Age 6-10 -0.016*** 0.00068 -0.012*** -0.012*** 0.0028
(0.0017) (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0059)
Age 11-13 -0.024*** -0.00023 -0.016*** -0.016*** 0.014
(0.0025) (0.0047) (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0087)
Observations 1319323 321843 494896 393653 108931
Panel B: Including explanatory variables
First child
Age 1-5 -0.0049*** 0.00046 -0.0039** -0.0021 0.0034
(0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0042)
Age 6-10 -0.015*** 0.0016 -0.0085*** -0.0089*** 0.0077
(0.0018) (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0060)
Age 11-13 -0.022*** 0.00065 -0.013*** -0.013*** 0.019**
(0.0025) (0.0047) (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0088)
Experience -0.0080*** -0.0011 -0.0013 0.0052** 0.0038
(0.0015) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0043)
Parental leave -0.013*** -0.010 -0.047*** -0.038*** -0.046***
(0.0028) (0.0068) (0.0054) (0.0044) (0.0073)
Part time -0.00062 0.024*** 0.026*** -0.019*** -0.047***
(0.0014) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0020) (0.0046)
Public sector -0.0065*** -0.011*** -0.0034*** 0.012*** -0.015***
(0.00070) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0023)
Observations 1319323 321843 494896 393653 108931
Note: Each column in each panel provides FE estimates from a regression based on Equation 1 for the
sample of individuals who had their ﬁrst child in 1994 or later. Year dummies, a polynomial in age,
individual ﬁxed eﬀects and a set of dummies for having a second and a third child at various ages are
included in all speciﬁcations. So are controls for pregnancy, having a baby younger than one year and
for having more than 3 children. In the lower panel additional controls are included. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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(columns (3) and (4)).
When we include the potentially explanatory variables in the regression the impact is
signiﬁcant, although 79% of the eﬀect estimated for the whole sample is left unexplained.
The coeﬃcient on having a ﬁrst child aged between 1 and 5 years is no longer signiﬁcant
for the group with higher education, lower degree (column (4)), and for the group with
upper secondary education it is cut in half. Also the persistence of the eﬀect, reﬂected in
the coeﬃcients on having a ﬁrst child aged 6 to 10 years and 11 to 14 years, is reduced,
although not by as much.
Including each of these variables separately shows that the wage penalty to fatherhood
does not at all covary with experience, part time work or sector of employment (the results
are displayed in Table 15 in the Appendix). It is the inclusion of parental leave that
matters for the estimated eﬀect on men’s wages of having children. In the two groups
where having children does have a statistically signiﬁcant impact on men’s wages, the
inclusion of paternity leave as an explanatory variable explains a substantial part of the
eﬀect.
The variation in parental leave in itself explains a great deal of men’s hourly wages.
For the three highest education groups (columns (3) to (5)), one year of parental leave
is associated with a 4 to 5% reduction in wages - more than the whole wage penalty
for women, who typically take somewhat less than a year of leave. We are not able to
determine to what extent this is due to the adverse eﬀect of paternity leave on human
capital accumulation or whether the length of paternity leave reﬂects men’s propensity to
spend more eﬀort at home relative to market work, thereby reducing wages. The ﬁnding
that parental leave is more strongly associated with the wage eﬀects of parenthood for
men than for women is in accordance with Albrecht et al. (1999)’s ﬁnding in their study
on Swedish data. They ﬁnd that career breaks around birth are associated with negative
wage eﬀects only for men, not for women. Their interpretation is that the negative wage
eﬀect stems from the employer oﬀering lower wages to women even before they have
children because they expect women to have a career break around birth. Employers do
not expect the same from men, and parental leave is therefore a stronger signal of the
strength of men’s commitment to market work. Another possible explanation that would
give the same empirical pattern, however, is that men to a larger extent than women
choose jobs where a career break has a larger eﬀect.
Part time work is associated with higher wages for those with only secondary education
(columns (2) and (3)) and with lower wages for those with higher education (columns (4)
and (5)). Public sector work is generally associated with having lower wages, except for




In this section we investigate whether the wage penalty is stronger for some groups than
for others. We do this by running separate regressions on diﬀerent subgroups; on those
who take relatively longer or shorter parental leave, on those who work full time and part
time, and on those who work in the public or in the private sector. Individuals are sorted
into groups based on the observed length of parental leave taken with the ﬁrst child, or
according to sector or working time category the year before their ﬁrst child is born. As
the variables we condition on are available from 1993 onwards, we limit the sample to
individuals having their ﬁrst child after 1993 (like in Section 3.6).
3.7.1 Parental leave
Probably the most direct labor market eﬀect of having children is the period of parental
leave.21. In Tables 6 and 7, we investigate whether parenthood wage eﬀects are stronger
for those who take relatively longer leave. We have divided the samples in four: Those
who take no, little, middle and long leave. The division into “little”, “middle” and “long”
is based on the assigned percentile in the distribution of all parents of the same sex
with children born in the same quarter of the year. The distribution is divided in three.
For men, though, there is very little spread in the number of leave days taken, and the
middle group - containing only 2140 individuals (.16% of the sample) - has therefore been
excluded from the analysis.
Among the parents who are not registered with taking any paid parental leave are both
individuals who have have not earned the right to paid parental leave and individuals who
may have earned the right but do not use it. It is very uncommon for women not to use
the right to maternity leave, hence the group of women taking no leave can generally be
thought of as consisting of women who did not earn the right. For men, it is much more
common not to take the paid leave granted them. Also, men’s right to wage compensated
paternity leave does not only depend on their own earned right but also on the child’s
mother having earned the right. Hence the group of men taking no leave is more mixed,
consisting of men who did not earn the right, men whose spouse did not earn the right,
and men who have the right to paid parental leave but do not use it.
The results for women are given in Table 6. On average, there is not much variation in
the immediate eﬀect of having children between the four groups, and though there is some
variation within each education group according to the relative length of maternity leave
taken with the ﬁrst child, there is no clear pattern of statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the groups. In the group of women with the highest education (column (5)),
taking longer leave, relative to taking no leave at all, is clearly associated with a greater
21Table 1 shows that in our sample of parents who had their ﬁrst child in 1994 or later, women on
average took .7 years of paid leave with their ﬁrst child, and men .05 years.
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Table 6: The eﬀect of children on women’s hourly wage. Subsample analysis according
to relative length of parental leave.
All
Secondary education Higher education
Lower Upper Lower deg. Higher deg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: No parental leave
First child
Age 1-5 -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.048*** -0.013** -0.020
(0.0039) (0.0090) (0.0080) (0.0052) (0.017)
Age 6-10 -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.037*** -0.012* -0.045**
(0.0051) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0069) (0.022)
Age 11-13 -0.029*** -0.028** -0.025 -0.017* -0.062*
(0.0070) (0.014) (0.015) (0.0098) (0.032)
Observations 199415 39353 47206 98259 14597
Panel B: Short length parental leave
First child
Age 1-5 -0.023*** -0.012*** -0.031*** -0.023*** -0.041***
(0.0018) (0.0042) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0073)
Age 6-10 -0.035*** -0.015** -0.037*** -0.029*** -0.044***
(0.0026) (0.0061) (0.0048) (0.0038) (0.011)
Age 11-13 -0.040*** -0.012 -0.036*** -0.032*** -0.035**
(0.0037) (0.0082) (0.0066) (0.0055) (0.017)
Observations 347595 65467 100336 157854 23938
Panel C: Middle length parental leave
First child
Age 1-5 -0.030*** -0.015*** -0.045*** -0.026*** -0.049***
(0.0018) (0.0043) (0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0085)
Age 6-10 -0.046*** -0.017*** -0.058*** -0.035*** -0.053***
(0.0027) (0.0063) (0.0050) (0.0039) (0.013)
Age 11-13 -0.058*** -0.023*** -0.061*** -0.043*** -0.050**
(0.0039) (0.0083) (0.0070) (0.0056) (0.020)
Observations 316632 57262 94689 146580 18101
Panel D: Long length parental leave
First child
Age 1-5 -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.042*** -0.018*** -0.049***
(0.0021) (0.0062) (0.0043) (0.0027) (0.0076)
Age 6-10 -0.038*** -0.033*** -0.049*** -0.028*** -0.048***
(0.0030) (0.0084) (0.0060) (0.0039) (0.011)
Age 11-13 -0.052*** -0.050*** -0.055*** -0.042*** -0.028*
(0.0041) (0.011) (0.0083) (0.0054) (0.017)
Observations 368953 44941 95284 199100 29628
Note: Each column in each panel provides FE estimates from a regression based on Equation 1 for the
sample of individuals who had their ﬁrst child in 1994 or later. Year dummies, a polynomial in age,
individual ﬁxed eﬀects and controls for further children, being pregnant and having a baby younger than
one year are included in all speciﬁcations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
65
Parenthood wage penalties
Table 7: The eﬀect of children on men’s hourly wage. Subsample analysis according to
relative length of parental leave.
All
Secondary education Higher education
Lower Upper Lower deg. Higher deg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: No parental leave
First child
Age 1-5 -0.016*** -0.0068* -0.0088*** -0.013*** 0.0021
(0.0020) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0077)
Age 6-10 -0.028*** -0.0091* -0.015*** -0.025*** 0.015
(0.0029) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0054) (0.011)
Age 11-13 -0.040*** -0.013** -0.024*** -0.030*** 0.019
(0.0040) (0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0078) (0.015)
Observations 559026 166016 202312 151866 38832
Panel B: Short length parental leave
First child
Age 1-5 0.0020 0.0037 -0.0026 0.00083 0.00065
(0.0016) (0.0035) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0062)
Age 6-10 -0.0057** 0.0068 -0.0057 -0.0031 0.00100
(0.0024) (0.0050) (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0089)
Age 11-13 -0.013*** 0.0056 -0.0090 -0.0073 0.015
(0.0035) (0.0070) (0.0055) (0.0063) (0.013)
Observations 628880 137075 253575 190723 47507
Panel C: Long length parental leave
First child
Age 1-5 -0.015*** -0.0020 -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.017**
(0.0033) (0.0085) (0.0065) (0.0048) (0.0078)
Age 6-10 -0.020*** 0.013 -0.021** -0.020*** -0.016
(0.0049) (0.012) (0.0094) (0.0074) (0.011)
Age 11-13 -0.018** 0.031* -0.018 -0.025** 0.0029
(0.0076) (0.018) (0.015) (0.012) (0.018)
Observations 129277 18414 37949 50460 22454
Note: Each column in each panel provides FE estimates from a regression based on Equation 1 for the
sample of individuals who had their ﬁrst child in 1994 or later. Year dummies, a polynomial in age,
individual ﬁxed eﬀects and controls for further children, being pregnant and having a baby younger than
one year are included in all speciﬁcations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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wage penalty to having children the ﬁrst four years after the wage compensated maternity
leave period is over. For the two groups with no more than secondary education (columns
(2) and (3)), the wage penalty during the ﬁrst years is stronger for the group who does
not take paid maternity leave, and then it is increasing in the relative length of the leave
period. All in all, it does not seem that the wage penalty to motherhood is not very
clearly linked to the length of maternity leave - as is also found by Albrecht et al. (1999).
For the women who are registered with middle and longer periods of paid maternity
leave, the wage penalty grows signiﬁcantly with time in all education groups but the
highest one, expressing a pattern of increasing diﬀerences between actual wages and the
reference path, as illustrated in the lowermost panel of Figure 1. Taking longer leave is
thus associated with a larger negative eﬀect both on wage levels and wage growth.
The results for men are given in Table 7. For men, there is a U-shaped relationship
between the penalty and the propensity to take leave. The wage penalty to fatherhood is
greatest for the group of men taking no leave and the group of men taking longer leave
than what is usual. Again, this is in line with the ﬁndings of Albrecht et al. (1999).22
The average wage penalty in these two groups of men is considerable, at about 1.5%.
3.7.2 Full time vs. part time employment
Having children is associated with a reduction in working hours both for men and women
- but mainly for women (Cools and Strøm, 2012). As we saw in Section 3.6, changing
working time status to part time is what correlates most with a motherhood wage penalty.
Here we investigate whether wage penalties are smaller for those who already work part
time before having children. However, if part time work is chosen in advance because the
individual plans to have a child, this would cause an upward bias in our estimates of the
eﬀect of having children.
The results for women are given in Panel A and B in Table 11. On average the negative
wage eﬀects of having children are two to three times stronger for the women who were
registered with full time employment the year before they had children, compared to the
women who had part time employment before having children. Also, on average, there is
a clear pattern of the wage penalty increasing over time for the group of full time working
women, reaching a wage reduction of 6.2% when the ﬁrst child turns 11 years old. In
the very small group of women with the highest education who worked part time before
having children, we see the ﬁrst instance of a wage premium to having children, reaching
7.8% and signiﬁcant at the 5% level by the time the child turns 11 years old.
Panel C and D in Table 11 give the corresponding results for men. Here, the diﬀerence
between the two groups is even more striking. The men who worked full time before
22It is not necessary, however, to evoke the employer as a signal taker, ﬁnding more new information
in men’s parental leave behavior than in women’s. It may also be that the group of men taking relatively
longer leave is just a select group of male employees who give less priority to their careers after having
children than men who take shorter paternity leave do.
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Table 8: The eﬀect of children on hourly wage. Subsample analysis according to being
employed full time or part time the year before having children.
All
Secondary education Higher education
Lower Upper Lower deg. Higher deg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Full time, women
First child
Age 1-5 -0.035*** -0.020*** -0.043*** -0.029*** -0.050***
(0.0011) (0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0043)
Age 6-10 -0.051*** -0.028*** -0.052*** -0.039*** -0.052***
(0.0017) (0.0043) (0.0032) (0.0022) (0.0065)
Age 11-13 -0.062*** -0.032*** -0.054*** -0.048*** -0.040***
(0.0024) (0.0058) (0.0045) (0.0033) (0.010)
Observations 887958 122553 242040 452112 71253
Panel B: Part time, women
First child
Age 1-5 -0.013*** -0.0081 -0.023*** -0.011*** 0.020
(0.0026) (0.0053) (0.0046) (0.0040) (0.018)
Age 6-10 -0.019*** -0.013* -0.031*** -0.011* 0.037
(0.0038) (0.0075) (0.0067) (0.0058) (0.025)
Age 11-13 -0.022*** -0.022** -0.028*** -0.011 0.078**
(0.0053) (0.010) (0.0094) (0.0082) (0.037)
Observations 186753 42881 57651 81316 4905
Panel C: Full time, men
First child
Age 1-5 -0.0088*** -0.0013 -0.0085*** -0.0079*** -0.0021
(0.0013) (0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0044)
Age 6-10 -0.024*** -0.0044 -0.016*** -0.018*** 0.0011
(0.0019) (0.0038) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0064)
Age 11-13 -0.037*** -0.0094* -0.021*** -0.027*** 0.0090
(0.0028) (0.0054) (0.0044) (0.0052) (0.0094)
Observations 1041909 232554 412447 306987 89921
Panel D: Part time, men
First child
Age 1-5 0.0100** 0.0036 0.0086 0.018** -0.020
(0.0048) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0073) (0.021)
Age 6-10 0.027*** 0.023* 0.019 0.036*** 0.012
(0.0069) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.029)
Age 11-13 0.043*** 0.027 0.022 0.065*** 0.057
(0.0099) (0.020) (0.019) (0.015) (0.043)
Observations 86209 22292 25031 34136 4750
Note: Each column in each panel provides FE estimates from a regression based on Equation 1 for the
sample of individuals who had their ﬁrst child in 1994 or later. Year dummies, a polynomial in age,
individual ﬁxed eﬀects and controls for further children, being pregnant and having a baby younger than
one year are included in all speciﬁcations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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becoming fathers on average experience a wage penalty to fatherhood, at .9%. This is a
50% larger penalty than the .6% wage penalty estimated for the whole sample given in
Table 5. The penalty grows signiﬁcantly over time, like the case is for women who work
full time before having children. The wage penalty estimated for the sample of full time
working men is on average stronger than for the part time working women, especially as
the ﬁrst child grows older.
For men who worked part time before becoming fathers, on the other hand, there
are statistically signiﬁcant wage premia to fatherhood when looking at the whole sample
(column (1) in Panel D) and in the group with higher education, lower degree. The
premium is growing over time.
3.7.3 Sector of employment
Working in the public sector is seen as more “family-friendly” than the private sector
because of less overtime, more centrally set wages (hence less prone to be inﬂuenced by
having children) and generally lower risk of job loss. The cost is that wages in the public
sector are generally lower than in the private sector. The variation in wages in the public
sector is smaller than the variation in wages in the private sector - and potentially also
the parenthood wage eﬀects.
Looking at the results in Table 9, it is clear that the wage penalty to parenthood is
larger in the private than in the public sector. For men, there is no wage penalty at all
in the public sector, whereas there is a 1% wage reduction in the private sector for all
education groups except for the one with no more than lower secondary education. For
women, the wage penalty in the public sector is only slightly higher than the one men face
in the private sector. In the private sector, the wage penalty to motherhood is three times
higher on average than in the public sector. For women in both the public and private
enterprizes and for men in the private sector, the wage penalty to parenthood grows over
time.
3.8 Concluding remarks
In spite of the encouragement built into the labor market institutions of the Nordic coun-
tries to combine work and family, the two remain in conﬂict, as is pointed out by the wage
penalties to parenthood documented in this paper. Like in most other countries, women
bear the greater share of the cost of having children also in Norway.
The wage penalties to motherhood are substantial for the women who have more to
lose in terms of a career by having children; the higher educated women, the women
working full and in the private sector. Contrary to what other studies have found using
U.S. data, the wage penalty to motherhood is not at all explained by time spent out of
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Table 9: The eﬀect of children on hourly wage. Subsample analysis according to being
employed in the public or in the private sector the year before having children.
All
Secondary education Higher education
Lower Upper Lower deg. Higher deg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Public sector, women
First child
Age 1-5 -0.018*** -0.000098 -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.034***
(0.0011) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0014) (0.0049)
Age 6-10 -0.030*** -0.0062 -0.027*** -0.022*** -0.029***
(0.0017) (0.0046) (0.0037) (0.0022) (0.0074)
Age 11-13 -0.039*** -0.015** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.014
(0.0025) (0.0062) (0.0053) (0.0032) (0.012)
Observations 647501 81813 129469 390330 45889
Panel B: Private sector, women
First child
Age 1-5 -0.056*** -0.035*** -0.060*** -0.056*** -0.065***
(0.0019) (0.0041) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0073)
Age 6-10 -0.078*** -0.041*** -0.067*** -0.071*** -0.081***
(0.0028) (0.0059) (0.0043) (0.0049) (0.011)
Age 11-13 -0.092*** -0.041*** -0.068*** -0.081*** -0.080***
(0.0040) (0.0080) (0.0059) (0.0071) (0.017)
Observations 427210 83621 170222 143098 30269
Panel C: Public sector, men
First child
Age 1-5 0.0010 0.0062 0.00058 0.00020 0.0092
(0.0018) (0.0046) (0.0036) (0.0026) (0.0061)
Age 6-10 -0.00061 0.0056 0.00015 0.00033 0.023***
(0.0027) (0.0069) (0.0053) (0.0038) (0.0088)
Age 11-13 -0.0023 0.0024 0.0000059 -0.0025 0.040***
(0.0040) (0.0095) (0.0075) (0.0057) (0.013)
Observations 357603 53382 94413 169848 39960
Panel D: Private sector, men
First child
Age 1-5 -0.012*** -0.0032 -0.011*** -0.0099*** -0.012**
(0.0016) (0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0035) (0.0058)
Age 6-10 -0.031*** -0.0041 -0.019*** -0.025*** -0.014*
(0.0024) (0.0043) (0.0035) (0.0052) (0.0084)
Age 11-13 -0.047*** -0.0084 -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.0051
(0.0035) (0.0062) (0.0051) (0.0078) (0.013)
Observations 770515 201464 343065 171275 54711
Note: Each column in each panel provides FE estimates from a regression based on Equation 1 for the
sample of individuals who had their ﬁrst child in 1994 or later. Year dummies, a polynomial in age,
individual ﬁxed eﬀects and controls for further children, being pregnant and having a baby younger than
one year are included in all speciﬁcations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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the labor force. After returning to work, mothers bear the cost of having children to a
larger extent than fathers do.
Contrary to earlier studies, both on U.S. and Norwegian data, we ﬁnd negative (though
comparatively small) wage penalties also to fatherhood. This is consistent with men’s
increasing involvement in child rearing - hence experiencing a private cost in terms of
lower wages. Parenthood is associated with a larger wage gap between men and women
in most countries. This still applies to Norway, but to a lesser extent.
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Table 10: The eﬀect of children on women’s hourly wage. Including dummies for the
years before having children.
All
Secondary education Higher education
Lower Upper Lower deg. Higher deg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First child
2 yrs pp 0.016*** 0.0064*** 0.00082 0.011*** 0.0091***
(0.00080) (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0032)
Age 1-5 -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.040*** -0.017*** -0.042***
(0.0012) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0053)
Age 6-10 -0.020*** -0.014*** -0.049*** -0.024*** -0.040***
(0.0015) (0.0033) (0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0069)
Age 11-15 -0.025*** -0.016*** -0.054*** -0.030*** -0.036***
(0.0017) (0.0036) (0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0084)
Age >15 -0.027*** -0.016*** -0.052*** -0.032*** -0.033***
(0.0019) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0028) (0.0099)
Second child
2 yrs pp 0.010*** 0.0076*** 0.0076*** 0.0056*** 0.0077**
(0.00081) (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0035)
Age 1-5 -0.0051*** 0.0032 -0.017*** -0.014*** -0.031***
(0.00097) (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0046)
Age 6-10 -0.0072*** -0.00070 -0.023*** -0.019*** -0.029***
(0.0012) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0063)
Age 11-15 -0.0075*** -0.0032 -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.030***
(0.0014) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0080)
Age >15 -0.0062*** -0.0021 -0.019*** -0.023*** -0.030***
(0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0034) (0.0025) (0.0100)
Third child
2 yrs pp 0.0083*** 0.0072** 0.0079*** 0.0016 0.0093**
(0.0011) (0.0032) (0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0047)
Age 1-5 -0.0031*** 0.0043 -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.035***
(0.0012) (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0016) (0.0054)
Age 6-10 -0.0042*** -0.00033 -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.038***
(0.0015) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0020) (0.0074)
Age 11-15 -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.019*** -0.025*** -0.046***
(0.0017) (0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0023) (0.0098)
Age >15 0.0023 -0.0033 -0.0046 -0.026*** -0.043***
(0.0020) (0.0040) (0.0047) (0.0028) (0.014)
Observations 2426818 672269 610888 1024431 119230
Note: Each column provides FE estimates from a regression based on Equation 1. Year dummies, a
polynomial in age and individual ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all speciﬁcations. So are controls for
pregnancy, having a baby younger than one year and for having more than 3 children. In addition three
dummies are included for observations in the two years preceding the three ﬁrst pregnancies. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 11: The eﬀect of children on men’s hourly wage. Including dummies for the years
before having children.
All
Secondary education Higher education
Lower Upper Lower deg. Higher deg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First child
2 yrs pp 0.012*** 0.0045** 0.0023 0.0060*** 0.0012
(0.00096) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0033)
Age 1-5 0.0067*** 0.0028 -0.0050** -0.00072 -0.0068
(0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0050)
Age 6-10 0.0030* 0.0042 -0.0075*** -0.0072** -0.0065
(0.0017) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0063)
Age 11-15 -0.00019 0.0026 -0.0074** -0.0097*** -0.0074
(0.0020) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0074)
Age >15 -0.0020 0.0016 -0.0059 -0.011*** -0.011
(0.0022) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0083)
Second child
2 yrs pp 0.0077*** 0.0057*** 0.0024 0.0024 0.0064*
(0.00099) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0036)
Age 1-5 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.0032 0.0023 0.0045
(0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0045)
Age 6-10 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.0048* 0.0029 0.0096*
(0.0015) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0055)
Age 11-15 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.0044 0.0029 0.017***
(0.0017) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0066)
Age >15 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.0058* 0.0043 0.018**
(0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0077)
Third child
2 yrs pp 0.0038*** -0.0012 0.0013 0.0025 -0.00096
(0.0014) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0044)
Age 1-5 0.012*** 0.0090*** 0.0078*** 0.0032 -0.0014
(0.0015) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0052)
Age 6-10 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.0092*** 0.0049 -0.0011
(0.0018) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0063)
Age 11-15 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.0074** -0.0013
(0.0021) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0074)
Age >15 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.0065 -0.011
(0.0024) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0085)
Observations 2904039 997512 931936 754604 219987
Note: Each column provides FE estimates from a regression based on Equation 1. Year dummies, a
polynomial in age and individual ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all speciﬁcations. So are controls for
pregnancy, having a baby younger than one year and for having more than 3 children. In addition three
dummies are included for observations in the two years preceding the three ﬁrst pregnancies. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 12: The eﬀect of children on women’s hourly wage, including women who are not
observed to have children in the sample.
All
Secondary education Higher education
Lower Upper Lower deg. Higher deg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First child
Age 1-5 -0.0098*** -0.017*** -0.038*** -0.024*** -0.045***
(0.00078) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0037)
Age 6-10 -0.013*** -0.021*** -0.049*** -0.032*** -0.046***
(0.0010) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0053)
Age 11-15 -0.016*** -0.024*** -0.055*** -0.039*** -0.043***
(0.0012) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0068)
Age >15 -0.017*** -0.025*** -0.056*** -0.041*** -0.044***
(0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0084)
Second child
Age 1-5 -0.0098*** -0.0033** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.035***
(0.00069) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0035)
Age 6-10 -0.012*** -0.0087*** -0.026*** -0.024*** -0.033***
(0.00092) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0052)
Age 11-15 -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.035***
(0.0011) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0070)
Age >15 -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.024*** -0.030*** -0.035***
(0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0089)
Third child
Age 1-5 -0.0086*** -0.0019 -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.035***
(0.00084) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0046)
Age 6-10 -0.012*** -0.0067*** -0.018*** -0.024*** -0.038***
(0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0066)
Age 11-15 -0.010*** -0.0070*** -0.017*** -0.026*** -0.042***
(0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0089)
Age >15 -0.0088*** -0.0046** -0.0061** -0.028*** -0.045***
(0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.013)
Observations 3778746 1537899 918022 1194770 128055
Note: Each column provides FE estimates from a regression based on Equation 1. Year dummies, a
polynomial in age and individual ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all speciﬁcations. So are controls for
pregnancy, having a baby younger than one year and for having more than 3 children. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 13: The eﬀect of children on men’s hourly wage, including men who are not observed
to have children in the sample.
All
Secondary education Higher education
Lower Upper Lower deg. Higher deg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First child
Age 1-5 0.0076*** 0.0036* -0.0043*** -0.0043** -0.0049
(0.00099) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0037)
Age 6-10 0.0036*** 0.0048* -0.0080*** -0.012*** -0.0044
(0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0050)
Age 11-15 -0.00083 0.0026 -0.0096*** -0.016*** -0.0068
(0.0016) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0061)
Age >15 -0.0036** 0.0018 -0.0091*** -0.019*** -0.012*
(0.0018) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0034) (0.0071)
Second child
Age 1-5 0.0094*** 0.0090*** 0.0018 0.00068 0.0024
(0.00092) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0034)
Age 6-10 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.0023 -0.00086 0.0079*
(0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0046)
Age 11-15 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.0022 -0.0014 0.015***
(0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0057)
Age >15 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.0016 -0.00074 0.014**
(0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0068)
Third child
Age 1-5 0.0078*** 0.0084*** 0.0047** 0.00072 -0.00028
(0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0043)
Age 6-10 0.011*** 0.0095*** 0.0060** 0.0018 0.0019
(0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0055)
Age 11-15 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.0085*** 0.0031 0.0032
(0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0067)
Age >15 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.0028 -0.0077
(0.0019) (0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0077)
Observations 3649791 1413929 1148953 846634 240275
Note: Each column provides FE estimates from a regression based on Equation 1. Year dummies, a
polynomial in age and individual ﬁxed eﬀects are included in all speciﬁcations. So are controls for
pregnancy, having a baby younger than one year and for having more than 3 children. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 14: The eﬀect of children on women’s hourly wage. Including controls for experi-
ence, parental leave, part time and sector of employment in separate regressions.
All
Secondary education Higher education
Lower Upper Lower deg. Higher deg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First child
Age 1-5 -0.030*** -0.018*** -0.038*** -0.025*** -0.044***
(0.00096) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0040)
Age 6-10 -0.044*** -0.023*** -0.045*** -0.033*** -0.044***
(0.0014) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0060)
Age 11-13 -0.052*** -0.027*** -0.045*** -0.039*** -0.036***
(0.0020) (0.0046) (0.0038) (0.0029) (0.0094)
Experience 0.0033*** 0.0042*** 0.0052*** 0.0013 0.0074**
(0.00069) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0037)
Observations 1232595 207023 337515 601793 86264
First child
Age 1-5 -0.028*** -0.017*** -0.039*** -0.024*** -0.042***
(0.0012) (0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0016) (0.0049)
Age 6-10 -0.042*** -0.022*** -0.046*** -0.033*** -0.043***
(0.0016) (0.0041) (0.0032) (0.0022) (0.0067)
Age 11-13 -0.050*** -0.025*** -0.045*** -0.039*** -0.034***
(0.0022) (0.0051) (0.0042) (0.0030) (0.0099)
Parental leave -0.0020** -0.0024 0.00012 -0.00051 -0.0024
(0.00088) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0034)
Observations 1232595 207023 337515 601793 86264
First child
Age 1-5 -0.035*** -0.026*** -0.045*** -0.030*** -0.044***
(0.00097) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0040)
Age 6-10 -0.049*** -0.031*** -0.053*** -0.038*** -0.044***
(0.0014) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0060)
Age 11-13 -0.057*** -0.034*** -0.051*** -0.044*** -0.036***
(0.0020) (0.0046) (0.0038) (0.0029) (0.0094)
Part time 0.017*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.017*** -0.00033
(0.00046) (0.0012) (0.00095) (0.00060) (0.0019)
Observations 1232595 207023 337515 601793 86264
First child
Age 1-5 -0.030*** -0.019*** -0.038*** -0.025*** -0.044***
(0.00096) (0.0024) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0040)
Age 6-10 -0.044*** -0.024*** -0.046*** -0.033*** -0.044***
(0.0014) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0060)
Age 11-13 -0.052*** -0.027*** -0.045*** -0.038*** -0.036***
(0.0020) (0.0046) (0.0038) (0.0029) (0.0094)
Public sector 0.0044*** -0.0067*** -0.0054*** 0.021*** -0.0052*
(0.00065) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0027)
Observations 1232595 207023 337515 601793 86264
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Note: Each column in each panel provides FE estimates from a regression based on Equation 1 for the
sample o ndividuals who had their first child in 1994 or later. Year dummies, a polynomial in age,
individual fixed eects and extensive controls for further childbearing are included in all specifications.
Each o our additional controls is included in the four dierent panels. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Parenthood wage penalties
Table 15: The eﬀect of children on men’s hourly wage. Including controls for experience,
parental leave, part time and sector of employment in separate regressions.
All
Secondary education Higher education
Lower Upper Lower deg. Higher deg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
First child
Age 1-5 -0.0060*** -0.00040 -0.0076*** -0.0057*** -0.0023
(0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0041)
Age 6-10 -0.016*** 0.00070 -0.012*** -0.012*** 0.0027
(0.0017) (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0059)
Age 11-13 -0.024*** -0.00020 -0.016*** -0.016*** 0.014
(0.0025) (0.0047) (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0087)
Experience -0.0080*** -0.0014 -0.0019 0.0036 0.0023
(0.0015) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0044)
Observations 1319323 321843 494896 393653 108931
First child
Age 1-5 -0.0051*** 0.00014 -0.0040** -0.0018 0.0032
(0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0042)
Age 6-10 -0.015*** 0.0012 -0.0085*** -0.0086*** 0.0080
(0.0018) (0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0060)
Age 11-13 -0.023*** 0.00027 -0.013*** -0.012*** 0.019**
(0.0025) (0.0047) (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0088)
Parental leave -0.013*** -0.0082 -0.047*** -0.039*** -0.046***
(0.0028) (0.0068) (0.0054) (0.0044) (0.0074)
Observations 1319323 321843 494896 393653 108931
First child
Age 1-5 -0.0062*** -0.00025 -0.0076*** -0.0054*** -0.0018
(0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0041)
Age 6-10 -0.016*** 0.00076 -0.012*** -0.012*** 0.0028
(0.0017) (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0059)
Age 11-13 -0.024*** -0.00027 -0.016*** -0.015*** 0.014
(0.0025) (0.0047) (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0087)
Part time -0.00094 0.024*** 0.025*** -0.019*** -0.047***
(0.0014) (0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0020) (0.0046)
Observations 1319323 321843 494896 393653 108931
First child
Age 1-5 -0.0062*** -0.00038 -0.0076*** -0.0057*** -0.0022
(0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0041)
Age 6-10 -0.016*** 0.00087 -0.012*** -0.012*** 0.0027
(0.0017) (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0059)
Age 11-13 -0.024*** 0.000036 -0.016*** -0.016*** 0.014
(0.0025) (0.0047) (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0087)
Public sector -0.0064*** -0.010*** -0.0027** 0.013*** -0.015***
(0.00071) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0023)
Observations 1319323 321843 494896 393653 108931
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Observations 1319323 321843 494896 393653 108931
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Note: Each column in each panel provides FE estimates from a regression based on Equation 1 for the
sampl o ndividuals who had their first child in 1994 or later. Year dummies, a polynomial in age,
individual fixed eects and extensive controls for further childbearing are included in all specifications.
Each o our additional controls is included in the four dierent panels. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Each column in each panel provides FE estimates from a regression based on Equation 1 for the
sample o ndividuals who had their first child in 1994 or later. Year dummies, a polynomial in age,
individual fixed eects and extensive controls for further childbearing are included in all specifications.
Each o our additional controls is included in the four dierent panels. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. * p < 0.10,** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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from using miscarriage as a natural
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Abstract The event of miscarriage has increasingly been used in the literature as random
variation in the timing of children. We argue that miscarriage inﬂuences several measures
of family structure; in addition to the timing of birth, it inﬂuences both the presence, the
number, and age-distribution of children in the household. The causal eﬀect of miscar-
riage on economic outcomes is therefore a combination of all these family measures, and
using miscarriage as an instrument for only one is misleading. We estimate the reduced
form impact of miscarriage on three measures of family structure and four measures of
labor market outcomes. We ﬁnd persistent diﬀerences in family outcomes ﬁve years after
planned birth-year. The eﬀect of miscarriage on labor market outcomes are largest in the
ﬁrst years, while the eﬀect almost disappears 3-5 years after.
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Miscarriage randomly prevents the birth of a child. It thus provides unique variation in
whether a woman has a child at the planned point in time which we exploit to estimate
the causal impact of an exogenous distribution of children on labor market outcomes. An
emerging literature has used miscarriage as an instrumental variable for the timing of
birth; Hotz et al. (1997, 2005) to study the eﬀect of teenage childbearing, Miller (2011)
to study the eﬀect of having children later in the career for life-time earnings and Buckles
and Munnich (2011) to study the eﬀect of spacing of siblings for child school performance
(identiﬁed by miscarriages before the second child). We argue that although miscarriage
provides random variation in a ﬁeld of study with few potential instruments (family and
labor economics)3, the causal inferences that may be drawn for labor market outcomes
goes through the eﬀect that miscarriage has on several family outcomes at the same time;
whether an individual has children at all, timing of birth, number of children, spacing of
siblings and age of youngest child4.
The main contribution of this paper is to estimate the eﬀect of miscarriage on diﬀerent
family outcomes and also on diﬀerent labor market outcomes. This is similar to the
approach in Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) who discuss the eﬀect of having twins in
the ﬁrst birth and the eﬀect it has on both subsequent fertility and female labor force
participation. They ﬁnd that having twins at the ﬁrst birth substantially alters the life-
cycle pattern of fertility but has only negligible impact on completed family size. The
later impact on labor force participation, they therefore interpret to be the impact of
exogenously distributing children over the life-cycle. In our case, miscarriage both leads
to a postponement of children, fewer children, narrower spacing of siblings and for some
no children at all, and the diﬀerence in family measures are substantial in the short run.
We therefore use miscarriage as a proxy for exogenously distributing children for women
who plan to have children at the same time.
We use Norwegian administrative data on all births in the period July 2001 to De-
cember 2003. The labor market outcomes that we look at are; earnings, labor market
participation, weekly hours and hourly wages. We observe the individuals in a quite short
interval - ﬁve years before birth and ﬁve years after birth. Because of the detailed data on
short-run outcomes, we are able to track the relative importance of the diﬀerent family
measures for labor market outcomes. We compare the relative eﬀect of miscarriage on
labor market outcomes in the ﬁve years following planned birth to the relative eﬀect of
3The most famous alternatives are maybe using twins as exogenous distribution of children (see for
instance Bronars and Grogger (1994); Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980)) and also the gender composition
of the ﬁrst two children to instrument the probability of having a third child (Angrist and Evans, 1998).
Neither of these can be used to study the eﬀect of the ﬁrst child, which is potentially the most important
4Using miscarriage as an instrument for a single family outcome means implicitly to assume that the
remaining fertility outcomes has no eﬀect on the object of study. If this is violated the instrumental




miscarriage on the diﬀerent fertility measures. We estimate separately the impact of a
miscarriage before the ﬁrst child and miscarriage before the second child to see whether
the marginal impact of having a second child is diﬀerent from the impact of having the
ﬁrst.
The impact of miscarriage on labor market outcomes are large in the ﬁrst few years
after planned birth. Those who give birth have lower earnings and work fewer weekly
hours. After ﬁve years, the only signiﬁcant diﬀerence in labor market outcomes is in
weekly hours, where those who gave birth in the planned birth-year still work fewer
hours. The small and insigniﬁcant diﬀerences in labor market outcomes 5 years after
planned birth are remarkable since the two groups diﬀer considerably along the measures
of family structure. The fertility measure that changes most over the 5 ﬁrst years is the
probability of having any children. Among those who miscarry, 80% have children 5 years
after. The diﬀerences in earnings in the last years indicate that whether the individual has
children at all, which is closely correlated to having small children, has largest eﬀect on
earnings. The marginal eﬀect of the second child is almost equally large, which indicates
that having small children is what matters most.
We also test the randomness of miscarriage with respect to labor market outcomes
before pregnancy. We ﬁnd that there are small signiﬁcant diﬀerences between those
who miscarry and those who give birth. After controlling for observable diﬀerences in
age, education and continent of origin, the group that miscarries are employed with a
smaller probability and have somewhat lower wage-rates two years before planned birth.
This indicates that the group that miscarries is also a negatively selected group, but
the diﬀerences are not large, and the assumption that miscarriage is exogenous to labor
market outcomes can be a good approximation.
4.2 Children and women’s labor supply
Since Mincer (1962), labor supply of women has been analyzed in connection to their
alternative use of time; in home-production (for instance taking care of children) in ad-
dition to leisure. This is also the basis of models of household production from Becker
(1965, 1981) to Chiappori (1988). More home-production increases the value of home-
time relative to time spent in market production and leads to a reallocation of hours from
market production to home-production. The eﬀect of having children on market labor
supply will be negative. The more children an individual has or the younger they are, the
more home-production, and the larger should the eﬀect on market hours be.
The empirical evidence of a negative relationship between children (the presence, the
number, and the age-distribution) and female labor supply is large (for a review, see
Browning (1992)). With the lack of exogenous variation in either family or labor market
outcomes, however, it is diﬃcult to draw causal inferences. There are theoretical reasons
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for seeing family and labor decisions as joint decisions and therefore to doubt that the
presence of children is exogenously given. With the reasoning of Becker (1965), an increase
in real wages increases the value of time and therefore the cost of home production such as
child-rearing. In addition, having children can be more expensive for high-income earners
because they demand ”higher quality” children (higher income families invest more in
each child) (Becker and Lewis, 1973). Both considerations would give fewer children for
higher-income families. As pointed out in Browning (1992), the two directions of causality
is also reﬂected in diﬀerent research traditions; labor economists treat children as an
independent variable inﬂuencing labor market outcomes, while demographers treat labor
market outcomes as the independent variable inﬂuencing fertility choices. The direction
of the causal eﬀect is therefore not obvious.
If miscarriage is truly random, it provides unique variation in the probability of having
children at the planned point in time. The potential impact of economic factors on who
becomes parents and at what time is equal for the group that miscarries and the group
that gives birth. The only diﬀerence between the groups is that some have children while
some do not in the planned birth-year. This will ensure the causal interpretation of the
eﬀect going from having children to labor market outcomes. New fertility decisions are
taken every period, however, and the two groups will diﬀer on several family outcomes in
the years following.
Those who give birth will be younger when they have a child, they will have a higher
probability of having children and have more children in the ﬁrst years - and potentially
permanently. The spacing between siblings is larger, and their youngest child is older.
The fact that they are younger when they give birth will not have an obvious impact on
hours worked. Both the higher probability of having children, the number of children and
a larger spacing between children have an expected negative eﬀect on labor supply. The
fact that the youngest child is older has an expected positive eﬀect. The random change
we use in family structure should therefore aﬀect those who have children in the planned
birth-year negatively, maybe with a positive adjustment over time as the child(ren) grow
older.
There is also a large literature on the negative wage-eﬀect of children (Waldfogel,
1997; Lundberg and Rose, 2000; Budig and England, 2001; Datta Gupta and Smith,
2002; Anderson et al., 2002; Wilde et al., 2010; Cools and Strøm, 2012). Periods out
of the labor market and periods of reduced working hours will adversely aﬀect mothers’
accumulation of human capital (Mincer and Polachek, 1974). We therefore expect to ﬁnd
negative wage-eﬀects in the years following negative labor supply eﬀects.
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Table 1: Observations of birth and miscarriages in our data. All Norwegian women in the
period 2001-2006
First birth Second birth
Birth Miscarriage Birth Miscarriage
Observations in data 58,853 2,614 30,639 1,335
Age between 23 and 45 years 49,207 2,189 30,639 1,335
Employed in planned birth year 24,958 1,887 14,611 1,155
Miscarriage with specialist diagnosis 961 565
Observations in sample 24,958 961 14,611 565
Mean length of sickness absence
with miscarriage 8.1 days 10.0 days
Share with children later 83.4% 77.4%
Mean length of postponement 15.0 months 13.4 months
4.3 The randomness of miscarriage
We ﬁrst evaluate whether or not miscarriages can be considered exogenous to labor mar-
kets outcomes before planned birth-year.
The measure of miscarriage we use are taken from register data provided by Statistics
Norway and the Norwegian Social Security Administration (NAV) on all sickness spells
certiﬁed by a physician between May 2001 and December 2003. Table 1 shows a summary
of the observations that we have. Our deﬁnition of miscarriage is based on the diagnosis
ICD-10, code O03. This diagnosis is used by specialists at hospitals, which means that the
women who miscarry in our sample has been to the hospital because of the miscarriage.
Most probably, these miscarriages happen before 22 weeks after conception (when the
diagnosis changes to still birth). The share of women registered with the specialist-coded
miscarriage is quite small (4.2% both before the ﬁrst and the second child - see table
1) compared to the high occurrence referred in the medical literature (around 10% of
clinically recognized pregnancies do not result in the delivery of a baby (30% if you count
early pregnancy loss) (Wilcox et al., 1988; Wang et al., 2003)). The main reason for this
is that 3/4 of miscarriages happen the ﬁrst trimester (before 12 weeks) and seldom lead to
complications that need hospital-treatment. Our observations of miscarriage is therefore
probably later than the ﬁrst trimester. Since we do not know the date of conception, we
set the length of pregnancy to 17 weeks (the middle between 12 and 22 weeks) at the time
of miscarriage and calculate the expected month of birth based on this.
We have more observations on miscarriage (about as many as the ones we use - see
table 1), but these are based on diagnosis from the physician. We exclude them from
the sample because the selection into physician-prescribed sick-leave is not random. The
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pattern in fertility and labor market attachment for this group follows the same path as
the group we include, however, which is an indication that the later miscarriages are not
so diﬀerent from earlier miscarriages on later outcomes.
According to the medical literature, miscarriage is in most cases caused by an anomal-
ity in the fetus (e.g chromosomal aberrations) or the mother has a physical defect (uterine
anatomic defect) (Kline et al., 1989; Garc´ıa-Engu´ıdanos et al., 2002). The impact of be-
havioral factors on miscarriage risk are small; extreme behavior like heavy alcohol drink-
ing or drug use can lead to miscarriage, but this is very rare. Miscarriage risk increases
dramatically with age, but age we observe and can control for.
In table 2 and 3 we test whether the group that miscarry is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from the group that gives birth 2 and 3 years before planned birth-year. The ﬁrst panel
measures the diﬀerence in observable variables between the groups. We see there are
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in age, educational level and continent of origin. These variables
we control for in later reduced form estimations, and do therefore not aﬀect the validity
of the estimates.
In the bottom panel of table 2 and 3, we test whether our measures of labor market
outcomes in addition to sickness absence behavior are diﬀerent in the groups 2 and 3
years before birth/miscarriage. If those who give birth have lower wages than those who
miscarry even before the year of planned birth, there are probably some unobservable
factors aﬀecting both the probability of miscarriage and the outcome variables. The
estimate of the eﬀect of miscarriage will then be biased and will therefore also bias the
results when using miscarriage as an instrument. We see that comparing the raw data in
column 1 and 2, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences. These diﬀerences are only partly due to
the observed diﬀerences in age, education and continent of origin as we show in the last
three columns.
In order to remove observable diﬀerences between the birth- and miscarriage groups
we ﬁrst run a regression controlling for age (21 dummy variables), planned birth-month
(30 dummy variables), continent of origin (5 dummy variables) and education level (9
dummy variables). These are the same observable variables that we control for in later
estimations and graphical presentations. The error term from this regression is added
to the sample mean before we divide in birth- and miscarriage groups and compare the
group averages (column 4 and 5). The diﬀerence is shown in column 6. We see that after
controlling for observables, the diﬀerence is smaller for some outcomes and the diﬀerence
is insigniﬁcant for wage before the second child. There are however signs of a negative
selection of those who miscarry: they are less employed, have lower wages and receive
more social security before the ﬁrst child.
The evidence in table 2 and 3 only partly supports the hypothesis that experiencing a
miscarriage is truly random in the group that plans to have children, at least exogenous




There are potential problems that the group that miscarries will diﬀer on other di-
mensions than in family structure. One is that miscarriage in itself will have career
consequences apart from the fact that the individual doesn’t have a child. If the woman
e.g experiences a trauma following the miscarriage, this can have negative career conse-
quences. The medical literature compares the period after a miscarriage to a period of
grief where feelings of depression/anxiety is most pronounced the ﬁrst six months after
the experience and then wavers oﬀ, and is back to ”normal” after a year (Broen et al.,
2004; Lok et al., 2010) or six months found by others (Brier, 2008). We do not observe a
jump in sickness absence following miscarriage (ﬁgure 2 and 3) which indicates that the
negative consequences are not too large.
Another potential problem with miscarriage is that it is based on sick-leave. Even
though the miscarriage is exogenous, it is not exogenous who is on sick-leave. We do,
however only include sick-leave given after a hospital-treatment. Hospital treatment in
connection to miscarriage is not decided by the woman herself but prescribed by a physi-
cian. The test we presented in table 2 and 3 show that those who experience a miscarriage
have a very similar sickness history as those who do not experience a miscarriage, so it
seems unlikely they are severely negatively selected on health.
4.4 Data
We use administrative data from oﬃcial registries provided by Statistics Norway for our
measures of demographical variables like age, education, region, the linking of children to
their parents and work status information like being on welfare and participating in the
labor force. The data on work status and welfare recipience gives us precise and detailed
information on labor market dynamics of the individuals and makes it possible to track
their status month by month. We use data from 1996-2008 to measure the eﬀect ﬁve years
before and after birth. The birth/miscarriages are observed from July 2001 to December
2003.
The frequency and the quality of our data provides us with unique opportunities
to both test the exogeneity of miscarriage and also compare economic activity of the
two groups before and after planned birth. The information on miscarriage is also from
oﬃcial registries on sickness spells. The good quality of the data is important in the
question of miscarriage because survey data are often based on retrospective recollection.
Retrospective reporting may suﬀer from measurement error and selection of who reports
an experience of miscarriage in addition to self-justiﬁcation bias (Bound, 1991).
Data on working hours and hourly wages are obtained from Statistics Norway’s Wage
statistics (”Lønnsstatistikken”), which is based on employer reports for a sub-sample of
Norwegian enterprizes. Every year all public enterprizes are included, whereas a 50%
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the group that gives birth and the group that miscar-
ries, ﬁrst child. T-test of whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the groups
in outcome-variables before planned birth-year. Both unconditional and conditional on
observable diﬀerences.
Raw data Controlled for observables
Birth Miscarriage Diﬀerence Birth Miscarriage Diﬀerence
Control variables
Age 29.6 30.2 -0.63***
Education 5.23 5.16 0.07
Europe 9.1 9.0 0.1
Asia 2.6 4.1 -1.5***
Africa 0.7 1.1 -0.5*
America 0.5 0.1 0.4*
Outcome variables
Employed
t-2 95.1 93.5 1.6** 95.1 93.5 1.6**
t-3 90.6 89.6 1.0 90.6 89.2 1.4
Work hours
t-2 32.6 33.0 -0.39 32.6 32.9 -0.29
t-3 31.8 32.5 -0.63 31.8 32.2 -0.34
Wage rate
t-2 184.4 183.7 0.67 184.5 180.9 3.59*
t-3 182.0 184.4 -2.38 182.1 180.7 1.43
Sickness leave
t-2 2.6 2.3 0.3 2.6 2.2 0.4
t-3 1.9 1.9 0.04 1.9 1.7 0.2
Social Security
t-2 2.1 2.2 -0.1 2.1 2.1 -0.01
t-3 2.4 3.4 -1.0** 2.4 3.3 -0.8**
In order to remove observable diﬀerences between the birth- and miscarriage groups we ﬁrst run a regres-
sion controlling for age (21 dummy variables), planned birth-month (30 dummy variables), continent of
origin (5 dummy variables) and education level (9 dummy variables). The error term from this regression
is added to the sample mean before we divide in birth- and miscarriage groups and compare the group
averages. The diﬀerence is shown in the last column.
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 are results from a t-test of whether the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the group that gives birth and the group that miscar-
ries, second child. T-test of whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the groups
in outcome-variables before planned birth-year. Both unconditional and conditional on
observable diﬀerences.
Raw data Controlled for observables
Birth Miscarriage Diﬀerence Birth Miscarriage Diﬀerence
Control variables
Age 31.8 33.0 -1.27***
Education 4.88 4.84 0.04
Europe 7.7 8.8 -1.13
Asia 2.7 4.1 -1.4**
Africa 0.6 0.5 0.1
America 0.3 0.9 -0.5**
Outcome variables
Employed
t-2 92.8 89.6 3.2*** 92.8 88.7 4.1***
t-3 88.6 88.3 0.3 88.7 86.9 1.7
Work hours
t-2 30.4 31.7 -1.34*** 30.4 31.4 -1.02**
t-3 30.7 31.3 -0.62 30.7 31.0 -0.3
Wage rate
t-2 179.3 186.9 -7.6** 179.5 181.3 1.8
t-3 176.7 184.5 -7.8** 176.9 179.1 -2.2
Sickness leave
t-2 3.0 3.1 -0.2 3.0 3.0 -0.06
t-3 2.0 1.7 0.3 2.0 1.5 0.5
Social Security
t-2 3.6 4.2 -0.6 3.6 4.1 -0.5
t-3 3.9 4.1 -0.2 3.9 4.1 -0.2
In order to remove observable diﬀerences between the birth- and miscarriage groups we ﬁrst run a regres-
sion controlling for age (21 dummy variables), planned birth-month (30 dummy variables), continent of
origin (5 dummy variables) and education level (9 dummy variables). The error term from this regression
is added to the sample mean before we divide in birth- and miscarriage groups and compare the group
averages. The diﬀerence is shown in the last column.
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 are results from a t-test of whether the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant.
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sample of medium size enterprizes and a 20% sample of small enterprizes is drawn every
year for the private sector5. In total 70% of the Norwegian labor force is covered in the
Wage statistics every year.
Our sample consists of women who had a child and/or experienced a miscarriage in
our time-window. We only include observations on women who work (earn more than
1G6) because the data on miscarriage is only available for those who have a job - and
therefore can get sickness leave.
In our analysis, we study the main activity on the labor market the ﬁrst 5 years after
planned birth and the ﬁve years before. The diﬀerent states we study are employed, on
parental leave, on pregnancy related sickness absence, on other type of sickness absence,
on welfare beneﬁt or inactive. We include all states if an individual is observed in several,
but being on parental leave is excluded from our measure of employment (if the individual
is on parental leave, we set employment to missing).
Employment is deﬁned as earning more than 1G. Sickness absence is registered absence
more than 16 days (the ﬁrst 16 days are paid by the employer and is therefore not
registered in the oﬃcial data on sickness-payments)7. Sickness absence observed the
last nine months before a birth, we deﬁne as pregnancy related sickness absence. Other
welfare beneﬁts are all registered beneﬁts excluding beneﬁts that are connected to having
children. We deﬁne the individual as inactive if she is not observed in any other activity.
4.5 Empirical speciﬁcation
We estimate a reduced form impact of miscarriage on measures of family structure and
labor market outcomes. The eﬀect of miscarriage on the diﬀerent family measures, we
interpret as the importance of the diﬀerent channels through which miscarriage can have
a labor market impact.
The setup is a linear regression of outcomes on a dummy for miscarriage, controlling
for observable characteristics:
Yt+x = β0 + β1Miscarriaget + β2Xt + ut+x (1)
where Yt+x are the outcomes that we study: 3 family measures: have children, number
of children and the age of the youngest child, and 4 labor market outcomes: labor market
participation, earnings, weekly hours and hourly pay.
5Employment in agriculture, hunting and forestry is left out. So are enterprizes with 3 or less employ-
ees.
6The basic amount G (Grunnbeløpet i folketrygden) is adjusted for wage inﬂation, usually once a year.
From May 2011 the amount is 79 216 NOK, approximately 14 400 USD.
7Note that these data are diﬀerent from the ones used to identify miscarriages. Whereas the data for
sickness-payments cover only spells lasting more than 16 days the data used for identifying miscarriages
cover all spells from the day a physician in visited. The reason why we use data on sickness payments is
that these are the only data on sickness absences we have available for the years 2007 and 2008.
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Xt are our observable characteristics, including age (21 dummy variables), planned
birth-month (30 dummy variables), continent of origin (5 dummy variables) and education
level (9 dummy variables). The observable characteristics are measured in the year the
individuals have a child or should have had a child had they not miscarried.
β1 is our parameter of interest; the eﬀect of miscarriage on the outcome variables. It
represents the diﬀerence in outcomes for those who give birth compared to those who
miscarry. The estimated eﬀects on family outcomes are representative of potential ﬁrst
step regressions in an instrumental variable set-up, e.g. the eﬀect of miscarriage on the







The estimated eﬀects on labor market outcomes are representative of the reduced form







In an instrumental variables set-up, the eﬀect of a family outcome on labor mar-
ket outcomes is the reduced form coeﬃcient β1wage divided by the ﬁrst step coeﬃcient
β1children. As miscarriage inﬂuences several family measures at the same time, using it
as an instrumental variable for only one family outcome is not valid. We may however
interpret the reduced form eﬀects as a weighted mean eﬀect of miscarriage, and the eﬀect
on the diﬀerent family measures as potential channels.
We present all results graphically as well to show the levels. In the ﬁgures, the pre-
dicted mean values for the treatment and control group are shown, corrected for diﬀerences
due to the observable characteristics. The 95% conﬁdence interval around the means are
shown as well. In addition, we present graphically the eﬀects on 6 economic activity mea-
sures: Labor market participation, sickness-absence, pregnancy related sickness absence,
on parental leave, overall beneﬁt dependency and inactive.
The eﬀects on economic activity represents what is the activity of the treatment and
comparison group. The impact on the labor market outcomes should be interpreted in
light of what it means to economic activity to have a miscarriage. Miscarriage means in
most cases a postponement of children which includes periods on parental leave and non-
employment. The economic activity of the two groups will tell us when the comparison
of labor market outcomes is relevant.
To see whether the marginal impact of the second child is the same as the ﬁrst, we
use miscarriages both before the ﬁrst birth and the second birth.
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Table 4: The eﬀect of miscarriage on family outcomes
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
Panel A: First child
Having children -0.53*** -0.33*** -0.24*** -0.19*** -0.17***
(0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0024)
Number of children -0.55*** -0.47*** -0.51*** -0.42*** -0.37***
(0.0069) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Age youngest child (in months) -7.16*** -7.26*** -5.31*** -7.58*** -9.26***
(0.023) (0.28) (0.50) (0.58) (0.62)
N 25919 25919 25919 25919 25919
Panel B: Second child
Having 2 children -0.53*** -0.32*** -0.27*** -0.24*** -0.23***
(0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Number of children -0.55*** -0.38*** -0.35*** -0.29*** -0.28***
(0.0079) (0.012) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020)
Age youngest child (in months) 38.7*** 22.9*** 19.2*** 15.4*** 14.2***
(0.45) (0.49) (0.59) (0.70) (0.79)
N 15176 15176 15176 15176 15176
OLS regression of the diﬀerent fertility outcomes on miscarriage, controlled for age (21 dummy variables),
planned birth-month (30 dummy variables), continent of origin (5 dummy variables) and education level
(9 dummy variables).
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
4.6 What miscarriage does to family structure - po-
tential ﬁrst stages
In this section, we show how the group that miscarries diﬀers from the group that gives
birth in three measures of family structure up to ﬁve years after planned birth year; having
children, number of children and age of the youngest child (see Table 4). In addition, a
miscarriage has an eﬀect on the spacing of siblings for those we observe have more children
in our time-window (First birth: 4.6 months closer between the ﬁrst and second child,
3.8 months closer between the second and the third child. Second birth: 2.5 months
closer between the second and the third child). The impact of miscarriage on all these
measures shows that it has potentially a strong ﬁrst-stage impact if it is to be used as an
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instrumental variable. It does also however, show, that it has impact on several variables
at the same time. It is not possible to identify the eﬀect of one from the other without for
instance putting more theoretical structure on the empirical analysis or including more
instruments.
The overall picture of fertility after miscarriage is that a miscarriage is mainly a
postponement of children. 76% of those who miscarry have a child within the three ﬁrst
years, and after ﬁve years, 83% have children. The diﬀerences we observe in labor market
outcomes 5 years after planned birth, we therefore interpret to come mostly from the
variation in number of children and age of the youngest child.
The data illustrates another important dimension of the decision to have children. It
is unlikely that the decision to have children is only taken once - in the ﬁrst period -
and that when the child comes after that (in case of miscarriage) is random. Fertility
decisions are taken every period, which also makes it hard to measure the causal impact
of one periods outcome of a pregnancy several years after.
4.7 Main economic activity
Figure 2 displays the fraction on parental leave, the employment rate, the fraction on
sickness-leave (during pregnancy and otherwise), the fraction who’s main income stem
from other social insurance programs and ﬁnally the fraction of people not belonging to
any of these groups denoted ”inactive”. At least four important lessons can be drawn
from this ﬁgure. First, the birth-group and the miscarriage group are as good as similar
prior to the ﬁrst pregnancy. Secondly, the groups are highly diﬀerent the ﬁrst two years
after planned birth. These diﬀerences mainly stem from a postponement of birth. We see
that the group that experiences a miscarriage postpones giving birth by approximately
one year. At ﬁrst sight one could imagine that a causal eﬀect of having children could be
estimated for the ﬁrst year after a miscarriage since the diﬀerence in child outcomes in this
period is truly random. However, as indicated by this ﬁgure, one would then compare the
women just ended their parental leave to the miscarriage group where around half of the
sample that miscarry are on parental leave in year t+2. The estimated eﬀect of having
children in year t+1 will be the estimated eﬀect of ”having children and coming back
from one year parental leave” compared to ”around 50% probability of being pregnant”.
The short-term causal impact of having children is therefore based on an ”apples and
pears-comparison” and is not providing much insight into the labor market consequences
of having children.
Thirdly, and perhaps the most interesting lesson from Figure 2 is that the long-term
consequences of a miscarriage on labor market status are small, despite substantial dif-
ferences in fertility outcomes. Five years after the ﬁrst planned birth, the group that
miscarries has more seldom, fewer, and younger children, but after ﬁnishing pregnancies
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and then parental leave(s), the two groups are similar. Despite substantial short-term
consequences of fertility, the long-term consequences for labor-market participation and
social beneﬁt uptake of having children are rather small.
Finally, an interesting pattern to note, is the pattern in sickness absence. It has been
argued that the combination of career and family gives women a ”double burden” that can
cause health problems - which in turn could explain the gender gap in sickness absence
that is observed in Scandinavia as in many other countries. The empirical evidence of
such a burden is mixed. Some studies support it (A˚kerlind et al., 1996; Bratberg et al.,
2002) while other studies ﬁnd no association between having children and sickness absence
(Voss et al. (2008), see also literature reviewed in Allebeck and Mastekaasa (2004)) or
even a positive association (Mastekaasa, 2000; Bratberg et al., 2002).
The ﬁgures 2 and 3 show that although the two groups diﬀer in number of children,
there is no diﬀerence in sickness absence between the groups 3-5 years after the planned
birth of the ﬁrst child. There are however signs of the group having more children also
having a higher level of sickness absence after the second child. This indicates that we
cannot reject the hypothesis of a ”double burden” giving rise to health-problems when
women have more than one child.
4.8 Labor market outcomes
As we now move on to study four economic outcomes in the labor market; employment,
earnings, hours worked and hourly wages, the pattern we observe is similar to the one in
the previous section. The two groups are similar prior to the birth/miscarriage. Then,
as only one of the groups give birth at time t, substantial diﬀerences between the groups
arises. Those who give birth have considerable lower earnings than those who miscarry,
but this eﬀect is short lived. The eﬀect is similar after the ﬁrst and the second child, and
means that having small children has substantial, but temporary, eﬀects on earnings.
When it comes to employment, those who miscarry have a lower probability of being
employed all the ﬁve years after. This eﬀect is largely due to the miscarriage group having
a higher probability of being pregnant and being on parental leave as we saw in section
4.7.
For those who have returned to work, we see there is particularly one outcome, hours
worked, for which we can see a permanent diﬀerence between the groups. Those who give
birth at time t, and because of this has more (and more often) children than those who
miscarry, work fewer hours ﬁve years later. The estimated diﬀerence for the ﬁrst child is
around 0.6 hours per week. There is the same diﬀerence in hours after the second child,
but this is not signiﬁcant. The similarity of the pattern after the ﬁrst and the second child
gives support to the hypothesis that it is the number of children that matters and not
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Table 5: The eﬀect of miscarriage on labor market outcomes
t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5
Panel A: First child
Earnings 45730.2*** 17122.9** 11739.8* 6818.2 1255.8
(3967.9) (6717.2) (6322.5) (6496.0) (6041.0)
N 25736 25527 25469 25708 25828
Employed -0.052*** -0.0026 -0.021* -0.036*** -0.041***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
N 25919 25919 25919 25919 25919
Weekly hours 1.23*** 0.60* 0.95*** 0.61* 0.62*
(0.36) (0.32) (0.34) (0.33) (0.33)
N 13848 12509 12348 14307 15458
Ln hourly wage 2.04 -1.87 4.58** 1.03 0.90
(2.88) (2.37) (2.32) (2.33) (2.32)
N 13806 12504 12347 14307 15458
Panel B: Second child
Earnings 50878.9*** 20362.3*** -1449.2 -896.4 2964.2
(5320.2) (6306.8) (6501.7) (6768.3) (7173.9)
N 15128 14977 14975 15090 15133
Employed -0.050*** -0.039** -0.063*** -0.036** -0.020
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
N 15176 15176 15176 15176 15176
Weekly hours 0.50 0.25 0.18 0.52 0.65
(0.45) (0.43) (0.44) (0.43) (0.41)
N 8171 8987 9320 9599 9843
Ln hourly wage 6.59* 3.32 2.25 -6.26** -2.35
(3.89) (3.15) (3.04) (3.02) (2.95)
N 8147 8982 9320 9599 9843
OLS regression of the diﬀerent labor market outcomes on miscarriage, controlled for age (21 dummy
variables), planned birth-month (30 dummy variables), continent of origin (5 dummy variables) and
education level (9 dummy variables).
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 99
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the age of the youngest child, because the eﬀect of miscarriage on the age of the youngest
child is exactly opposite after the ﬁrst and the second child (see Table 4).
The results for wages are imprecise. Those who give birth in the planned birth-year
have lower wages than those who miscarry three years after, and also the ﬁrst year after
the second child. It seems, however that they catch up, and have higher wages than those
who miscarry four years after. Having (more) children has therefore only a temporary
negative eﬀect on wages. After the children have grown older, the wages catch up.
4.9 Conclusion
We have shown that miscarriage is close to a natural experiment, providing random
variation in the probability of having children at the planned point in time. We argue,
however that when using this random variation to measure impacts on labor market
outcomes, miscarriage should be used as a proxy for several fertility measures at the
same time. Miscarriage inﬂuences whether an individual has children at all, the timing
of children, the number of children and the age-distribution of the siblings. The causal
impact of miscarriage is therefore on a more broader deﬁnition of family structure - and
the resulting impact on labor market outcomes a weighted average of all.
Instead of assuming that the miscarriage works through only one of the several possible
”fertility channels” we study the reduced form diﬀerences in fertility outcomes as well as
economic-/labor market outcomes between those who give birth and those who miscarry.
There are mainly three lessons to learn from undertaking such comparisons: First, having
a miscarriage has what seems like permanent consequences for fertility outcomes. 1 out
of 5 having a miscarriage still has no children ﬁve years later. The number for those who
miscarry at second birth are approximately the same. Furthermore, those who miscarry
also has fewer children and for those that have more than one child, the spacing between
their children is shorter than for others.
Secondly, the labor market consequences of having children are dramatic in the short
run, when there is a much higher probability of having children in the group that gives
birth as planned. This indicates that the presence of small children has direct eﬀects on
the time-allocation of women, and that children matter on the having-not having margin,
not in numbers or distribution.
Thirdly, and perhaps also more surprisingly, despite permanent consequences for fer-
tility it seems to be very few such long term consequences for labor-market outcomes.
Whereas i.e. employment and sickness absence are dramatically aﬀected during pregnan-
cies and the ﬁrst one or two years after birth, those who miscarry and those who give
birth are almost identical 5 years later, regardless of whether we compare wages, earnings,
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How husbands and wives vote
Marte Strøm1
Abstract Political preferences depend on income. In a household, the income of the
individual is part of the income of the whole household. I investigate empirically the im-
portance of individual vs household income, and ﬁnd that individual income is important
if it is representative of the household income. If the wife is the maximum earner of the
household or works fulltime, she votes more according to her own wage, similar to men.
On average women earn less than their husband and vote according to their husbands
income. Household income is therefore the best predictor of average voting behavior.
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Introduction
The rich and the poor have diﬀerent interests, and this is the foundation for political
economy models of voting behavior. Basic models, like the median-voter model (Meltzer
and Richard, 1981), emphasise private income relative to the median as important for
the preferred degree of redistribution or level of public services. The basic insight is that
redistribution is less beneﬁcial for high-income earners (with proportional taxation) who
therefore demand lower levels of redistribution. These models abstract from the fact that
most individuals are part of a household, and that this household will inﬂuence your
economic position and/or your political views. Most major surveys on voting behavior
(like the World Values Survey, the Eurobarometer, American National Election Studies
and a number of other election studies) take the other extreme and only ask for household
income.
The unitary model of household behavior (Becker, 1974, 1985) suggest that household
income determines the vote. The usual income pooling result would apply, and it does not
matter who of the couple has the highest income. The literature on household decision-
making has moved beyond the Becker-theory of unitary decision, however. Bargaining
theories (Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981) and the theory of the
collective model (Chiappori, 1988) model the household rather as two individuals making
individual decisions, taking into account the eﬀect of the decision on the individuals posi-
tion in the household. The median voter model explicitly models the vote as demand for
redistribution and/or public services. As the degree of redistribution and public services
has a direct impact on the outside option of the spouses, bargaining or collective theories
of household decision making should also apply to political voting behavior. The spouse
with the lowest incomes could potentially have other political interests than the spouse
with the highest income.
I use the National Child Development Study (NCDS) and the British Cohort Study
(BCS) which are detailed survey data on two British cohorts born in 1958 and 1970. The
data are unique for my purpose, as it is the only dataset to my knowledge that contains
both individual income and spouse income in combination with individual voting behavior.
In addition, it is panel-data, which enables me to investigate the role of income over the
life-cycle. The empirical method I use is OLS regression to estimate the quantitative
importance of own versus household income.
I show that predictions of voting behavior based on individual income and household
income give very diﬀerent results, especially for women who are not the main earners of
the family. I ﬁnd that individual income is only important for women if their income is
fairly representative of the household - if they work full-time or earn a higher income than
their husband. Otherwise, their husband’s income has a much larger impact. Men always
vote according to individual income. Even in the cases where he earns less than his wife,
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his wife’s income has no signiﬁcant impact on his voting behavior. On average, household
income is therefore the best predictor of both men and women’s voting behavior, but this
is mainly the result of women’s average economic position in the family.
Women vote more independently from their husband’s economic interests if she herself
is economically independent. As women on average earn less than men, a rise in female
labour force participation can in the aggregate lead to a divergence of men and women’s
voting behavior. A modern2 gender gap in voting (where women have become more leftist
relative to men) is observed in all OECD countries over the last decades (Inglehart and
Norris, 2000; Box-Steﬀensmeier et al., 2004a; Norrander and Wilcox, 2008). Edlund and
Pande (2002) have found that rising divorce rates actually account for a large share of the
increasing US gender gap in voting from 1964-1996, and ﬁnd similar results for Europe
(Edlund et al., 2005). A larger impact of individual income on voting behavior for women
is a possible mechanism. I ﬁnd some empirical support for this hypothesis using divorce
next period as a proxy for perceived higher individual risk of divorce. Women who divorce
next period are on average less conservative, and also vote relatively more according to
own income.
The impact of income on voting behavior is sensitive to what age income is measured. I
show that using a measure of permanent income, the average income when the individuals
are 33 and 41, increases the impact of income for both men and women over the life-
cycle. According to Solon (1999), the end of the 30’s, beginning of the 40’s is the age
when actual income is closest to permanent income. The larger impact of income when
using the measure of permanent income indicates therefore that permanent income is
more important for voting behavior than transitory income. It may also be that this
measure corrects some of the measurement problems of income that could potentially
give a downward bias to the estimate.
Literature
There is to my knowledge no investigation of the importance of individual vs household
income on political preferences in the literature. Most studies that study egotropic voting3
use survey data that have information about household income, but interpret the results as
if the income was representative of the individual. There are not many empirical studies
of the importance of income on voting at all. Lind (2007, 2010) are exceptions, and
ﬁnd a positive correlation between income and conservative voting for Norwegian voters.
Other studies have found support for egotropic voting on preferences for various welfare
2During the postwar era, women were more conservative than men in all western democracies. This
changed from the beginning of the 1980’s and women became increasingly more leftist relative to men
(Inglehart and Norris, 2000)
3Egotropic voting refers to the importance of personal income for individual voting. Sociotropic voting
refers to the importance of the macro-economy for individual voting
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measures like redistribution (Husted, 1989; Ribar and Wilhelm, 1999), taxes (Lewis, 1979;
Furnham, 1984) and provision of public goods (Preston and Ridge, 1995).
There is some evidence of women voting less egotropic than men. Norrander and
Wilcox (2008) ﬁnd that income was traditionally a stronger predictor of men’s rather than
women’s ideology in Europe, but that the diﬀerence has declined over the period 1972-
2000. Welch and Hibbing (1992) investigate the gender diﬀerences in economic voting,
and ﬁnd that women cast less egotropic, and more sociotropic votes than men. These
studies are based on measures of household income and the estimates might therefore
be biased downward for women because household income is a better predictor of the
husband’s personal income than the wife’s personal income (more measurement error in
the estimate for women e.g).
Several studies indicate that women are more inﬂuenced by their husbands social class
when casting their vote than vice versa (and social class and income is usually closely
related). For instance Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992) attempt to ﬁnd which social class
women identify with. Among other things, they investigate whether political attitudes are
determined by their own social class or their husbands social class (deﬁned by profession),
and ﬁnd a large impact of the husband’s social class. Dirk De Graaf and Heath (1992)
investigate the heterogeneity of the eﬀect of own and spousal social class on political
voting behavior, and ﬁnd that women in the service class or blue-collar occupations take
more account of own class than their husband’s class, while women in the petty bourgeoise
and routine non-manual class take relatively little account of their own class positions.
Among men, they ﬁnd no big diﬀerences according to class in how they weight their wife’s
class.
There is also a strand of literature on the increasing gender gap in voting (women
became more left-wing relative to men) from the 1970’s to 2000 on the aggregate level.
Structural-economic explanations have been increasing female labour market participa-
tion and preferences for social spending since women who enter the labour market have
lower average wages and have a higher demand for kindergardens/elderly care (Iversen
and Rosenbluth, 2006; Manza and Brooks, 1998). Lott and Kenny (1999) studied the
introduction of female voting rights in the US in the beginning of the 1900 and found
a signiﬁcant shift towards more redistribution. Other structural-economic explanations
have been the growing number of economically vulnerable single women/lone mothers
(Box-Steﬀensmeier et al., 2004b) and the higher risk of worse economic outcomes accom-
panying the higher divorce rates (Edlund and Pande, 2002). These studies look at the
aggregate diﬀerence in voting behavior of men and women, explaining the trend with
aggregate measures. They all point to a larger role of the individual compared to the
household for political preferences.
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A theoretical framework
To illustrate the importance of individual versus household income for economic voting
behavior, I introduce household income and a probability of divorce in a textbook median-
voter model of the demand for redistribution (Persson and Tabellini, 2002). I contrast
the predictions of looking at household income as pooled income and of looking at it as
two separate incomes of the spouses (like in the bargaining models or collective models of
the family).
As the vote is cast individually, I model the vote as an individual decision, but take
into account the possibility that consumption is dependent on total income of the couple.
Individuals are part of a household, and income is therefore in part the income of the
individual Yi and in part the income of the spouse of individual i; Ys. There is also a
probability, p > 0, of getting divorced and only getting your own income. For simplicity,
we assume risk neutrality in consumption.
The individuals’ utility function is simple:




(1− t)(αYi + (1− α)Ys) if married/cohabiting
(1− t)Yi if divorced
(2)
This gives the expected consumption: E(ci) = (1−p)(1− t)(αYi+(1−α)Ys)+p(1− t)Yi.
In addition to getting utility from consumption, ci, individuals get utility from a public
good, ln g, a concave and increasing function4. The parameter 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 represents
the degree of income pooling in the household. If α = 1, the individual only consumes
according to own income, and the preferred level of consumption and public goods would
be the same whether the individual was married or not. Every individual in the economy
gets the same amount of public goods and the provision of public goods is ﬁnanced by
a proportional income tax where t is the marginal tax rate. The expected value of Yi is
E(Yi) = Y , and the government budget constraint is tY = g.
Putting the individual’s and the government’s budget constraint into the utility func-
tion gives us the following:
Ui = (1− p)(Y − g)
(
αYi + (1− α)Ys
Y
)





+ ln g (3)
Maximizing this equation with respect to g gives the following policy preferences of the
individual that determines uniquely the individuals’ demand for public goods as a function
4ln g could also be modelled as diﬀerent whether the individual is married or not. E.g the utility the
individual gets from a certain level of public services like kindergartens or elderly care can be higher if the
individual is not married. This would give even larger weights on individual income for voting behavior.
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of relative income:
gi = (1− p)
(
Y








Since policy preferences are monotonic in the relative income of the individual, the
demand for g is an inverse function of the price, which is higher the higher is the relative
income of the individual to the median income (because taxes are proportional).
The role of partner’s income in the demand for redistribution depends on two things
in this setup. The ﬁrst is the share α which represents to what extent the household
pools income and consumption. If the household shares everything equally, the share will
be 1
2
and the marginal impact of each partner’s income on the demand for redistribution
will be the same. If the share is bigger than 1
2
(the individual consumes more according
to own income relative to partner’s income), individual income will be relatively more
important for the demand for redistribution. As women are not the prime-earners of the
family on average, household income will be more representative of the individual income
of the husband. If only household income is measured in the data, the lower degree of
egotropic voting of women will merely be an artifact of the fact that household income is
not close to their individual income.
The second role of partner’s income on the demand for redistribution is the probability
of divorce5. If the probability of divorce is larger than zero, the individual income is more
important for the vote than the partner’s income, reﬂecting Edlund and Pande (2002);
Edlund et al. (2005)’s result that the gender gap in voting behavior has been increasing
with the rising divorce rates.
In my set-up, it is the pure economic conditions that determine the vote. Individuals
follow their own political preferences determined by income - and income may be earned
by the individual herself/himself or by the spouse. In a more general household model
of voting behavior, the preferences of an individual may depend on the preferences of
the spouse. For instance through discussions in the household, information is shared and
political views can be adjusted. If the political views of both spouses nevertheless depend
on their individual income, the conclusions from this kind of model would be the same
as inserting both incomes directly into the individual utility function. The interpretation
will be slightly diﬀerent though. The impact of spouse income will work through the
impact that spouse income has on spouse political preferences - and the impact that
spouse political preferences has on individual political preferences.
5The probability of divorce could also enter the sharing weights of the household, like in a collective
model of household behavior (Chiappori, 1988). This would potentially give divorce a multiplier eﬀect
making individual income have an even larger impact.
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Empirical speciﬁcation
I estimate a linear regression model of voting behavior, where policy preferences for re-
distribution are represented by the vote cast in the last general election. The dependent
variable is a dummy for whether the individual voted Conservative or not, and the co-
eﬃcients can therefore be interpreted as the impact of the explanatory variable on the
probability of voting Conservative.
The reason for using the vote as representing the individuals preferences for redistri-
bution is an argument of revealed preferences. An answer to a survey question is not
binding and involves no cost to the individual, whereas the vote does6.
To estimate the role of individual vs household income, I estimate the model using
diﬀerent measures of income; in speciﬁcation (1) I use household income, in speciﬁcation
(2) I enter both individual and spouse income separately to see whether these have diﬀer-
ent impact. In speciﬁcation (3) I enter the maximum income and the minimum income of
the household separately to see whether the diﬀerential impact of individual and spouse
income is explained by which income is highest.
I use OLS-regression methods which gives the estimated impacts on the probability
for an average individual. I cluster the standard errors at the individual level.
The policy preferences of the individual is represented by this equation:
Conservativeit = α+β1ln Incomeit+β2Wealthit+β3Religionit+β4Regionit+β5Yeart+uit
(5)
I do not control for educational level of the individual because this is in itself a proxy
for permanent income. I have included education level as a robustness check however,
and the results are largely unchanged.
Wealthit is a dummy equal to one if the household owns its own house. This is a proxy
for wealth which I do not have information on.
I control for religious denomination (Anglican, Catholic, other Christian, with not
religious as reference category), region (East Midlands, East of England, North West
England, South East England, South West England, West Midlands, Yorkshire and the
Humber, Wales, Scotland, with North East England as the reference category) and year
of observation by including year ﬁxed eﬀects. This is mainly to control for important
factors that determine the vote that could potentially be correlated with income. I am
not able to control for everything that correlates with income, and the interpretation of the
coeﬃcients should therefore be wide. The impact of income on voting in my set-up may
be interpreted as how well individual voting ﬁts into the foundations of the median voter
model - namely to what degree individuals vote along the private economic dimension
6Voting preferences are correlated to the stated preferences for redistribution. Around 30% of the
Conservative and around 70% of the Labour voters answered agree or strongly agree to the statement
”Government should redistribute income from better-oﬀ” (see descriptives table 1).
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(to what extent demand for redistribution/public goods is correlated with the private
economic interests of individuals).
Data
I use the National Child Development Study (NCDS) and the British Cohort Study (BCS)
which are detailed survey data on two British cohorts born in 1958 and 1970. It is the
only data to my knowledge that has information on political voting behavior, household
income and individual income over the life-cycle7. There is lot of potential for studying
political attitudes in relation to childhood and current family environment. The BCS data
are not as representative of the life-cycle with information on both incomes and voting
behavior only in 1996 and 2000 when they were 26 and 30 years old. The BCS study, we
will therefore mostly use for robustness.
The British political system is well-suited for an analysis of economic voting. The two
biggest parties are Labour and the Conservatives, and the parties diﬀer from each other
on the socioeconomic dimension (Lijphart 1999). The government is formed by one party,
which may have a minority in Parliament. Labour and the Conservatives have long been
the only two ”real” alternatives 8, as representation is not proportional, but decided by
the winners of the constituencies. For robustness, we do the estimations without those
who voted Liberal Democrats and the results are largely unchanged.
I study the impact of partners income relative to own income, and therefore I only use
individuals who have a partner in my sample. I have not used the respondents who are
students, unemployed or sick/disabled because I do not observe their income, and setting
their income to zero would probably not be very representative. The men and women in
my sample are not married to eachother. The information on the partner is given by the
individual.
Housewives’ income are set equal to zero. I measure the impact of income, not hourly
wage, and the eﬀect will both be a wage and a labour supply eﬀect. I control for the
individual or the partner being a housewife with a dummy. This is mostly important
because it captures a clear non-linear eﬀect of income; those who are housewives are more
conservative on average, even though income is zero. One reason for this may be a smaller
demand for public services as they have chosen to do the work themselves, like taking
care of children and elderly.
Surveys have the problem of measurement error, and the most important measurement
error in this context is the error in income. In the literature on social mobility, Solon (1999)
7The data have not been used often for political economy analysis, to my knowledge only three times.
These are studying the eﬀect of growing up with a lone parent (Fluori 2004), the eﬀect of cognitive
ability and personality on voter turnout (Denny and Doyle 2008) and the attitudes of the underclass
(Buckingham 1999).
8This is true at least in my period of study - in the 2010 election, the Liberal Democrats won 57 seats
in the Parliament, with the result that they formed a coalition government with the Conservatives
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found that transitory income is closer to permanent income in the late thirties, beginning
of the forties. An average measure over several years also gives lower measurement error.
I therefore constructed a measure of mean income based on the observations when the
respondents are 33 and 41 and compare the baseline results to the results using this
measure.
I use the years 1981, 1991, 2000 and 2008 for the NCDS sample and the years 1996
and 2000 for the BCS sample. One source of measurement error is the fact that the last
election was not immediately preceding the questioning and may therefore be colored by
what they wish they voted in retrospect. The correlation between what the individual
said he/she voted at the last election and what they would vote tomorrow is 0.63, not too
high. Another source of bias is that income measured at the time of the survey may also
be diﬀerent from the income the respondent had at the time of the election. Measurement
error gives a potential downward bias to my results.
The descriptive statistics in table 1 (and tables 8, 9 and 10 in the appendix) show
that those who voted Conservative have on average higher own income and higher spouse
income. The share of women being housewives are however quite equal in both parties,
and also the share of women working part-time
Results
Income
Income has a large impact on voting behavior in all speciﬁcations in table 2. We see that
for men, those who have 1% higher household income, has a 0.079 percentage point higher
probability of voting Conservative. For women, the probability is 0.088 percentage point
higher.
When we investigate the separate eﬀects of own and spouse income, we see that women
vote more according to their husband’s income than their own, while the spouse income
is insigniﬁcant for men. The association between voting and own income is four times as
large for men than for women and without the inclusion of partner income, men would
seem artiﬁcially more prone to egotropic voting than women.
In model 3, we investigate whether it is the maximum income of the household that
is important - and we ﬁnd support for this, although there is a negative signiﬁcant eﬀect
of the lowest household income for men. From these estimations, we may conclude that
household income is at least a better predictor of voting behavior than own income - and
this is especially true for women. The political preferences of both men and women seem
to follow the ”representative income” of the family - the maximum income. It’s clear that
which spouse you have, and the spouse’s income, is important for your voting behavior.
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Table 1: Descriptives for Conservative and Labour voters in 1991
Conservative Labour All
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Net income 1518.2 510.8 990.5 420.5 1297.0 426.8
Partner income 331.7 1405.9 311.0 1162.6 326.9 1277.3
Household income 1615.9 1565.4 1165.4 1250.2 1442.4 1352.4
Wealth, own house 0.89 0.88 0.74 0.68 0.80 0.78
Married 0.74 0.78 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.72
Divorced/separated 0.089 0.11 0.090 0.13 0.096 0.13
Has children 0.64 0.73 0.62 0.80 0.61 0.75
Housewife 0.0033 0.28 0.0066 0.26 0.0039 0.27
Partner housewife 0.35 0.0012 0.32 0.0066 0.34 0.0036
Part-time 0.0050 0.27 0.014 0.31 0.0077 0.29
Partner part-time 0.28 0.0076 0.31 0.013 0.29 0.0098
Gov should redistribute 0.30 0.29 0.74 0.69 0.51 0.49
Religion
Anglican 0.31 0.45 0.20 0.29 0.24 0.36
Catholic 0.074 0.089 0.11 0.15 0.083 0.11
Other Christian 0.060 0.10 0.074 0.10 0.085 0.12
Not religious 0.55 0.35 0.61 0.44 0.57 0.40
Geographical area
East Midlands 0.090 0.073 0.085 0.060 0.081 0.064
East of England 0.045 0.044 0.026 0.035 0.034 0.040
North East England 0.035 0.042 0.11 0.096 0.064 0.061
North West England 0.088 0.090 0.13 0.14 0.10 0.11
South East England 0.37 0.38 0.21 0.21 0.30 0.31
South West England 0.10 0.10 0.047 0.053 0.087 0.090
West Midlands 0.11 0.097 0.095 0.080 0.095 0.087
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.071 0.072 0.12 0.11 0.092 0.091
Wales 0.042 0.044 0.066 0.075 0.055 0.055
Scotland 0.044 0.057 0.11 0.14 0.085 0.093
N 1809 2011 1524 1528 5605 5802
”Gov should redistribute” is the share answering agree or strongly agree to the statement ”Government
should redistribute income from better-oﬀ”.
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Table 2: The probability of voting Conservative - eﬀect of diﬀerent speciﬁcations of in-
come, men and women
Men Women Men Women Men Women




Partner income -0.0090 0.051***
(0.0088) (0.011)
Maximum inc in hh 0.084*** 0.070***
(0.013) (0.011)
Minimum inc in hh -0.015* 0.0092
(0.0090) (0.0088)
Wealth, own house 0.093*** 0.11*** 0.097*** 0.12*** 0.093*** 0.12***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Housewife -0.024 0.053*** 0.45*** 0.12** -0.13 0.075
(0.083) (0.014) (0.13) (0.054) (0.100) (0.053)
Partner housewife 0.039*** 0.054 -0.049 0.34*** -0.081 0.15
(0.014) (0.094) (0.053) (0.11) (0.054) (0.099)
N 7055 7615 7056 7622 7056 7622
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
OLS estimations with individual-clustered standard errors. Dependent variable is a dummy=1 if individ-
ual voted Conservative at the last general election. All incomes are measured in logs. Control variables
are three religion dummies, nine regional dummies and year ﬁxed-eﬀects.
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This has not been a concern in political economy, with the exception of Edlund and Pande
(2002) who analyse the importance of divorce rates on political voting behavior.
There is a clear non-linearity in the association between voting and income. Female
housewives are more conservative on average, although their income is zero. This may
be explained by ”family values” of the Conservative party. The Conservatives have tra-
ditionally wished for families to have larger responsibility for children and elderly e.g,
compared to the left who are relatively more in favor of the state doing more of these
tasks (like kindergartens, elderly care etc). Even though households have lower income
due to the wife being a housewife, they also demand less public services because they can
do some of the tasks themselves.
I also did the estimations using the measure of permanent income (appendix, table
13), and the pattern is even clearer here. Household income has the highest explanatory
power for women, or the maximum income in the household. Individual or maximum
income has the highest explanatory power for men. For robustness, I checked whether
the results were diﬀerent if I only used the income at age 41 as a measure of permanent
income (because there are around 27% women who are housewives at age 33 and only
13% at age 41), but this only gave lower coeﬃcients.
For robustness, I did the estimations only for those working full-time, and the results
are similar (see appendix, table 11). An important diﬀerence is that own income is more
important for full-time working women than their spouse income, but spouse income is
still signiﬁcant. I also did the estimations without those who voted Liberal Democrats
(see appendix, table 12), because comparing Conservative voters to only Labour voters
might give other results. These estimations give similar results, and the reason is probably
the few observations for Liberal Democrats.
Highest and lowest income in the household
We divide the individuals into separate groups according to their relative economic po-
sition in the household; whether they earn more than half the household income, less
than half or in the range 0.3-0.7 of the household income (according to our measure of
permanent income: mean income over the ages 33 and 41). We see that the apparent
gender diﬀerence in economic voting behavior is partly due to the gender diﬀerence in
economic position. For women earning more than half the household income, only own
income is signiﬁcant, and of nearly the same size as for men (similar to the larger eﬀect
of own income for women who work fulltime).
For men earning less than a half, however, own income is still what matters most to
him. Political preferences of men seem to be formed on the basis of own income, regardless
of the wife’s economic position. The sample of men earning less than their wife is however
small and the conclusion on this point should not be too strong.
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For robustness, I did the same with the measure of permanent income (table 14 in
appendix). I ﬁnd that for women own income has an even clearer explanatory power both
in the group that earn more than the husband, but is important also in the group that
earns in the range 0.3-0.7 of the household income.
The results are connected to the level of wages for men and women in the diﬀerent
groups. The income is largely the same for men in all groups; men earning less than their
wife earns as much as 78% the wages of men who earn more than his wife. For women this
is diﬀerent. Women earning less than their husband earn on average 39% of the wages of
women who earn more than their husband. The total household income in families where
the wife earns most is therefore higher than the average. I did the estimations for diﬀerent
individual income deciles and found that the eﬀect of individual income is largest in the
middle income deciles, and in the higher income deciles. There are more women in the
lower income deciles, relative to men, where income has small impact on voting behavior
(having a relatively higher income in the lowest income deciles still means the individual
has low income relative to the mean - and a higher relative income within this group will
not mean more conservative preferences).
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Over the life-cycle
In table 4 I present results from the estimation of the impact of income in every year of
observation, to see if income has a larger impact in some years than others. I ﬁnd that
income has the largest impact for men when they are 33 and 41, for women when they
are 23, but also 33 and 41. We also see the signs of the wife’s income being important for
men at the age of 23.
The larger impact in some years might in part be variations over the life-cycle in the
importance of economic factors, but could also be an indication of the role of transitory
vs permanent income. When we check the life-cycle variation in the importance of our
measure of permanent income (mean income over the ages 33 and 41) in table 5, we ﬁnd
that the eﬀect of income is very stable over the life-cycle with a quite large estimate of
the impact of income (1% higher income give 0.1 percentage point higher probability of
voting Conservative for men).
For women, the eﬀect of both own and husband’s permanent income is less stable over
the life-cycle, indicating a larger importance of transitory income for women relative to
men. For robustness, I also constructed a measure of permanent income based on all years.
Using this gave the same pattern, but smaller coeﬃcients, underlining the importance of
when we measure income for the representability of the measure.
Divorce risk
In the theoretical set-up, the role of individual income for voting behavior is inﬂuenced by
the probability of divorce (p in equation 4). A higher probability of divorce will give an
increased impact of individual relative to spouse income. As women have lower average
incomes than men, a higher risk of divorce will make women less conservative compared
to men. Edlund and Pande (2002) and Edlund et al. (2005) ﬁnd as mentioned that the
growing political gender gap in the US and Europe over the last decades can be explained
by increasing aggregate divorce rates. With panel-data structure, I have the opportunity
to investigate the eﬀect of individual divorce risk on individual voting behavior.
I include a dummy for being divorced next period to capture the eﬀect of perceived
increased divorce risk on voting behavior. The assumption is that individuals who divorce
next period have some foresight of their marriage having a relatively higher probability
of divorce. I also interact own income and spouse income with the divorce-dummy to
see whether own income is weighted relatively more if the individual has a higher risk of
divorce. The eﬀects of divorce risk should be interpreted with caution, however, because
I have not done anything to control for the selection of individuals who divorce and there
might also be biases due to a small sample of individuals who divorce (137 women and 126
men, 6.5% of the sample). Nevertheless, it might give some indication of the relevance of
individual divorce risk.
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Table 4: The probability of voting Conservative - for each year of observation separately,
men and women
Age 23 Age 33 Age 42 Age 50
Panel A: Men
Income 0.024 0.14*** 0.066*** 0.040
(0.048) (0.029) (0.018) (0.026)
Partner income 0.066 0.0037 -0.013 -0.019
(0.043) (0.018) (0.013) (0.018)
Wealth, own house 0.084*** 0.090*** 0.077** 0.10*
(0.029) (0.033) (0.033) (0.058)
Housewife -0.087 0.79** 0.37** 0.50**
(0.29) (0.31) (0.16) (0.24)
Partner housewife 0.31 0.032 -0.057 -0.084
(0.23) (0.11) (0.087) (0.13)
N 895 1983 2140 1232
Panel B: Women
Income 0.085*** 0.040** 0.031** -0.0051
(0.033) (0.017) (0.013) (0.023)
Partner income 0.076* 0.078*** 0.046*** 0.034*
(0.043) (0.021) (0.013) (0.018)
Wealth, own house 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.10*** -0.010
(0.027) (0.031) (0.029) (0.059)
Housewife 0.43** 0.26** 0.28*** 0.036
(0.17) (0.10) (0.089) (0.17)
Partner housewife 0.31* 0.22* 0.60***
(0.19) (0.13) (0.21)
N 1191 2113 2357 1167
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
OLS estimations with individual-clustered standard errors. Dependent variable is a dummy=1 if individ-
ual voted Conservative at the last general election. All incomes are measured in logs. Control variables
are three religion dummies, nine regional dummies and year ﬁxed-eﬀects.
120
How husbands and wives vote
Table 5: The probability of voting Conservative - for each year of observation separately
using the mean of the income at age 33 and 41 as a measure of permanent income
Age 23 Age 33 Age 42 Age 50
Panel A: Men
Income, permanent 0.085*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.020) (0.031)
Partnerinc, permanent 0.0019 -0.0039 -0.0027 -0.010
(0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0074) (0.0095)
Wealth, own house 0.081*** 0.10*** 0.060* 0.082
(0.028) (0.032) (0.033) (0.058)
Housewife -0.17*** 0.048 0.16 0.23
(0.058) (0.28) (0.12) (0.14)
Partner housewife -0.028 -0.0013 0.0089 0.0077
(0.029) (0.031) (0.043) (0.051)
N 895 1983 2140 1232
Panel B: Women
Income, permanent 0.0017 0.0020 0.013* 0.020*
(0.0073) (0.0065) (0.0077) (0.012)
Partnerinc, permanent 0.024 0.073*** 0.061*** 0.050***
(0.026) (0.019) (0.014) (0.019)
Wealth, own house 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.099*** -0.025
(0.025) (0.031) (0.029) (0.058)
Housewife -0.019 0.019 0.13*** 0.13**
(0.027) (0.032) (0.041) (0.061)
Partner housewife 0 0.21 0.26* 0.45***
(.) (0.19) (0.14) (0.17)
N 1191 2113 2357 1167
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
OLS estimations with individual-clustered standard errors. Dependent variable is a dummy=1 if individ-
ual voted Conservative at the last general election. All incomes are measured in logs. Control variables
are three religion dummies, nine regional dummies and year ﬁxed-eﬀects.
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The eﬀect of divorce is not signiﬁcant when I use all years of observation, the only
year divorce is signiﬁcant is in 1999 when the individuals are 42 years old. This is also the
ﬁrst year in my sample where women are relatively less conservative than men. British
women have traditionally been more conservative than British men, but less so in the
1990s compared to 1980s (Norrander and Wilcox, 2008). The modern gender gap in
voting is therefore less visible in Britain, and may be a reason why my results are not
signiﬁcant for all years.
The results for 1999 are shown in table 6. In the two ﬁrst columns, I have not interacted
the income and divorce-variable, and show the average impact of divorce-risk on voting
behavior. The impact is 2 percentage point lower probability of voting Conservative for
women, and 1.5 percentage point lower probability for men, but the average results are
not signiﬁcant.
In column 3 and 4, I interact income and risk of divorce, and the results are big and
signiﬁcant. There are large interaction eﬀects of income and divorce, showing that average
eﬀects of each variable can hide great heterogeneity. When I interact income and risk of
divorce, we see that the eﬀect of divorce is negative for women. With average income
(ln income = 5.61), the eﬀect is around 22 percentage points lower probability of voting
Conservative. The higher is the income for women, the less negative impact has divorce
(the coeﬃcient on the interaction is positive). The same coeﬃcient can be interpreted as
an increased importance of own income with higher individual divorce-risk. The eﬀects
are in line with what we would expect from the theoretical framework.
For men, the higher divorce-risk gives a positive eﬀect on Conservative voting. With
average income (ln income = 7.25), the eﬀect is around 12.5 percentage points higher
probability of voting Conservative. The average impact of divorce on men’s and women’s
voting behavior is consistent with the fact that men have higher average incomes relative
to women. This would isolated make women relatively worse of because of a divorce,
and men relatively better oﬀ. For men with higher incomes, divorce has smaller eﬀect on
conservative voting relative to men with lower incomes (the interaction is negative). This
might be connected to the result that income has smaller impact on voting behavior for
high-income individuals generally.
Younger cohort - the British Cohort Study-sample
The British Cohort Study (BCS) sample born in 1970 shows a very similar pattern as the
National Child Development Study (NCDS) sample (table 7). Partner income is more
important for women than own income. This is however not true for the fulltime-working
women who vote according to their own income (see appendix table 15). When we divide
according to the economic position in the family, the groups with men earning least and
the women earning most are too small to get any signiﬁcant results (see appendix table
16). Women who earn least in this cohort also votes according to their husbands income.
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Table 6: The probability of voting Conservative - income variables interacted with a
dummy for divorce next period. Year of observation is 1999
Men Women Men Women
Divorce next period -0.015 -0.020 0.85** -0.45***
(0.041) (0.038) (0.40) (0.17)
Ln net income 0.068*** 0.036*** 0.077*** 0.034**
(0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.014)
Ln netinc*divorce -0.10* 0.041**
(0.053) (0.017)
Ln partner income -0.0095 0.039*** -0.0086 0.037***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Ln partnerinc*divorce -0.023 0.027
(0.016) (0.022)
Wealth, own house 0.066* 0.081** 0.064 0.080**
(0.038) (0.034) (0.039) (0.034)
Housewife 0.39** 0.33*** 0.45*** 0.33***
(0.18) (0.094) (0.17) (0.094)
Partner housewife -0.040 0.14 -0.044 0.17
(0.094) (0.14) (0.094) (0.14)
N 1924 2098 1924 2098
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
OLS estimations with individual-clustered standard errors. Dependent variable is a dummy=1 if individ-
ual voted Conservative at the last general election. All incomes are measured in logs. Control variables
are three religion dummies, nine regional dummies and year ﬁxed-eﬀects.
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Table 7: BCS sample: The probability of voting Conservative - for men and women
according to their economic position in the family
Men Women Men Women Men Women




Partner income 0.00080 0.039***
(0.011) (0.0099)
Maximum inc in hh 0.043*** 0.045***
(0.014) (0.0099)
Minimum inc in hh -0.0065 0.00097
(0.011) (0.0085)
Wealth, own house 0.078*** 0.070*** 0.081*** 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.070***
(0.022) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.022) (0.017)
Housewife 0.055 0.062*** 0.21 0.048 0.032 0.049
(0.11) (0.018) (0.15) (0.064) (0.10) (0.057)
Partner housewife 0.035* 0.13 0.019 0.30*** -0.025 0.15*
(0.021) (0.10) (0.075) (0.10) (0.071) (0.082)
N 3280 4186 3284 4201 3284 4201
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
OLS estimations with individual-clustered standard errors. Dependent variable is a dummy=1 if individ-
ual voted Conservative at the last general election. All incomes are measured in logs. Control variables
are three religion dummies, nine regional dummies and year ﬁxed-eﬀects.
When we move to the group where they earn in the range 0.3-07, we see that already
here, women vote according to own income. The sample is not big enough, or the cohorts
many enough to say anything about a trend, though. The results from the younger are
rather reassuring in that there was not anything particular about the 1958 cohort.
Conclusion
Individual income and household income has a very diﬀerent impact on voting behavior
for men and women. Women on average earn less than their husband, and also vote on
average more according to their husbands income than their own, or the total household
income (which is closer to their husbands individual income than their own). The average
pattern of voting behavior is however closely related to women’s economic position in the
household. If the woman earns more than her husband, she votes according to her own in-
come. The same is true if she works full-time. If the wife is economically independent/has
an income that is a larger part of the household economy, she votes more independently
as well.
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For men, voting behavior does not vary with their economic position in the family.
Men vote according to their own income even though they earn less than their wife, and
there is no signiﬁcant impact of the wife’s income in any of the estimated speciﬁcations.
My results show that the household is important for the individual voting behavior,
especially for women. Including the spouse in political economy models may give inter-
esting implications and dynamics in the demand for redistribution in a society. There are
major societal changes in female labour force participation and divorce rates around the
world, and the classic models of voting behavior will not capture fully the eﬀect of these
changes on political preferences in the society without including the household.
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Table 8: Descriptives for Conservative and Labour voters in 1981
Conservative Labour All
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Net income 365.6 219.8 356.2 173.6 359.1 186.0
Partner income 177.0 437.1 138.0 398.1 145.7 409.1
Household income 423.9 444.1 406.3 414.3 413.9 422.4
Wealth, own house 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.35 0.22 0.36
Married 0.30 0.52 0.37 0.58 0.35 0.54
Divorced/separated 0.014 0.031 0.022 0.049 0.023 0.049
Has children 0.097 0.22 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.33
Housewife 0 0.17 0.00054 0.27 0.00064 0.24
Partner housewife 0.092 0 0.14 0 0.14 0
Part-time 0.0053 0.038 0.0038 0.062 0.0061 0.055
Partner part-time 0.024 0.00062 0.036 0.0023 0.034 0.0019
Religion
Anglican 0.37 0.49 0.25 0.36 0.28 0.40
Catholic 0.094 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.099 0.12
Other Christian 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.14
Not religious 0.42 0.26 0.49 0.33 0.49 0.32
Geographical area
East Midlands 0.083 0.072 0.074 0.060 0.072 0.068
East of England 0.033 0.039 0.029 0.031 0.033 0.034
North East England 0.044 0.043 0.088 0.088 0.062 0.064
North West England 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.12
South East England 0.38 0.38 0.26 0.24 0.31 0.31
South West England 0.088 0.097 0.044 0.049 0.077 0.078
West Midlands 0.097 0.098 0.11 0.091 0.097 0.094
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.074 0.070 0.10 0.10 0.090 0.086
Wales 0.045 0.036 0.062 0.073 0.054 0.052
Scotland 0.046 0.059 0.12 0.12 0.096 0.10
N 1505 1625 1851 1725 6267 6270
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Table 9: Descriptives for Conservative and Labour voters in 1999
Conservative Labour All
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Net income 2113.7 844.9 1914.0 703.7 1950.6 703.7
Partner income 746.1 2224.3 748.7 1682.4 699.0 1682.4
Household income 2410.8 2496.6 2321.0 1915.5 2270.8 1915.5
Wealth, own house 0.90 0.92 0.81 0.78 0.82 0.78
Married 0.78 0.78 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.70
Divorced/separated 0.072 0.081 0.098 0.12 0.093 0.12
Has children 0.73 0.78 0.72 0.82 0.70 0.82
Housewife 0.0050 0.14 0.0094 0.11 0.0080 0.11
Partner housewife 0.19 0.0047 0.16 0.0094 0.18 0.0094
Part-time 0.0067 0.30 0.015 0.33 0.015 0.33
Partner part-time 0.36 0.0056 0.37 0.019 0.35 0.019
Gov should redistribute 0.22 0.24 0.57 0.54 0.45 0.54
Religion
Anglican 0.52 0.55 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.42
Catholic 0.090 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.16
Other Christian 0.23 0.25 0.21 0.25 0.23 0.25
Not religious 0.14 0.078 0.21 0.15 0.20 0.15
Geographical area
East Midlands 0.086 0.071 0.080 0.074 0.080 0.074
East of England 0.050 0.049 0.038 0.038 0.040 0.038
North East England 0.030 0.040 0.087 0.078 0.062 0.078
North West England 0.097 0.087 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12
South East England 0.37 0.38 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.26
South West England 0.11 0.10 0.067 0.073 0.094 0.073
West Midlands 0.11 0.095 0.092 0.094 0.093 0.094
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.064 0.095 0.099 0.088 0.087 0.088
Wales 0.043 0.031 0.062 0.070 0.056 0.070
Scotland 0.044 0.050 0.094 0.11 0.094 0.11
N 1195 1244 2224 2387 5626 2387
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Table 10: Descriptives for Conservative and Labour voters in 2008
Conservative Labour All
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Net income 2710.0 1127.5 2358.0 1236.1 2333.0 1123.2
Partner income 1041.6 2622.3 1062.4 2159.3 1024.0 2250.8
Household income 3084.8 2694.9 2905.3 2534.1 2781.3 2447.1
Wealth, own house 0.91 0.91 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.84
Married 0.78 0.75 0.71 0.68 0.69 0.68
Divorced/separated 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.17 0.20
Has children 0.75 0.79 0.72 0.81 0.72 0.81
Housewife 0.0075 0.11 0.012 0.081 0.0089 0.095
Partner housewife 0.14 0.0099 0.12 0.0071 0.13 0.0080
Part-time 0.018 0.28 0.016 0.26 0.021 0.28
Partner part-time 0.31 0.026 0.28 0.044 0.30 0.029
Religion
Anglican 0.59 0.56 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.48
Catholic 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.15
Other Christian 0.081 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.12
Not religious 0.19 0.20 0.29 0.22 0.26 0.23
Geographical area
East Midlands 0.084 0.081 0.095 0.074 0.084 0.069
East of England 0.052 0.048 0.043 0.032 0.043 0.040
North East England 0.032 0.039 0.091 0.080 0.060 0.060
North West England 0.075 0.079 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.11
South East England 0.38 0.40 0.24 0.26 0.29 0.30
South West England 0.12 0.11 0.069 0.075 0.095 0.098
West Midlands 0.11 0.095 0.093 0.091 0.093 0.091
Yorkshire and the Humber 0.072 0.074 0.093 0.089 0.087 0.088
Wales 0.041 0.031 0.059 0.060 0.056 0.054
Scotland 0.035 0.043 0.10 0.11 0.094 0.096
N 1205 1210 1426 1445 4822 4968
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Table 11: The probability of voting Conservative - sample is fulltime-workers
Men Women Men Women Men Women




Partner income -0.000085 0.024**
(0.0024) (0.011)
Maximum inc in hh 0.079*** 0.082***
(0.016) (0.019)
Minimum inc in hh -0.00090 0.0037
(0.0024) (0.011)
Wealth, own house 0.090*** 0.068*** 0.089*** 0.072*** 0.090*** 0.067***
(0.016) (0.025) (0.018) (0.025) (0.018) (0.025)
N 7058 3374 4919 3374 4919 3374
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
OLS estimations with individual-clustered standard errors. Dependent variable is a dummy=1 if individ-
ual voted Conservative at the last general election. All incomes are measured in logs. Control variables
are three religion dummies, nine regional dummies and year ﬁxed-eﬀects.
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Table 12: The probability of voting Conservative - sample is without individuals voting
Liberal Democrats
Men Women Men Women Men Women




Partner income 0.0034 0.062***
(0.0095) (0.013)
Maximum inc in hh 0.099*** 0.079***
(0.015) (0.012)
Minimum inc in hh -0.0047 0.0012
(0.0097) (0.0097)
Wealth, own house 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.15***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)
Housewife 0.0045 0.064*** 0.52*** 0.051 -0.044 0.035
(0.098) (0.014) (0.14) (0.059) (0.11) (0.058)
Partner housewife 0.050*** 0.034 0.030 0.39*** -0.017 0.094
(0.015) (0.10) (0.057) (0.13) (0.058) (0.11)
N 6118 6481 6119 6487 6119 6487
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
OLS estimations with individual-clustered standard errors. Dependent variable is a dummy=1 if individ-
ual voted Conservative at the last general election. All incomes are measured in logs. Control variables
are three religion dummies, nine regional dummies and year ﬁxed-eﬀects.
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Table 13: The probability of voting Conservative - using measure of permanent income
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Hh income, perm 0.069*** 0.073***
(0.014) (0.012)
Income, permanent 0.11*** 0.0027
(0.016) (0.0040)
Partner inc, permanent -0.0035 0.061***
(0.0038) (0.011)
Max income, perm 0.11*** 0.082***
(0.018) (0.014)
Min income, perm -0.0044 0.00090
(0.0038) (0.0040)
Wealth, own house 0.097*** 0.12*** 0.088*** 0.12*** 0.089*** 0.11***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017)
Housewife -0.040 0.040*** 0.10 0.035** 0.0079 0.032*
(0.086) (0.014) (0.092) (0.017) (0.090) (0.017)
Partner housewife 0.023 -0.0017 -0.0020 0.29*** -0.00091 0.085
(0.014) (0.089) (0.017) (0.11) (0.017) (0.091)
N 6713 7305 6250 6828 6250 6828
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
OLS estimations with individual-clustered standard errors. Dependent variable is a dummy=1 if individ-
ual voted Conservative at the last general election. All incomes are measured in logs. Control variables
are three religion dummies, nine regional dummies and year ﬁxed-eﬀects.
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Table 15: BCS sample: The probability of voting Conservative - sample is fulltime-workers
Men Women Men Women Men Women




Partner income -0.0022 0.0013
(0.0030) (0.013)
Maximum inc in hh 0.043** 0.048**
(0.019) (0.023)
Minimum inc in hh -0.0031 -0.0011
(0.0031) (0.013)
Wealth, own house 0.076*** 0.045 0.075*** 0.046* 0.071*** 0.046*
(0.022) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028)
N 3280 1820 2369 1820 2369 1820
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
OLS estimations with individual-clustered standard errors. Dependent variable is a dummy=1 if individ-
ual voted Conservative at the last general election. All incomes are measured in logs. Control variables
are three religion dummies, nine regional dummies and year ﬁxed-eﬀects.
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